Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Islam. Show all posts

Thursday, March 22, 2012

The Basis of Religious Tolerance...or its Lack


درست الفرق الإسلامية (المذاهب السنية والشيعية ومذاهب الخوارج الأربعة وأهمها الإباضية والدروز والعلويين - وبالذات النصيرية - والقرامطة والحشاشين) وكل المذاهب المسيحية (بما فيها ما يعده مسيحيو العالم اليوم "هرطقة" مثل المسيحية الأريوسية والنسطورية) وكل الأديان والمعتقدات الأخري (البرهمية ... البوذية ... الطاوية ... إلخ) ... كما درست اليهودية بتعمق وعندي ولع باليهود القرائين (اليهود الربانيون يؤمنون بكل أسفار ما يسميه المسيحيون بكتاب العهد القديم وكذلك بكتابي "المشنة والجمارة" اللذين يطلق عليهما معا "التلمود" ... أما اليهود القراؤن ، فلا يؤمنون بالتلمود ولا يؤمنون إلا بالأسفار الخمسة الأولي من العهد القديم .... وأنا كذلك أحب لغة "المزامير" وطبيعتها الشعرية ... وهذه الرحلة مع المعرفة هي ما جعلتني أتعجب من "التعالي" على الآخر الديني ... فالقبطي "قبطي" لأنه ولد لوالدين قبطيين ... وأنا مسلم ، لأنني ولدت فى أسرة مسلمة ... وهكذا ، فليس لأحد منا أي حق فى التعالي على "الآخر" الديني .... سيما أن معظم الناس يعرفون عن دينهم وعن المعتقدات الأخري "أقل القليل" !! أليس كذلك ؟ طارق حجي ...

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

The Proliferation of Militant Islam: Who Is Responsible?










In the years between 1967 and 1973, while I was studying towards a degree in law and a Masters in general and comparative law, I acquired a rudimentary knowledge of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Later, while teaching at universities abroad, I set out to develop a wider knowledge of the subject.  In the course of a journey extending over twenty years, I developed a strong aversion for those I call “worshippers of the word” and “prisoners of tradition”, and a profound admiration for the proponents of reason, most notably, of course, Ibn Rushd (Averoess), whose championship of the primacy of reason was adopted by Europe and rejected by the Muslim world. Europe’s gain was our loss: in turning our backs on Ibn Rushd, we lost a historic opportunity for development. A close reading of all Ibn Taymeya’s works, as well as the works of his disciples, from Ibn Qaiym Al-Juzeya to Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab at the end of the eighteenth century, only deepened my aversion towards this trend and my admiration for the Mu’tazalites, who emphasized human responsibility in matters of religion, and for liberal thinkers who chose the path of reason over that of dogma, like Ibn Sinna (Avicenna), Al-Farabi and the leading exponent of this school, Ibn Rushd.


I spent years trying to understand why the Muslims had chosen to follow the line advocated by Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, the proponent of orthodoxy and tradition for whom knowledge meant only knowledge of religion and who cancelled the role of the mind altogether by denying the possibility of acquiring knowledge through intuition, over the line advocated by Ibn Rushd, who upheld the primacy of reason and sowed the seeds of a renaissance we chose not to reap. Why were Al-Ghazali’s ideas so readily accepted while Ibn Rushd’s were rejected? I believe the answer to this paradox can be summed up in one word: despotism. At a time despotism in our part of the world was at its height, it is not surprising that Muslim rulers should have found Al-Ghazali’s ideas more appealing than those of Ibn Rushd. 


The orthodox line was also more appealing to their subjects who, under the yoke of tyranny, found it safer and less demanding to go along with the views of those who required nothing more from them than a suspension of their critical faculties. In Europe, where the forces of enlightenment were locked in a confrontation with the clericalism that stifled intellectual initiative and rational thought, despotism was in retreat. This explains why, in the thirteenth century, a prestigious centre of learning like the University of Paris supported the ideas of the Arab Muslim Ibn Rushd over those of the European Christian Thomas Aquinas, the scholastic philosopher famous for his two-swords doctrine.

Meanwhile, the Muslim world continued to be ruled by despots who brooked no challenge to their authority and an equally despotic religious establishment which decried the use of reason and demanded blind adherence to the authority of tradition. Closely linked as to methods, motivations and goals, these two factors created an atmosphere that was inimical to the unhindered pursuit of knowledge. Still, things were not only either black or white. True, the Muslims lost an historic opportunity to use Ibn Rushd’s ideas as a springboard that could have placed them on a path similar to the one which took Europe from the obscurantist thinking of the thirteenth century to the vigorous intellectual climate which encourages debate, free thinking, general freedoms and creativity in literature, art and science. But it is also true that Muslims have known two “Islams” as it were; one that can be described as the Turkish-Egyptian model and one as the Bedouin model. While the former cannot claim to have attained the level of enlightenment, progressive thinking and freedom that characterizes the ideas of Ibn Rushd, it was nevertheless a gentle and tolerant Islam that could and did coexist with others. Indeed, non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed more protection that any other minority living anywhere else in the world at the time. Under the Ottomans, Christians of the Levant and Jews in Arab countries lived in conditions very similar to the ones in which the Muslim subjects of the empire were living. Even when they were persecuted by certain rulers, like Al-Hakem bi Amr Allah, it was part of a general policy that made no distinction between non-Muslims and Muslims. And although this model of Islam can in no way be described as secular, it adopted an enlightened approach to religion, dealing with it as a system of spiritual beliefs rather than as a system that ruled all aspects of life and governed the affairs of society.


Concurrently, an altogether different model of Islam was taking shape among geographically isolated communities living far from coastlines and hence from exposure to the outside world. Their insularity provided an ideal breeding ground for the ideas of Ibn Taymema, Ibn Qaym Al-Juzeya and, towards the end of the eighteenth century, those of Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab. A collision between the two models of Islam was inevitable, and, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, they confronted one another on the field of battle. Under the command of Mohamed Ali’s son, Tousson, then of his other son, Ibrahim, arguably the greatest of the Egyptian ruler’s sons, the Egyptian army, and with it, the more enlightened Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam, emerged victorious.

But the winds of change were blowing throughout the region, and the years that followed were not kind to Turkey and Egypt. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I brought an end to Turkey’s ascendancy, while Egypt’s influence receded as its economy and educational system declined. Meanwhile, the proponents of the model of Islam which demanded a strict adherence to the letter of scripture and slammed the door shut in the face of rationality, suddenly found themselves in control of vast wealth unprecedented in history. This gave them an enormous edge over their moderate rivals and allowed them to extend their influence into the traditional strongholds of the Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam, where they waged a systematic campaign to co-opt establishment personalities and institutions. The success of this campaign found its most salient expression in the emergence of fanatical movements like the Taliban, who interpreted the doctrines of religion on the basis of tradition alone and imposed a scholastic, doctrinal brand of Islam that left no room for the exercise of reason. This sorry state of affairs could have been avoided if the majority of Muslims had supported Ibn Rushd or if conditions had not forced the retreat of the Turkish-Egyptian model.

In numerous lectures I gave in Europe and America, I tried to familiarize people with what I call Egyptian Islam which, until the nineteen forties, stood as a unique example of tolerance and flexibility. Noted for its acceptance of the Other, it was not pathologically obsessed with the fine print of scripture. While recognizing the divine character of the prophetically revealed laws, it also recognized that some of their provisions were formulated in the context of a different time, place and circumstances. Thus divinity was reserved for religion and did not extend to how mortals understood or chose to interpret its strictures. It was tacitly understood that there is a subjective dimension to the interpretation of any text, and that interpretation is necessarily coloured by the interpreter’s cultural formation, knowledge and intellectual abilities.

The voices now raised in the West in general and in the United States in particular to warn against the menace of “militant Islam” would do well to ask themselves a number of important questions:

- Who shut their eyes for many years to a general climate which allowed the militant model of Islam to spread unchecked and forced the civilized, humanistic Turkish-Egyptian model to retreat in disarray as economic conditions and educational institutions declined, leaving the way open to an invasion by the militant model? Who turned a blind eye to these developments for close to thirty years and are today bemoaning the way things have turned out?


- Who in the nineteen fifties and perhaps even earlier invented the dangerous game of using political Islam to create a strategic balance with socialism? (In the seventies, Egypt played the same game with disastrous consequences.)


- Has the West only now realized that there is no room for freedom, democracy, human rights, women’s rights or civil rights in the militant model of Islam? Did it really believe this model to be a shining example of these noble humanistic values in the nineteen sixties, seventies and eighties?


- Why is the dossier of the honeymoon between the United States and the Afghan mujahedeen not being opened? Or, for that matter, the chapter of the close links which political Islam in pre-revolutionary Iran enjoyed with the West, particularly France? And, before that, the relations between political Islam in Egypt and Britain, the occupying power at the time, particularly during the two terms of the Mohamed Mahmoud government (1928 and 1938)?

The critical mind, which is the pride of civilized humanity, imposes an obligation on all of us to answer those questions. It also requires all parties to assume a share of the responsibility for what happened and is continuing to happen. It requires us, further, to look closely into the two models of Islam referred to in this article and ask ourselves which is more capable of joining the march of civilization and living in harmony with the requirements of the age, without abandoning the positive features of our cultural specificity. 


Is it the model engendered by the school of traditionalists, victims of their geographical isolation behind high sand dunes, or the moderate, tolerant, liberal Turkish-Egyptian model? Better still, could we adopt the enlightened model of Ibn Rushd, which helped Western civilization move out of the Dark Ages into the Enlightenment at a time we chose to adopt the thinking of his opponents, thereby allowing ourselves to fall prey to a culture which favours superstition, myths, ignorance and a rabid militancy over education, work, development and brotherhood? 




One may read the full article (Islam Between Copying & Thinking) here.

Friday, January 13, 2012

Thoughts from a fossilized mind....


خواطر عن العقل الأحفوري ... بقلم : طارق حجي ولعت (منذ دراستي للشريعة الإسلامية بشكل معمق ضمن مواد الماجيستير فى القانون منذ أربعين سنة بالتحديد ) بدراسة الفقه الإسلامي . وهو عمل بشري محض صاغ مؤسسه المعروف بالأمام الأعظم أبي حنيفة النعمان تعريفا رائعا له بأنه علم إستنباط الأحكام العملية من أدلتها الشرعية. ولم أكتف بدراسة شاملة ومعمقة للفقه الحنفي والمالكي والشافعي والحنبلي وفقه مذاهب أخري سنية اندثرت مثل فقه الإمام الليث وأبي جعفر الطبري ، وإنما امتد بحثي لسائر فقه الشيعة ، واهمه فقه جعفر الصادق (وهو ابن محمد الباقر بن علي زين العابدين بن الحسين بن علي بن ابي طالب) ، كما شغفت (من باب الفضول ليس إلا) بفقه مذاهب الخوارج الأربعة ، وأهمها فقه الإباضية وفقه الأزارقة ... كما عرجت على موضوع هام فى التاريخ الإسلامي ، وهو موضوع "الفرق" ... ولم اعجب بفرقة كما اعجبت بالمعتزلة ومن إنبثق عنهم (كالزمخشري فى التفسير والجاحظ فى الأدب ... (وسحرني عقل غيلان الدمشقي الذى كان ينكر فكرة القدر ، ويعتبرها نافية لمسئولية الانسان عن اعماله الخيرة والسيئة ... وسأكتب فى يوم من الأيام عن رحلتي فى هذه العوالم والتى بدأت فى السبعينات بسبب إفتتانى بمؤلفات العلامة المصري محمود اسماعيل الرزاق بوجه عام ، وكتاباته الفذة عن الخوارج والقرامطة . ولكنني أكتفي فى هذا المقال بعدد من الملاحظات والأسئلة الملحة . عاش فقهاء المذاهب السنية الأربعة الكبري (أبو حنيفة ومالك ومحمد بن ادريس الشافعي واحمد بن حنبل) ما بين سنة 70 هجرية وسنة 220 هجرية (690 - 840 ميلادية) . ومن الغرائب والعجائب ان الاول كان اكثر تحررا من الثاني ، وان الثاني كان اكثر تحررا من الثالث ، وان الثالث كان اكثر تحررا من الرابع ... وان الرابع كان اكثرهم محافظة وانعدام حرية عقلية امام النص واكثرهم نقلا واقلهم عقلا ! وسأعطي مثالا واحدا : فبينما سوغ ابو حنيفة رفض الفقيه لتأسيس الأحكام على الأحاديث التى تسمى أخبار أحاد" ، فإن مذهب الرابع (احمد بن حنبل ، واشهر شراحه ابن تيمية وابن قيم الجوزية والداعية الذى سار على نهجهم محمد بن عبدالوهاب الذى تنسب له الوهابية) قام كله (او جله) على اخبار الأحاد ! .... ومن ملاحظاتي أيضا ، أن المحافظين فى التاريخ الإسلامي اتسموا دائما بإنتقائية فيما يقدمونه لطلاب العلم ! فاليوم (وبسببهم) يظن كل المسلمين ان كبار العقول المسلمة آمنت دائما بالقضاء والقدر ، وهو قول غير صحيح ، فهناك عقول مسلمة جبارة كانت ترفض فكرة القضاء والقدر (فرقة "القدرية") ... وهناك مئات الأمثلة على هذه "الإنتقائية" غير العلمية ... والتى أدت بالمسلمين لشكل من النمطية السلبية المنافية لطبيعة المعرفة والثقافة والعلم . ومن أشهر هذه الأمثلة إخفائهم لرأي أبي حنيفة النعمان بخصوص عقوبة المرتد ... فرغم انه لم يرفض العقوبة ، الا انه ابطلها بقوله ان المرتد يستتاب ، وان مدة الإستتابة هى "طول عمر المرتد" !!! ومن ملاحظاتي التى أود أن أعود لها لإيفاءها حقها من البحث ، ان اعظم العقول المسلمة مثل ابن سينا والفارابي وابن رشد (وكثيرين غيرهم) قد إدمغوا جميعا من طرف اتباع المذهب الحنبلي بالكفر !!! ورغم ان رجلا مثل ابن تيمية هو صاحب عقل بالغ المحدودية ولا قبل له بمعالجة القضايا الفلسفية العميقة ، فقد اعطي نفسه الحق ان يكفر رجالا لاشك أن المتابع القادر على فهم أوزان الرجال والعقول سيقر بأنهم أساتذة أساتذة أساتذة ابن تيمية .... والخلاصة ، ان . العقل المسلم بسبب حاكم مظلم العقل (هو الخليفة العباسي الثامن "المعتصم") وبسبب علو سلطان ونفوذ أكثر الفقهاء المسلمين "قلة عقل" (أحمد بن حنبل وشراح مذهبه الأساس : إبن تيمية وإبن قيم الجوزية) قد أصابته حالة فريدة من الجمود والخمود والركود ، بل والتكلس والتحول لحفرية من الحفريات . وهى "حفرية فكرية وذهنية وثقافية" لا تشكل خطرا على الإنسانية فحسب ، بل انها تشكل خطرا على المسلمين انفسهم ، إذ تأخذ المسلمين ومجتمعاتهم لحالة عداء ، بل وحرب مع الإنسانية .... ورغم الحالة حالكة الظلام عميقة التأخر شديدة البدائية لعقول ملايين المسلمين المعاصرين الذين تستقطبهم رؤي فكرية لا تمت للعصر وللعلم وللثقافة المعاصرة بأية صلة ، ورغم أن بعضهم يردد مقولات وأفكار ووجهات نظر لا مثيل لها - على سطح الكرة الأرضية اليوم - من التخلف والبدائية والظلامية .... فإنني على يقين ان المستقبل سيشهد زلازلا تهز العقل المسلم وتهد العديد من بناه الأحفورية بما يماثل ما حدث للمسيحية منذ زلزالي مارتن لوثر وكالفن ... وسيصل المسلمون لقناعة بفصل الدين عن الدولة وبفصل الدين عن التشريع الدستوري والقانوني ، بل وسيصلون لفقه يقوم على "خصوص السبب ، لا عموم النص" ، وهو ما سيسمح بآراء جديدة (مناسبة للعصر وللعلم ولمسيرة التقدم الإنساني) فيما يخص المرأة والآخر ... ولكن بيننا وبين الوصول لذلك الأفق الأرقي سنوات وعقود وكفاح مرير لنصرة العقل والعلم والتقدم ، ولهزيمة سدنة الرحلة الآثمة التى بدأت مع مجيء حاكم سمح للحنابلة بذبح (بالمعني الحرفي للكلمة) المعتزلة فى أزقة دمشق .... وما زال أهل العقل فى مجتمعاتنا من يومها يذبحون إما حرفيا او مجازا بسلاح دعاة التخلف الذى قل نظيره فى تاريخ الإنسانية ..... كتب هذا المقال فى مدريد ليلة 11 يناير 2012

Thursday, January 12, 2012

The Perception of Islam Today



As early as the first century of the Muslim calendar, Islam has known radical sects who demanded blind adherence to their rigid reading of the articles of faith, side by side with mainstream Islam, whose adherents eschew violence and extremism and do not profess to hold a monopoly on Truth. The phenomenon began with the emergence of the Khawarij (Seceders) in 660 AD, (the middle of the first Hejira century), a sect which preached a dogmatic interpretation of Scripture and practiced a version of excommunication by branding those who did not adopt its teachings as heretics. This was the first such sect but by no means the last, and throughout the history of Islam the quiet of religious life was broken many times by marginal groups who tried to impose their extremist views on the majority by violent means.



Alongside the groups and sects whose members insisted on a literal interpretation of holy texts and laid down strict rules governing all aspects of life, there was the general trend represented in the main Sunni schools (the most important being the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafite and Hanbalite, and their offshoots, Al-Laith and Al-Tebarry), as well as the Shiites, who are split into a number of sects. The most important Shiite sect is the Imammeya, or Ithna’ashariyya, (i.e. Twelvers), so called because they accept as imams twelve of the descendants of Ali ibn-Abu Talib (according to their belief, the twelfth imam, who disappeared about 874 AD, is still living and will return). Within this general trend there emerged prominent proponents of deductive reasoning, like the great jurist Abu Hanifa, who accepted just over one hundred of the Prophet’s Hadiths as apostolic precept, as well as uncompromising champions of tradition, like Ahmed ibn-Hanbal, whose book, Al-Musnad, is a compilation of over ten thousand Hadiths. The conservative ibn-Hanbal served as the bulwark of orthodoxy and tradition against any intellectual endeavour, and for a time exerted a considerable hold on public imagination. Although his influence eventually waned, in its heyday tradition reigned supreme and very little room was left for reason. 

The two main disciples of ibn-Hanbal were ibn-Taymiyah and ibn-Qaiym Al-Juzeya, who, like their mentor, allowed no scope for reason or independent thinking, but insisted on a dogmatic adherence to the Hadiths as authoritative sources of all matters spiritual and temporal, laying down strict guidelines to govern every aspect of everyday life. In addition, the world of Islam was the scene of a battle of ideas between Abu Hamid Al-Ghazzali (Algazel), a strict traditionalist who did not believe the human mind capable of grasping the Truth as ordained by God, and Ibn Rushd (Averoess), who championed the primacy of reason. The exponents of these two schools waged a bitter battle in which the first salvo was fired by Al-Ghazzali with his book, The Incoherence of the Philosophers. Ibn Rushd answered with his brilliant treatise in defense of rationality, The Incoherence of the Incoherence. But despite his spirited defense, the outcome of the battle was clearly in Al-Ghazzali’s favour, and the great majority of Islamic jurists adopted his ideas, interpreting the precepts of Islamic law by appeal to the authority of tradition and spurning deductive reasoning altogether. Islamic jurisprudence was dominated by the Mutakallimun, or dialectical theologians, who asserted the primacy of tradition (naql), as advocated by Al-Ghazzali, over that of reason (‘aql), as advocated by Ibn Rushd. But though Ibn Rushd’s ideas were rejected by the Muslim world, they took root strongly in Europe, particularly France, which embraced his vision of the primacy of reason wholeheartedly.

Thus Muslims can be said to have known two different understandings to Islam, as it were, one based on a rigid, doctrinaire interpretation of holy texts and the violent repression of free thought; the other on a moderate and tolerant understanding of Scripture which allowed for the acceptance of the Other. The first was espoused by the secret sects (limited in number and influence) which emerged in remote areas of the Arabian Peninsula and can best be described as the Bedouin model. The second took hold in the more intellectually vibrant climate that prevailed among the peoples descended from ancient civilizations in places like Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and the Levant, which I call the Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model of Islam.

Until the mid-eighteenth century, this was the model adopted by most Muslim communities outside the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula. But that was before the rise of Wahhabism, a puritan revival movement launched by Mohamed ibn-Abdul Wahab from Najd, where he was born in 1703. In 1744, he forged an alliance with the ruler of Al-Dir’iyah, a tribal chieftain by the name of Mohamed ibn-Saud, who became his son-in-law. The alliance led to the first incarnation of the Saudi state, which, by 1804, had expanded to control nearly one million square metres of the Arabian Peninsula. It was a short-lived incarnation, lasting only until 1819, when Mohamed Ali’s son, Ibrahim Pasha, led a military expedition which destroyed Wahhabi power and razed the capital of the first Saudi state, Al-Dir’iyah, to the ground.

Mohamed Ali’s decision to send first his son Tousson then his son Ibrahim Pasha, known for his military skills, to destroy the first Saudi state had implications going far beyond the political or military ambitions of one man. It was in fact an expression of a cultural/civilizational confrontation between the two models of Islam, a confrontation the enlightened Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model decided to take to the heartland of the obscurantist, extremist and fanatical Wahhabi model. Mohamed Ali, who was extremely impressed by the European model of development and saw no contradiction between the mechanisms by which it had come about and his Islamic beliefs, believed the Wahhabi understanding of Islam stood as a major obstacle in the way of the dream he had nurtured since coming to power in 1805 (and until he abdicated in favour of his son Ibrahim in 1848), to place Egypt on a similar road to development.

Years after the defeat inflicted on them by Ibrahim Pasha (who captured their leader and sent him to Egypt, then to Istanbul where he remained until his death), the Saudis reemerged as a political force in the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula. Basing themselves in Riyadh, they began to meddle covertly in political affairs. This placed them on a collision course with the al-Rashid family in Ha’il, and the two sides were soon locked in battle. The Saudis, under the leadership of Abdul Rahman, father of the founder of the current Saudi dynasty, King Abdul Aziz, were defeated in 1891. Abdul Rahman fled to Kuwait with leading members of the House of Saud, where they remained in exile until 1902. During this period, they were the guests of Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabbah, who played an important role in the formation of the young Abdul Aziz. Born in 1876, Abdul Aziz, who came to be known as Ibn Saud, was encouraged in his dream to recapture Riyadh by the ruler of Kuwait. In 1902, Ibn Saud (Abdul Aziz) seized Riyadh and waged a 30-year campaign to assert his dominion over the Arabian Peninsula. In 1925 he entered first Mecca then Medina, and, in September 1932, the 56-year old proclaimed himself king over the Kingdom of Najd and Hejaz, later to become the first kingdom named after its ruling dynasty, Saudi Arabia.

Concomitantly with the birth of the new kingdom, which officially adopted the doctrine of Wahhabism, came the discovery of vast reservoirs of oil under its deserts. This provided the Wahhabis with a virtually endless source of funds which they used to propogate their model of Islam.

Three decades after the creation of Saudi Arabia and the discovery of oil, many things had changed in the world:

  • One, Saudi Arabia had built up a huge fortune that enabled it to further the cause of Wahhabism not only within its own borders but throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Its efforts proved successful, as many once moderate Muslims were gradually won over to the harsh version of Islam preached by the Wahhabis.
  • Two, beginning in the ‘sixties, Egypt suffered a reversal of fortune at all levels, including a decline in its general cultural climate, allowing Wahhabi influence to infiltrate the venerable institution of Al-Azhar. The defeat of June 1967 opened the door wide to groups which espoused the Saudi understanding of Islam and who translated their radical views into political action, often at the point of a gun.
  • Three, in the context of the Cold War, the West in general and the United States in particular adopted a number of misguided policies towards the region, including turning a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabi influence in the Arab and Islamic world, and even occasionally supporting radical groups inspired by the Wahhabi doctrine to achieve their own political ends, such as ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
The assassination of President Anwar Sadat by an extremist group was a wake-up call which alerted the world to the growth and spread of the Saudi-backed Wahhabi model of Islam and the retreat of the Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model. A succession of similar events attested to the dangerous spread of this model in most societies with a Muslim majority; in Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia. On the morning of September 11, 2001, a group of fanatics belonging to the Wahhabi brand of Islam launched attacks on New York and Washington that illustrated how the members of this sect view the Other in general and Western civilization in particular.

For the average European or American unfamiliar with some of the facts presented in this article, it is easy to believe that Islam, violence and terrorism go hand in hand. But those who have a more thorough grasp of the issue know that this perception of Islam has taken hold only because a puritanical, fundamentalist model of Islam, which was marginal and ineffectual before oil wealth put it on the map, has managed, thanks to petrodollars, to make the world believe that its interpretation of Islam is Islam. 


The doctrinaire version of Islam propounded by the Wahabbis had no followers among the Muslims of the world before the expansion of Saudi influence following the oil boom. Millions of Muslims in Egypt, Turkey, the Levant, Iraq, Indonesia and throughout the world remained immune to the appeal of the fanatical, violent and bloody message of what was a small and obscure sect bred in the intellectually barren landscape of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. All that changed with the massive influx of petrodollars into the coffers of Saudi Arabia, which used its new-found wealth to propagate the message of its home-grown Wahhabi sect with missionary zeal. Hence the emergence of militant Islam as a force to be reckoned with on the world stage, a force that now represents a dangerous threat to world peace, to humanity and to Islam and Muslims. Half a century ago, the Muslims of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey were models of tolerance who believed in a gentle and enlightened Islam that could, and did, coexist peacefully with other religions and cultures. Following the decline in living standards they have suffered since at the hands of despotic and corrupt rulers, they have become easy prey for the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.


The perception of Islam today by many non-Muslims is that it is a fanatical and violent religion. That is a superficial view which ignores the fact that there are two models of Islam, one that is uncompromising and extremist in its views and another that is tolerant, moderate and humanistic. It is also a naïve view that can lead to dangerous decisions like the ones which informed the West’s policies when it turned a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabism and established close links with radical Islamic movements like the Taliban in Afghanistan.


Finally, there is no need to point out to the neutral reader that the existence of Qur’anic texts which can be used to evidence the violence of Islam is unimportant, because there are enlightened interpretations of the same texts which link them to specific circumstances and events. At the end of the day, any text, even if it is divine, requires a human agency to interpret it, and the real test is how the mind elects to interpret it. Moreover, there are also many Qur’anic texts which proscribe the use of violence and aggression against those belonging to other faiths and creeds, and calls on Muslims to treat them fairly and humanely. But texts should not be the focus of debate here, not least because this would allow extremists on the other side to justify their use of violence by invoking Old Testament texts exhorting believers to violence, notably in the Book of Joshua, son of Nun.

What needs to be done at this stage is to champion the cause of enlightenment by supporting moderates and promoting the humanistic understanding of Islam that once prevailed among the vast majority of Muslims. Efforts in this direction must go hand in hand with a counter offensive against the rigid, doctrinaire, even bloodthirsty, version of Islam that first appeared among isolated communities separated from the march of civilization by the impenetrable sand dunes of the Arabian desert. Geographical isolation coupled with a narrow tribal outlook is a lethal mix that cannot possibly shape a humane and tolerant perception of the Other. The time has come for the Saudi government to part ways with Wahhabism and to realize that the alliance between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi dynasty is responsible for the spread of obscurantism, dogmatism and fanaticism, poisoning minds with radical ideas opposed to humanity, progress, civilization, cultural continuity and pluralism, the diversity of opinions and creeds that is one of the most important and enriching features of human life. 

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

What is needed is the Martin Luther of Islam

أنا على ثقة أن المجتمعات الإسلامية ستشهد مارتن لوثر الإسلام (وربما أكثر من مارتن لوثر) ، وأن صراعا مريرا سيستمر لسنوات (بالأحري لعقود) قبل أن نصل للحالة الصحية والتى تسمح بإنطلاق وإبداع العقل الإنساني ، وهى الحالة التى بدونها لا يمكن حدوث التقدم واللحاق بمسيرة التقدم الإنسانية ... فثقافة الطاعة والتقليد والإتباع التى يروج لها كثير من الإسلاميين بوجه عام والحنابلة وأتباع إبن تيمية وإبن قيم الجوزية والدعوة الوهابية لا يمكن أن تفرز العقل صانع التقدم ... والدليل الأوضح هو حالتنا الراهنة : فحتي أغني المجتمعات الإسلامية تعيش عالة على تجليات العقل الغربي الذى حرر نفسه منذ أكثر من أربعة قرون من ربقة عبودية العقل الإنساني للسلف والتقليد والإتباع والطاعة.

Sunday, January 8, 2012

Ten Random Observations


First Observation: My visits to colleges of Middle Eastern Studies in a number of prestigious European universities were and continue to be a source of great personal joy and enormous intellectual vitality. Some of the most stimulating and enjoyable hours I spent were in the departments of Middle Eastern studies in the universities of Leiden in Holland, Durham in Britain, Heidelberg in Germany and Naples in Italy, among others. On a visit to Calabria University at the southern tip of Italy last March, I had the opportunity to meet with Professor Alberto Ventura, who can rightfully be described as one of Europe’s foremost experts on Sufism in Islam. Our discussion turned to Ibn Rushd, a major influence in my intellectual formation, and to Mohiedine Ibn Araby, whose life and works are the specialized subject of Professor Ventura.
From our discussion I learned something new about the relationship between the two men. I already knew that Ibn Araby was a great admirer of the ideas of Ibn Rushd; what I learned that day was that the two men enjoyed a warm personal friendship. According to Professor Ventura, when Ibn Rushd died in exile, Ibn Araby was the one who handled the burial arrangements, he who wrapped the body in a shroud and carried it on his shoulders to the grave site. There he placed it in a wooden coffin while placing all the deceased’s works in another wooden box. These were then loaded onto the back of a pack animal, the coffin on the right and the book-laden box on the left, the two lashed to a stout pole strapped to the animal’s back. The cortege moved forward followed by Ibn Araby and others in a dramatic scene pregnant with symbolism in which Ibn Rushd’s works balanced the body of the man I believe was the greatest thinker in Islamic history.
As is my wont, I did not take Professor Ventura’s story for granted but on my return delved into the many books written on Ibn Rushd to verify for myself the accuracy of his account. My research confirmed that the Italian professor who had devoted his life to the study of Mohiedine Ibn Araby deserved his reputation as the ultimate authority on the history of Sufism and Sufis. The most interesting aspect of the story is the affinity that existed between a great Sufi and a great thinker, an affinity that is totally lacking in the attitude of Sunni theologians towards the great thinker Ibn Rushd. This is an issue that needs to be looked into in greater depth.
Second Observation: Much has been written about the corruption of ousted president Hosni Mubarak and all the members of his family. But no one has written about the crass ignorance and complete absence of any cultural depth of this thieving despot. In the period between 1986 and 1996, I met him several times when he visited petroleum and natural gas sites belonging to companies I was heading at the time. In the course of those visits, I had the chance to see for myself that Egypt was being ruled by an uncultivated boor. I could well believe that what he took pride in declaring on several occasions was true: the man had never read a serious book in his life. A pastime I indulge in for my own amusement is to paint a picture of the cultural formation of any person I deal with on the basis of the level of their discourse. I was stunned by the way Mubarak spoke, by his crude style and coarse language, and can honestly say he is one of the most ignorant people I have ever spoken to.
The same can be said of his wife, who is even more arrogant and high-handed than her husband, like most children born, like herself, of European mothers. She is also equally shallow and ignorant. Once when I was still chairman of the Heliopolis Library [before I tendered my resignation because of her meddling in the way I managed the library] I organized a Mozart evening on the occasion of the anniversary of the composer’s death on December 5th. The plan was for the Cairo Symphony Orchestra, under conductor Ahmed el-Saidi, a good friend of mine, to play a number of Mozart’s later works, including the Requiem which he died while composing. When I knew Suzanne Mubarak would be attending the musical evening, I suggested to maestro el-Saidi that he begin with a piece she could understand [if only partially] and perhaps appreciate. Maestro el-Saidi accepted my proposal that the recital begin with Mozart’s 40th Symphony because it is not as alien to the eastern ear as the Requiem or the works of some composers like Wagner, Liszt or Mendelssohn.  As the second of the four movements of the 40th Symphony began, Suzanne Mubarak whispered in my ear, “tell him to cut it short”!! I turned my head away pretending not to hear, horrified at the cruel trick fate had played in allowing a bunch of ignorant crooks to rule Egypt, whose name is a shining beacon in the history of nations.
After the “tell him to cut it short” incident, Suzanne Mubarak objected to my inviting Dr. Murad Wahba to give a talk at the Library on “Education in Egypt: from the school of rote memorization to the school of creativity”. I had no choice but to present my resignation (in December 1997) bringing to an end the one hundred sorry days I had spent dealing with a woman whose blind ambition precipitated her husband’s tragic downfall and blackened his name in Egypt’s history as its most ignorant and corrupt ruler in centuries.
Third Observation: I  was asked why I hated Saudi Arabia so much. I replied that I neither hated nor loved it, but that I rejected, condemned, and resisted its pervading cultural climate that it exports to my country, Egypt, as it does to most societies in the world. I reject, condemn and resist the role of the Saudi religious establishment, which I consider to be the root of all evil since the alliance forged between Mohamed Ibn Saud and Mohamed Ibn Abdul Wahab in Al-Dir’iyah in 1955. I reject, condemn and resist the constraints imposed by Saudi men of religion, a caste characterized by extreme ignorance, backwardness and obscurantism, on Saudi women. I reject, condemn and resist the zealotry of the Saudi religious establishment in propagating the Wahabi/Saudi model of Islam, a model that has done more to harm the reputation of Islam and Muslims in the last half of the previous century than anything perpetrated by the so-called enemies of Islam. All of this has nothing to do with the Saudi people or with love or hate. I believe that when the men of deshdasha-land rebel against their anachronistic costumes, particularly the headdress known as the shamagh, which covers not only the head but the mind as well, when the women of that region rebel against the dictum that it is the men who decide what they can and cannot wear, then and only then will their region have taken its first steps towards civilization.
Fourth Observation: One of the things that exasperates me most is the way many in Arabic-speaking societies designate men of religion as ulamas (learned). How can a narrow-minded, ignorant sheikh be described as learned? A man who cannot read-let alone understand- one page of a book by Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Auguste Compte, Kierkegaard, Whitehead, Bertrand Russel, Martin Heidegger, Sartre or John Dewey? How can we use the word ulama to describe someone who doesn’t know whether John Stewart Mill, Ricardo, Malthus, Freud and Durkheim are leading thinkers or automobile brands?
Fifth Observation: In 1914, Taha Hussein, one of the leading lights of enlightenment and reason in all the Arabic-speaking societies, boarded a ship in Alexandria bound for Marseille. In his own words, once the ship set sail, “I removed the turban from my head … and from my heart.” This succinct sentence conveys a powerful message that is self-explanatory.
Sixth Observation: I believe that prosecuting all of Hosni, Suzanne and Gamal Mubarak’s men who dominated Egypt’s political, economic, media and cultural landscape under the ancient regime is the ‘purgatory’ [to use Dante’s term] that will guarantee for the Egyptian people that the black cloud of corruption and despotism under which they have been living for three long decades has finally lifted.
Seventh Observation: In the course of my professional life I met with deposed president Hosni Mubarak quite a few times. Each time I felt a deep sense of shame: how could this ignoramus be the president of a country like Egypt, its name a thing of glory throughout the ages? To this day I cannot understand why Anwar Sadat picked such a shallow, ignorant and uncultured man to be his vice-president. What could have prompted such an ill-founded decision?
Eighth Observation: More than 10 years ago, a senior Egyptian official told me that the interior ministry had finally found an antidote against the poison of the Muslim Brotherhood. I listened with growing amazement as he proceeded to explain that it had been decided to encourage and strengthen the Salafis to hit at the Brotherhood. This is yet another example of the consequences of a ruling caste devoid of any sort of cultural vision for there is no doubt that the Salafis represent a far greater threat to any contemporary society than the Brotherhood. This is just one of countless incidents that attest to the dangerously ignorant leadership that ruled Egypt, the most important country in Africa and the Middle East, for long decades.
Ninth Observation: A few days ago I was walking in Turin when I found myself before the palace of King Victor Emmanuel which stands a few steps away from the Egyptian Museum, home to the largest collection of ancient Egyptian antiquities outside Egypt. As I stood there, I was reminded of the truism that truth is often stranger than fiction. Mohamed Ali, the founder of modern Egypt, sent his grandson Ismail [the son of Ibrahim] who was to rule Egypt from 1863 to 1879, to study in Italy. The young man fell in love with Italy and all things Italian. When he decided to build the Cairo Opera, the first opera in the Middle East, he stipulated that it be an exact replica of the opera house in Turin. When he organized festivities to celebrate the opening of the Suez Canal he commissioned a new opera for the occasion (Giuseppe Verdi’s ‘Aida’). When Britain and France forced him to abdicate in 1879, he went to Turin and placed his youngest son, Ahmed Fouad, (born in 1868, he was to become ruler of Egypt from 1917 until his death in 1936) in the care of King Victor Emmanuel II. Ahmed Fouad was effectively raised in Turin; he attended school in the city and, after graduating from the Military Academy, became an officer in Victor Emmanuel’s royal guards. When he became Sultan of Egypt on October 9th, 1917, he appointed so many Italians to his household that Italian became the first language of the palace! It was in this atmosphere that Farouk was born and raised so that, not surprisingly, Italian was the language closest to his heart. In a referendum held in May 1946, the Italian people voted to abolish the monarchy forcing the last king of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III, to abdicate. He chose to spend his last years in Alexandria, where he died and is now buried. When Farouk abdicated and left Egypt on July 26th, 1952, he chose to spend his exile in Italy where he died (probably by poison) on April 18th, 1965. All this flashed through my mind as I strolled towards the Egyptian museum in Turin, hometown of the House of Savoy.
Tenth Observation: I did not really begin mixing in Egyptian society until 1996. Before then most of my relationships and contacts were with non-Egyptians of all nationalities: European, American, African, Asian, Australian. During those years, I found myself before two options, neither of which was particularly appealing. It was a case of being caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, to be precise, between two circles of people: I shared with the members of one circle cultural, artistic and intellectual interests, while with the other I shared social links. A circle of intellectuals and a circle of class! The members of the first circle were intelligent and highly knowledgeable – but filled with bitterness. The members of the other circle were silly and frivolous – as insipid as a meal of watermelons, to quote Nizar Qabbani.
And so life continues to prove over and over that it is a comedy of errors or, as Tewfik El Hakim put it in the title of the last book he wrote, “The world is a farce.”
 

Tuesday, January 3, 2012

العقل المسلم بين التقليد والإبداع


عندما تطورت المجتمعات التى هى اليوم الأكثر تقدما ، فإنها قامت بتقليم أظافر رجال الدين والمؤسسات الدينية المسيحية (دين أغلبية شعوب هذه المجتمعات) ... وتم رسم الحدود بوضوح تام بين ما يحق لرجال الدين تنظيمه ، وبين ما يترك للعلم الوضعي لإدارته. وقد إقتضي حدوث ذلك صراع مرير بيت رجال ومؤسسات الدين وبين قادة الفكر . ولولا ظهور رجل مثل مارتن لوثر وما أحدثه من هزة لقواعد سلطان رجال الدين لما كانت تلك المجتمعات قد تمكنت من الخروج من الدائرة المغلقة لسلطان المؤسسات الدينية . وكما يحلو لي أن لأصف ما حدث باللهجة المصرية ، فإن رجال الدين والمؤسسات الدينية بعدما أعطوا "العقل العلمي" أكثر من ضربة موجعة "أي علقة بالمصري و قتلة بالسوري) ، فإن التقدم العلمي والفكري مكن (بفتح الميم وتسكين الكاف) من أن يعطوا هم رجال الدين والمؤسسات الدينية "علقة تاريخية" ، فأصبحوا ملتزمين بأن مجال نفوذهم هو الجانب الروحي ، أما إدارة المجتمع فإنها ليست مجالهم . وعندما رأي رجال الدين اليهود الذين كانوا يعيشون فى المجتمعات الغربية "الضربة " أو "العلقة" أو "القتلة" التى نالها رجال الدين المسيحي والمؤسسات الدينية المسيحية ، تعلموا الدرس ، فصاروا يقصرون نفوذهم - اساسا- على يوم "السبت" ... أما بقية أيام الأسبوع فيعيشها اليهود فى ظل نظام المجتمع المدني ... وأنا على ثقة أن المجتمعات الإسلامية ستشهد مارتن لوثر الإسلام (وربما أكثر من مارتن لوثر) ، وأن صراعا مريرا سيستمر لسنوات (بالأحري لعقود) قبل أن نصل للحالة الصحية والتى تسمح بإنطلاق وإبداع العقل الإنساني ، وهى الحالة التى بدونها لا يمكن حدوث التقدم واللحاق بمسيرة التقدم الإنسانية ... فثقافة الطاعة والتقليد والإتباع التى يروج لها كثير من الإسلاميين بوجه عام والحنابلة وأتباع إبن تيمية وإبن قيم الجوزية والدعوة الوهابية لا يمكن أن تفرز العقل صانع التقدم ... والدليل الأوضح هو حالتنا الراهنة : فحتي أغني المجتمعات الإسلامية تعيش عالة على تجليات العقل الغربي الذى حرر نفسه منذ أكثر من أربعة قرون من ربقة عبودية العقل الإنساني للسلف والتقليد والإتباع والطاعة

Friday, December 30, 2011

Tarek Heggy's newest article (in Arabic) that will be published by "al WAFD" daily on 4th January, 2012

يقولون أنهم يطلبون احترام العالم لهم (وهو حق مؤكد لهم) ، ولكنهم لا يحترمون الآخر بالشكل الذى يطلبونه لأنفسهم ... فبمناسبة وبدون مناسبة يقولون للآخر أن كتابه المقدس محرف ! وأن عقيدته فاسدة ومزيفة !!! .... ويقولون أنهم يؤمنون بحرية الإعتقاد ، ولكنهم يتمسكون بأن المعتقدات المسموح (!!) بها هى الأديان الثلاثة الإبراهيمية (أو التى يسميها البعض بالسماوية) ! ويقولون أنهم ليسوا ضد أي دين آخر ، ولكن ما أن يشرع أبناء أي دين آخر فى بناء دورعبادة لهم ، حتى يثور بركان غضبهم ويقوم بعضهم بتدمير دورالعبادة التى كان "الآخر" يهم ببناءها ! ... ويتحدثون بحماس عن حقهم فى إنشاء دور عبادة لأبناء وبنات دينهم فى أي وكل مكان على سطح الكرة الأرضية ، ولكن الدولة التى تضم أقدس مقدساتهم لا يوجد بها (وغير مسموح) دور عبادة لأي دين أو معتقد أو طائفة أخري !!! وعندما يقرر الشعب السويسري (من خلال إقتراع عام) أنه رغم السماح لهم بإنشاء دور عبادة جديدة ولكن بدون مآذن ، يغلي الدم فى عروقهم ويفور بركان غضبهم وتنطلق كالجحيم صراخاتهم ! وكأنهم نسوا أن كبري بلدانهم لا تسمح بكنيسة واحدة للمسيحيين أو معبد لليهود أو للبوذيين أو للبهائيين !!!! يتمسكون (عن طريق منظمات المجتمع المدني) بتحسين صورتهم وصورة معنقداتهم فى برامج التعليم فى البلدان المتقدمة التى آوتهم وفتحت صدرها وقبلتهم كمهاجرين اليها ... فإن طالب المسيحيون او اليهود او البهائيون بالمقابل ، تعالي عويلهم وشجبهم للتدخلات الأجنبية المشبوهة فى برامجهم التعليمية . يوجد من أبناء دينهم أعضاءا بكل برلمانات أوروبا وأمريكا الشمالية وأستراليا ... أما هم فلا يوجد ببرلماناتهم أي وافد من الخارج ، بل ويقومون بإلغاء عضوية أي إبن أو إبنة من الوطن إن ثبت تمتعه بأية جنسية أخري !!! يهاجرون لبلدان أوروبا وامريكا الشمالية وأستراليا هاربين من إنعدام الحريات (بشتى صورها) وإنعدام فرص الحياة الطيبة ... وما أن يستقروا فى الجنة التى طالما حلموا بها حتى يبدأ بعضهم فى العمل على تدمير البنية الأساسية للمنظومة الدستورية والقانونية والثقافية للجنة التى فروا اليها من جحيم مجتمعاتهم الغارقة تحت مياه بحيرة التخلف الآسنة ... وعندما يكتشف أبناء المجتمعات المتقدمة التى فر لها "هؤلاء" أن كل ما يريده من الديموقراطية "بعض" هؤلاء المهاجرين انما هو إستعمال الديموقراطية لنسف وتدمير الديموقراطيات الغربية ، يعلو صراخهم : إنقذونوا من موجة العداء لنا ولديننا !! .... إنها مأساة منطقتنا التى اختطفها حكام هم آية من أكبر آيات الجهل المضفر بالفساد وإنعدام الرؤية وغياب الحس التاريخي واختفاء الثقافة ... وبعد نصف قرن من حكم هؤلاء اللصوص - الجهلة تكون شعوب مجتمعاتنا غير قادرة على الإطلاق على إختيار الكفاءة المضفرة بالمعرفة والمتوخية للتقدم والمتسمة بالنزاهة .... وعندما تصل بنا عواقب نصف قرن من الجهل والفساد الى ما نحن فيه اليوم ، فلا يبقي لنا من خيار الا خوض المباراة بأدوات الديموقراطية وفى مقدمتها التمسك بإيماننا بالعلم (لا بالخرافة) وبتقنيات علوم الإدارة الحديثة وبالإنسانية وبالتقدم وبالحداثة وبالنسبية وبالتعددية (بمعناها الحقيقي ، لا بمعناها الزائف الذى يكرره اليوم بعض الثيوقراطيين) وبقبول الآخر وبحقوق الانسان وبحقوق المرأة العصرية المساوية تماما للرجل وبالسماحة الثقافية والدينية .... والأهم : بالدولة المدنية القائمة على المواطنة وعلى فصل الدين عن الدولة .... وأن يتمرسوا على العمل السياسي وعلى التواصل من الشعب بشتي طبقاته وعلى خدمة المجتمع .... ورغم أن هذا يبدو كمهمة عسيرة فى مواجهة سحب التراجع (للخلف) السوداء التى تغطي سماء واقعنا اليوم ، فإن الإيمان الحقيقي بقيم التقدم لا يكون حقيقيا وجديرا بالإحترام ما لم يعلنه المؤمنون به فى ظل ظرف تاريخي محبط كالظرف التاريخي الذى خلفه حكام مجرمون مثل بن علي وحسني مبارك والقذافي وعبدالله صالح (وقد سقطوا) وبشار الأسد (وهو سيسقط لا محالة خلال هذا العام الجديد) .... وأن يعملوا من الآن على إسترداد عقل وقلب الوطن من دعاة الماضي وخصوم العلم والتقدم والحريات والمعاصرة

Thursday, December 29, 2011

Religious Reform: Cornerstone of Reform in the Arab Societies

I. Overview:

Islam has played an important role in the making of history and culture of the Arabic speaking peoples. While the “Muslim mind” has known periods of prosperity (according to the norms of the Middle-Ages) until the twelfth century A.D., it has also known, since that time, a course of decline, stagnation, and isolation, of which one cannot hide the features. Since the interaction of the peoples of this region with the West (from the first day of the French Campaign in Egypt in 1798), the problematic has materialized in two trends: the first trend asserts that the backwardness of our societies is due to the fact that we do not hold the set of religious doctrines as the way of life and work of individuals and societies. The holders of the second trend believe that it is inevitable to follow the mechanisms of the Western civilization in order to accomplish progress in their societies. It may be said (with some generalization) that the political, cultural, intellectual, and educational atmosphere of the Arabic speaking societies is witnessing a conflict between these two tendencies: the tendency of returning to Islamic sources and origins, and the tendency to use the mechanisms and values of the Western civilization which have gone beyond the frontiers of the West in the geographic sense, as they have been adopted by several societies outside the West. 

I suggest that the preachers of the return to the sources and origins have little to offer besides big promises to the masses, while the intellectuals know that Islamic history is a purely human history which has known an era of relative prosperity (the reality and extent of which are often exaggerated), which has then diminished and fallen after adopting a mentality of copying, opposed to reason and innovation, and when it set a low ceiling to the work of the human mind. 

A big dilemma in this debate (which, in my opinion, is futile) is the mistake of looking upon the engines, mechanisms, dynamics and incentives of the Western civilization as being “Western”. I have proven in many of my books that the progress which Europe has witnessed occurred due to human factors and not European or Western factors. The first of these factors is the strict limitation imposed on the authority and power of clergymen, followed by raising the ceiling on freedom of thought, and the encouragement of the critical mind. These are the two factors which have helped the evolution of the values of progress, which are all “purely human”, not Western, Christian, or European. 

One of the most obvious proofs that the values and characteristics of human progress are human and universal is what has taken place on a big scale in the Asian continent, when non-European societies employed the mechanisms and values of progress to accomplish development, and were able to achieve the required progress. This is what the world has witnessed in Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and then in other societies such as the Malaysian society which one may consider as the biggest proof that the values and mechanisms of progress are universal and human. 

Coming back to Arabic speaking societies, analyzing their present political, economic, social, cultural, educational and media phenomena shows that their environments are devoid of the values of progress which are, as previously stated, clearly human and universal. The biggest challenge this approach will have to face will always come from religious institutions, not for a purely religious motive (or even any religious motive as such), but to defend the unlimited authority and power to rule and direct life in their societies. 

The reform of general education and with equal importance, of religious education is the cornerstone of the project of progress and development, which no one in our (Arabic speaking) societies can achieve before the educational reform, and particularly the reform of religious education, inculcates in the minds and consciences the values of progress as values that are first and foremost human and universal.

II. The Values of Progress:

An overview of the advanced societies, with a parallel knowledge of their history and march, shows that the progress of the societies which have advanced in their course towards development and progress is the result of a set of values which have been made fundamental to the society, by making them fundamental to the religious question.  It is on the basis of these values that our Arabic speaking societies need to rebuild their educational institutions, among which  the institutions of religious teaching. 

The first value of progress is reason, criticism, and a wide space for the “critical mind”. This first value of progress will always be the most attacked by theocracy and those theocrats who know the implications of making this value fundamental to the educational institution of any society.

The second value is the one of “plurality” as being one of the most important characteristics of life in general, and of knowledge, science and culture in particular. 

The third value is “otherness”, the essence of which is accepting the other, regardless of the aspect or the race of that other. Otherness is a natural consequence of the implantation of plurality. 

The fourth of these values is the “universality of science and knowledge”. This value has a strong dialectical link with the three values previously mentioned. 

The fifth value is the value of religious and cultural “tolerance”, as the natural consequence of the belief in the diversity of the different aspects of life. 

The sixth value concerns “women and their place in the society”, starting with the idea that women are totally equal to men, have equal rights and duties, and have an equal human value. The link between progress and the status of women is a double dialectical link: on one hand, women represent half of the society in number; immobilizing half of the society can only have negative effects.  On the other hand, women raise the other half of the society; if they are not free people, they will bring up the other half with a mixture of the defects and disadvantages resulting from being brought up at the hands of an inferior person. 

The seventh value is the one of “human rights” according to the concept which was developed during the past two centuries. 

The eighth value is that of “citizenship”, as being the basis of the relationship between citizens, and their relationship with the state. 

The ninth value is the modern concept of the state and “the rule of law” which differs from the concept of the tribe, the village, and the family. 

The tenth value is that of “democracy”, the noblest human invention of the last two centuries.
The eleventh value is the value of “work”, including the modern notions surrounding work, such as team work, competence, the techniques of modern management, and the culture of enterprise as opposed to the culture of individuals. 

The twelfth value is the “interest in the future” more than the excessive interest in the past, which is a characteristic of the Arab culture. 

The thirteenth value is the value of “objectivity” which, even if it is relative, differs from the subjectivity that reigns in certain ancient cultures, the Arab culture being one of the most important. The sociology of the tribe which has widely governed the Arab culture favors subjectivity, and is far from the notion of objectivity. 

The fourteenth value is the “relativity of science, knowledge and human governance”. The course of the human mind during these last three centuries has led it far from the culture of absolute governance, and driven it closer to the culture of relative governance. 

The fifteenth value is that of “participation” and not following. Participation is a value which strongly opposes the importance of following and the scantiness of participating which the Arab cultures have secreted.
 
III. What is to be done?

During the last two centuries, the partisans of science, reason, and modernity slightly advanced in our societies. Then, they fell back to second place, far behind the school of returning to the roots and origins. In my opinion, there are several reasons for this, the major one being that the debate remains at a global (macro) level, without focusing on the radical change of the mentality through learning. Dialogue on a global level is generally based on slogans which are more attractive to the public. The majority of the supporters of the return to origins hold slogans that attract masses, even if they are half educated or half cultured (which is the case of most of them). When the opportunity presented itself in the form of leadership which was capable of undertaking the crossing from the darkness of reality to the light of progress (like in Turkey from 1923 to 1938, and in Tunisia from 1956 to 1987), the work on the educational institutions remained incomplete, along with the size of religious teaching (totally divorced from the mentality of progress and modernity) reaching, in chief countries like Turkey and Egypt, between 15% and 20% of the number of children of the society enrolled in the educational operation. 

I think that despite the rise of the wave of the return to origins and roots, the world situation and the flow of history favor political authorities, authorities of the civil society, a selection of intellectuals, and authorities of education and media who believe in progress.  These will be able, in the shadow of the general conditions, to sow the seed of reform in the land of education in general, and religious teaching in particular.
 
IV.  Reforming religious institutions, not ignoring them:

Having observed the cultural conditions of Arabic speaking societies for almost forty years, I am almost certain that ignoring religion (let alone wound it with pens and tongues of people motivated by anger rather than knowledge) is a fact which will yield no positive fruit. Religion is an essential element of the air which the peoples of our Arabic speaking region breathe. It is better to work on the reformation of religious institutions, religious culture, religious education and education in general, than to wage a Don Quixotic style duel which will only result in losing of the peoples and distancing them. Here lies the danger of some groups of Arab intellectuals who have set as their primary mission the insolent attack on religion, instead of working on the way people understand religion.



Edited by Sharon Bussell