Egyptian Culture--Where Are We Headed?

قضايا الوطن عندنا هى النهوض بمستوي معيشة الأغلبية و خلق فرص عمل حقيقية للشباب و تطوير التعليم (وعصرنته) ومحاولة اللحاق بركب التقدم الإنساني فى كل المجالات بما فى ذلك وضع وحقوق المرأة ، وتأسيس العلاقة بين الشعب والدولة على أساس المواطنة ... أما السواد الأعظم من أعضاء البرلمان الجديد فقضاياهم هى : محاربة الإختلاط بين الجنسين والعودة بالمرأة لوضعيتها فى القرن الثامن الميلادي وتحجيب النساء وغلق البنوك الربوية !!! وقطع يد السارق ورجم الزناة ! وبإختصار ، فإن مصر تم تسليمها لكادر بشري لا علاقة له بالثقافة المصرية وإنما هم أبناء ثقافة البداوة والصحراء وإزدراء الآخر وإحتقار النساء والزواج من فتيات فى المدرسة الإبتدائية !

دانات ... بمناسبة إرتداء مصر للجلباب القصير !!! (الدانة الثانية)

سيحسب التاريخ للقوات المسلحة المصرية موقفها النبيل من الشعب المصري خلال ثورته التي اطاحت بحسني مبارك واسرته وهم أسوأ من حكم مصر في تاريخها الحديث . ولكن التاريخ نفسه سيسجل للمجلس الاعلى للقوات المسلحة أنه أهدر فرصةَ تاريخيةٍ نادرةٍ لوضع مصر ( عقب اطاحة الثورة بالمخلوع حسني مبارك) على طريق الانطلاق صوب مستقبل افضل واللحاق بركب التقدم الإنساني. واظن ان المؤرخين سيرجعون ذلك لسببين رئيسيين : الأول : هو انعدام الحس التاريخي والرؤية الثقافية لقيمة اللحظة التاريخية التي اتيحت بعد خلع حسني مبارك وما كان يمكن تحقيقه . والثاني: الرغبة في حماية النفس ، والتي كان من الميسور تحقيقها دون الاخطاء التي اقترفت وسوء الاختيارات من طارق البشري لصبحي صالح لعصام شرف لكمال الجنزوري وكلهم أصغر بكثير من حجم اللحظة التاريخية وتحدياتها وقيمتها.

دانات ... بمناسبة إرتداء مصر للجلباب القصير !!!

أدت تراكماتُ سلبيات ستين سنة من حكم غير متسم بالكفاءة والثقافة والرؤية والنزاهة الى ما وصلنا له والذي تجسد في اختيار اعضاء برلمان ثلاثة أرباعهم لا ينتمون فكراً ورؤية لمسيرة التقدم الانساني . والحقيقة ، أن ما حدث هو أمر طبيعي للغاية . فالشعبُ الفقير المهمش المظلوم والمنهوب والذي تلقى اسوأ انواع التعليم لم يكن بوسعه ان يختار بشكل مغاير. من الناحية السياسية ، فإن ما حدث طبيعيُ ومتناغمُ مع الديمقراطية المنشودة . أما من الناحية الثقافية ، فان ما حدث "كارثةُ " .ولكنها كارثةُ لا يجوز ولا ينبغي التعامل معها بأدواتِ غير ادوات وآليات الديمقراطية . أي بجهاد متواصل من جانب انصار الدولة المدنية بهدف رفع مستوى اختيار الشعب المصري بحيث يكون للأكفأ القادر على تحقيق احتياجات المصريين الاساسية وهي: (1) تحسين الظروف الحياتية (2) خلق وظائف عمل حقيقية جديدة تتناسب عددياً مع طلاب العمل في المجتمع (3) تطوير وتحديث التعليم (4) تفعيل مشاركة المصريين في الشأن العام وهي المشاركة التي تم خنقها خلال السنوات الستين الماضية ولم تنطلق الاَّ مع ثورة 25 يناير 2011.

Teaching superstitions as truths is a most terrible thing...

"Fables should be taught as fables, myths as myths, and miracles as poetic fancies. To teach superstitions as truths is a most terrible thing." - Hypatia of Alexandria (370 - 415 AD) 

هذه مقولة وإن كان عمرها 24 قرنا ، إلا أنها تبقي رائعة وصائبة وحكيمة وعلمية ، ونحن أكثر الشعوب حاجة لتدبر معانيها بعد أن أصبح معظم المصريين عاجزين عن إدراك الفارق بين "الحقيقة العلمية" و "الحقيقة الدينية" .... وهو ما أوصلنا لحالتنا الراهنة ولكون مساهمتنا فى مسيرة التقدم العلمي "صفرا" كبيرا .... طارق حجي

بماذا أؤمن

أؤمن بأن الحضارة الغربية فى قسم كبير منها انسانية اكثر من كونها غربية ... أؤمن ان هذه الحضارة هى الوحيدة "الحضارة الحية" ، بينما يصح وصف سائر الحضارات بعكس ذلك... أؤمن بكل ما تعنيه الكلمة بالتعددية فى كل مناحي الحياة والعلم والمعرفة والثقافة والفنون ... أؤمن بالغيرية كقيمة عظمي منبثقة من ايماني العتيد بالتعددية ... أؤمن بعالمية او كونية العلم والمعرفة ... أؤمن ان "النقد" و "النقد الذاتي" و "العقل النقدي" هم من اعظم الانساق القيمية التى طورتها الحضارة الغربية غداة انتصارها على الثيوقراطية ... أؤمن ان الاديان كانت وستبقي مصدرا للقيم ، ولكن ذلك لا ينبغي ان يمتد خارج نطاق "الشأن الخاص" ، اما الشأن العام كله فلا ينبغي ان يحكم بغير العلم ، ولا شيء غير العلم ، وان رجال الدين يجب ان يمنعوا من محاولات تحكمهم فى الشأن العام لكونهم يفتقرون لألف باء التكوين المعرفي اللازم ... وأؤمن بأن خلط الدين (أيا كان اسمه) بالسياسة هو مدخل مؤكد للحروب ، فملاك الحقيقة المطلقة لا يمكن الا ان يحاربوا ... وأؤمن بالتعايش المشترك حتى بين من كانوا فى حالة عداوة مطلقة ... وأؤمن ان السبل السياسية والحوارية والتفاوضية هى فقط السبل المشروعة لحل الخلافات والصراعات السياسية وان ما يسمي بمعسكر المقاومة (بين الدول العربية اليوم) ما هو الا غطاء للعنف وثقافة الدم والبغض المتفشية فى عدة مجتمعات وان بقت المجتمعات العربية ملعب هذه الثقافة الاكبر فى عالمنا المعاصر ... وأؤمن ان الانخراط فى التعاملات العلمية والثقافية والمعرفية "مع الآخر" امر حتمي للتقدم وان الخوف (والهلع) من هذا الانخراط هو تكتيك سياسي ممن يرغبون فى بقاء شعوبهم داخل الاقفاص التى صنوعها هم بدعواتهم الثقافية (والدينية) التى تحتاج للانغلاق كي لا تتفتت وكي لا تكنسها مقشة العلم والحداثة ... وأؤمن ان المرأة اكثر اهمية بكثير من كونها عدديا نصف المجتمع وان كفالة كل الحقوق وكل الفرص لها هو شرط اساسي من شروط التقدم ، فوضع المرأة التى يبقيها فى الاطار القرون-أوسطي الذين ينشده البعض كفيل بوجود مجتمع مترع فى التخلف اذ يكون نصفه (عدديا) متخلفا ويكون قسمه الذى ينشيء النصف الآخر ايضا متخلفا وهو ما يضمن التخلف الكلي للمجتمع ... وأؤمن بنفس الكيفية بحقوق الاقليات بشتي صورها واشكالها الدينية والاثنية والثقافية ... وأؤمن ان اهم العلوم الاجتماعية المعاصرة هى علوم الادارة الحديثة التى بوسعها (هى فقط) احداث الطفرات الاقتصادية والمجتمعية ، وهذه العلوم لا دين ولا عرق ولا جنسية ولا هوية لها ، وهى علوم لا تستقيم مع تحكم اية ايدولوجيا فى المجتمع ... وأؤمن ان ما يظنه كثيرون فى واقعنا من تآمر الغرب علينا هو وهم وهو ثمرة سيولوجيا الاقنان المنتشرة فى المجتمعات العربية بوجه عام وفى المجتمعات التى حكمها (وعربد فيها ) المماليك وتركوها وجل ابنائها مسلسلين بسيكولوجيا وسيوسيولوجيا "تراث العبيد" والذى يقابل فى علم الاجتماع الامريكي سوسيولوجيا الزنوج ، بوجه خاص ... وأؤمن ان هناك رابطة ثقافية بين الناطقين باللغة العربية ، ولكن محاولة اجبار هذه الرابطة (بفعل البعثيين والقومجية العرب) على ان تصير رابطة سياسية تأخذ الناطقين بالعربية للوحدة السياسية (البعث ... الناصرية ... القذافية ) قد الحقت ضررا جسيما بالفكرة التى ولدت على يد السوريين المسيحيين وانتهت كتابع للفكرة الاسلامية ... وأؤمن ان نظم التعليم فى المجتمعات الناطقة بالعربية هى نظم ماضوية ومترعة فى التخلف ، بل وتنبثق من فلسفة تعليمية هجرها العالم المتقدم الذى تخلي عن فلسفة التعليم القائمة على التذكر وحشد المعلومات فى الاذهان وانتقل لفلسفة قوامها تطوير القدرات على الابتداع والخلق ... هذه هى اهم القيم التى أؤمن بها ، وكنت ولا ازال (منذ صدر اول كتبي فى المغرب سنة 1978) منشغلا بتقدمها والترويج لها والدفاع عنها ، فهى وحدها (فى ظني) القادرة على قيادة مجتمعاتنا المثخنة بجراح تسببنا نحن (وحكامنا فى مقدمتنا) فيها وليس اعداؤنا بوجه عام واوروبا وامريكا واسرائيل (كما يظن كثيرون) بوجه خاص .

The Proliferation of Militant Islam: Who Is Responsible?

---

In the years between 1967 and 1973, while I was studying towards a degree in law and a Masters in general and comparative law, I acquired a rudimentary knowledge of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Later, while teaching at universities abroad, I set out to develop a wider knowledge of the subject.  In the course of a journey extending over twenty years, I developed a strong aversion for those I call “worshippers of the word” and “prisoners of tradition”, and a profound admiration for the proponents of reason, most notably, of course, Ibn Rushd (Averoess), whose championship of the primacy of reason was adopted by Europe and rejected by the Muslim world. Europe’s gain was our loss: in turning our backs on Ibn Rushd, we lost a historic opportunity for development. A close reading of all Ibn Taymeya’s works, as well as the works of his disciples, from Ibn Qaiym Al-Juzeya to Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab at the end of the eighteenth century, only deepened my aversion towards this trend and my admiration for the Mu’tazalites, who emphasized human responsibility in matters of religion, and for liberal thinkers who chose the path of reason over that of dogma, like Ibn Sinna (Avicenna), Al-Farabi and the leading exponent of this school, Ibn Rushd.


I spent years trying to understand why the Muslims had chosen to follow the line advocated by Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, the proponent of orthodoxy and tradition for whom knowledge meant only knowledge of religion and who cancelled the role of the mind altogether by denying the possibility of acquiring knowledge through intuition, over the line advocated by Ibn Rushd, who upheld the primacy of reason and sowed the seeds of a renaissance we chose not to reap. Why were Al-Ghazali’s ideas so readily accepted while Ibn Rushd’s were rejected? I believe the answer to this paradox can be summed up in one word: despotism. At a time despotism in our part of the world was at its height, it is not surprising that Muslim rulers should have found Al-Ghazali’s ideas more appealing than those of Ibn Rushd. 

The orthodox line was also more appealing to their subjects who, under the yoke of tyranny, found it safer and less demanding to go along with the views of those who required nothing more from them than a suspension of their critical faculties. In Europe, where the forces of enlightenment were locked in a confrontation with the clericalism that stifled intellectual initiative and rational thought, despotism was in retreat. This explains why, in the thirteenth century, a prestigious centre of learning like the University of Paris supported the ideas of the Arab Muslim Ibn Rushd over those of the European Christian Thomas Aquinas, the scholastic philosopher famous for his two-swords doctrine.

Meanwhile, the Muslim world continued to be ruled by despots who brooked no challenge to their authority and an equally despotic religious establishment which decried the use of reason and demanded blind adherence to the authority of tradition. Closely linked as to methods, motivations and goals, these two factors created an atmosphere that was inimical to the unhindered pursuit of knowledge. Still, things were not only either black or white. True, the Muslims lost an historic opportunity to use Ibn Rushd’s ideas as a springboard that could have placed them on a path similar to the one which took Europe from the obscurantist thinking of the thirteenth century to the vigorous intellectual climate which encourages debate, free thinking, general freedoms and creativity in literature, art and science. But it is also true that Muslims have known two “Islams” as it were; one that can be described as the Turkish-Egyptian model and one as the Bedouin model. While the former cannot claim to have attained the level of enlightenment, progressive thinking and freedom that characterizes the ideas of Ibn Rushd, it was nevertheless a gentle and tolerant Islam that could and did coexist with others. Indeed, non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed more protection that any other minority living anywhere else in the world at the time. Under the Ottomans, Christians of the Levant and Jews in Arab countries lived in conditions very similar to the ones in which the Muslim subjects of the empire were living. Even when they were persecuted by certain rulers, like Al-Hakem bi Amr Allah, it was part of a general policy that made no distinction between non-Muslims and Muslims. And although this model of Islam can in no way be described as secular, it adopted an enlightened approach to religion, dealing with it as a system of spiritual beliefs rather than as a system that ruled all aspects of life and governed the affairs of society.


Concurrently, an altogether different model of Islam was taking shape among geographically isolated communities living far from coastlines and hence from exposure to the outside world. Their insularity provided an ideal breeding ground for the ideas of Ibn Taymema, Ibn Qaym Al-Juzeya and, towards the end of the eighteenth century, those of Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab. A collision between the two models of Islam was inevitable, and, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, they confronted one another on the field of battle. Under the command of Mohamed Ali’s son, Tousson, then of his other son, Ibrahim, arguably the greatest of the Egyptian ruler’s sons, the Egyptian army, and with it, the more enlightened Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam, emerged victorious.

But the winds of change were blowing throughout the region, and the years that followed were not kind to Turkey and Egypt. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I brought an end to Turkey’s ascendancy, while Egypt’s influence receded as its economy and educational system declined. Meanwhile, the proponents of the model of Islam which demanded a strict adherence to the letter of scripture and slammed the door shut in the face of rationality, suddenly found themselves in control of vast wealth unprecedented in history. This gave them an enormous edge over their moderate rivals and allowed them to extend their influence into the traditional strongholds of the Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam, where they waged a systematic campaign to co-opt establishment personalities and institutions. The success of this campaign found its most salient expression in the emergence of fanatical movements like the Taliban, who interpreted the doctrines of religion on the basis of tradition alone and imposed a scholastic, doctrinal brand of Islam that left no room for the exercise of reason. This sorry state of affairs could have been avoided if the majority of Muslims had supported Ibn Rushd or if conditions had not forced the retreat of the Turkish-Egyptian model.

In numerous lectures I gave in Europe and America, I tried to familiarize people with what I call Egyptian Islam which, until the nineteen forties, stood as a unique example of tolerance and flexibility. Noted for its acceptance of the Other, it was not pathologically obsessed with the fine print of scripture. While recognizing the divine character of the prophetically revealed laws, it also recognized that some of their provisions were formulated in the context of a different time, place and circumstances. Thus divinity was reserved for religion and did not extend to how mortals understood or chose to interpret its strictures. It was tacitly understood that there is a subjective dimension to the interpretation of any text, and that interpretation is necessarily coloured by the interpreter’s cultural formation, knowledge and intellectual abilities.

The voices now raised in the West in general and in the United States in particular to warn against the menace of “militant Islam” would do well to ask themselves a number of important questions:

- Who shut their eyes for many years to a general climate which allowed the militant model of Islam to spread unchecked and forced the civilized, humanistic Turkish-Egyptian model to retreat in disarray as economic conditions and educational institutions declined, leaving the way open to an invasion by the militant model? Who turned a blind eye to these developments for close to thirty years and are today bemoaning the way things have turned out?


- Who in the nineteen fifties and perhaps even earlier invented the dangerous game of using political Islam to create a strategic balance with socialism? (In the seventies, Egypt played the same game with disastrous consequences.)


- Has the West only now realized that there is no room for freedom, democracy, human rights, women’s rights or civil rights in the militant model of Islam? Did it really believe this model to be a shining example of these noble humanistic values in the nineteen sixties, seventies and eighties?


- Why is the dossier of the honeymoon between the United States and the Afghan mujahedeen not being opened? Or, for that matter, the chapter of the close links which political Islam in pre-revolutionary Iran enjoyed with the West, particularly France? And, before that, the relations between political Islam in Egypt and Britain, the occupying power at the time, particularly during the two terms of the Mohamed Mahmoud government (1928 and 1938)?

The critical mind, which is the pride of civilized humanity, imposes an obligation on all of us to answer those questions. It also requires all parties to assume a share of the responsibility for what happened and is continuing to happen. It requires us, further, to look closely into the two models of Islam referred to in this article and ask ourselves which is more capable of joining the march of civilization and living in harmony with the requirements of the age, without abandoning the positive features of our cultural specificity. 


Is it the model engendered by the school of traditionalists, victims of their geographical isolation behind high sand dunes, or the moderate, tolerant, liberal Turkish-Egyptian model? Better still, could we adopt the enlightened model of Ibn Rushd, which helped Western civilization move out of the Dark Ages into the Enlightenment at a time we chose to adopt the thinking of his opponents, thereby allowing ourselves to fall prey to a culture which favours superstition, myths, ignorance and a rabid militancy over education, work, development and brotherhood? 




One may read the full article (Islam Between Copying & Thinking) here.

The Perception of Islam Today

As early as the first century of the Muslim calendar, Islam has known radical sects who demanded blind adherence to their rigid reading of the articles of faith, side by side with mainstream Islam, whose adherents eschew violence and extremism and do not profess to hold a monopoly on Truth. The phenomenon began with the emergence of the Khawarij (Seceders) in 660 AD, (the middle of the first Hejira century), a sect which preached a dogmatic interpretation of Scripture and practiced a version of excommunication by branding those who did not adopt its teachings as heretics. This was the first such sect but by no means the last, and throughout the history of Islam the quiet of religious life was broken many times by marginal groups who tried to impose their extremist views on the majority by violent means.

Alongside the groups and sects whose members insisted on a literal interpretation of holy texts and laid down strict rules governing all aspects of life, there was the general trend represented in the main Sunni schools (the most important being the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafite and Hanbalite, and their offshoots, Al-Laith and Al-Tebarry), as well as the Shiites, who are split into a number of sects. The most important Shiite sect is the Imammeya, or Ithna’ashariyya, (i.e. Twelvers), so called because they accept as imams twelve of the descendants of Ali ibn-Abu Talib (according to their belief, the twelfth imam, who disappeared about 874 AD, is still living and will return). Within this general trend there emerged prominent proponents of deductive reasoning, like the great jurist Abu Hanifa, who accepted just over one hundred of the Prophet’s Hadiths as apostolic precept, as well as uncompromising champions of tradition, like Ahmed ibn-Hanbal, whose book, Al-Musnad, is a compilation of over ten thousand Hadiths. The conservative ibn-Hanbal served as the bulwark of orthodoxy and tradition against any intellectual endeavour, and for a time exerted a considerable hold on public imagination. Although his influence eventually waned, in its heyday tradition reigned supreme and very little room was left for reason. 

The two main disciples of ibn-Hanbal were ibn-Taymiyah and ibn-Qaiym Al-Juzeya, who, like their mentor, allowed no scope for reason or independent thinking, but insisted on a dogmatic adherence to the Hadiths as authoritative sources of all matters spiritual and temporal, laying down strict guidelines to govern every aspect of everyday life. In addition, the world of Islam was the scene of a battle of ideas between Abu Hamid Al-Ghazzali (Algazel), a strict traditionalist who did not believe the human mind capable of grasping the Truth as ordained by God, and Ibn Rushd (Averoess), who championed the primacy of reason. The exponents of these two schools waged a bitter battle in which the first salvo was fired by Al-Ghazzali with his book, The Incoherence of the Philosophers. Ibn Rushd answered with his brilliant treatise in defense of rationality, The Incoherence of the Incoherence. But despite his spirited defense, the outcome of the battle was clearly in Al-Ghazzali’s favour, and the great majority of Islamic jurists adopted his ideas, interpreting the precepts of Islamic law by appeal to the authority of tradition and spurning deductive reasoning altogether. Islamic jurisprudence was dominated by the Mutakallimun, or dialectical theologians, who asserted the primacy of tradition (naql), as advocated by Al-Ghazzali, over that of reason (‘aql), as advocated by Ibn Rushd. But though Ibn Rushd’s ideas were rejected by the Muslim world, they took root strongly in Europe, particularly France, which embraced his vision of the primacy of reason wholeheartedly.

Thus Muslims can be said to have known two different understandings to Islam, as it were, one based on a rigid, doctrinaire interpretation of holy texts and the violent repression of free thought; the other on a moderate and tolerant understanding of Scripture which allowed for the acceptance of the Other. The first was espoused by the secret sects (limited in number and influence) which emerged in remote areas of the Arabian Peninsula and can best be described as the Bedouin model. The second took hold in the more intellectually vibrant climate that prevailed among the peoples descended from ancient civilizations in places like Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and the Levant, which I call the Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model of Islam.

Until the mid-eighteenth century, this was the model adopted by most Muslim communities outside the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula. But that was before the rise of Wahhabism, a puritan revival movement launched by Mohamed ibn-Abdul Wahab from Najd, where he was born in 1703. In 1744, he forged an alliance with the ruler of Al-Dir’iyah, a tribal chieftain by the name of Mohamed ibn-Saud, who became his son-in-law. The alliance led to the first incarnation of the Saudi state, which, by 1804, had expanded to control nearly one million square metres of the Arabian Peninsula. It was a short-lived incarnation, lasting only until 1819, when Mohamed Ali’s son, Ibrahim Pasha, led a military expedition which destroyed Wahhabi power and razed the capital of the first Saudi state, Al-Dir’iyah, to the ground.

Mohamed Ali’s decision to send first his son Tousson then his son Ibrahim Pasha, known for his military skills, to destroy the first Saudi state had implications going far beyond the political or military ambitions of one man. It was in fact an expression of a cultural/civilizational confrontation between the two models of Islam, a confrontation the enlightened Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model decided to take to the heartland of the obscurantist, extremist and fanatical Wahhabi model. Mohamed Ali, who was extremely impressed by the European model of development and saw no contradiction between the mechanisms by which it had come about and his Islamic beliefs, believed the Wahhabi understanding of Islam stood as a major obstacle in the way of the dream he had nurtured since coming to power in 1805 (and until he abdicated in favour of his son Ibrahim in 1848), to place Egypt on a similar road to development.

Years after the defeat inflicted on them by Ibrahim Pasha (who captured their leader and sent him to Egypt, then to Istanbul where he remained until his death), the Saudis reemerged as a political force in the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula. Basing themselves in Riyadh, they began to meddle covertly in political affairs. This placed them on a collision course with the al-Rashid family in Ha’il, and the two sides were soon locked in battle. The Saudis, under the leadership of Abdul Rahman, father of the founder of the current Saudi dynasty, King Abdul Aziz, were defeated in 1891. Abdul Rahman fled to Kuwait with leading members of the House of Saud, where they remained in exile until 1902. During this period, they were the guests of Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabbah, who played an important role in the formation of the young Abdul Aziz. Born in 1876, Abdul Aziz, who came to be known as Ibn Saud, was encouraged in his dream to recapture Riyadh by the ruler of Kuwait. In 1902, Ibn Saud (Abdul Aziz) seized Riyadh and waged a 30-year campaign to assert his dominion over the Arabian Peninsula. In 1925 he entered first Mecca then Medina, and, in September 1932, the 56-year old proclaimed himself king over the Kingdom of Najd and Hejaz, later to become the first kingdom named after its ruling dynasty, Saudi Arabia.

Concomitantly with the birth of the new kingdom, which officially adopted the doctrine of Wahhabism, came the discovery of vast reservoirs of oil under its deserts. This provided the Wahhabis with a virtually endless source of funds which they used to propogate their model of Islam.

Three decades after the creation of Saudi Arabia and the discovery of oil, many things had changed in the world:

• One, Saudi Arabia had built up a huge fortune that enabled it to further the cause of Wahhabism not only within its own borders but throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Its efforts proved successful, as many once moderate Muslims were gradually won over to the harsh version of Islam preached by the Wahhabis.
• Two, beginning in the ‘sixties, Egypt suffered a reversal of fortune at all levels, including a decline in its general cultural climate, allowing Wahhabi influence to infiltrate the venerable institution of Al-Azhar. The defeat of June 1967 opened the door wide to groups which espoused the Saudi understanding of Islam and who translated their radical views into political action, often at the point of a gun.
• Three, in the context of the Cold War, the West in general and the United States in particular adopted a number of misguided policies towards the region, including turning a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabi influence in the Arab and Islamic world, and even occasionally supporting radical groups inspired by the Wahhabi doctrine to achieve their own political ends, such as ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The assassination of President Anwar Sadat by an extremist group was a wake-up call which alerted the world to the growth and spread of the Saudi-backed Wahhabi model of Islam and the retreat of the Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model. A succession of similar events attested to the dangerous spread of this model in most societies with a Muslim majority; in Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia. On the morning of September 11, 2001, a group of fanatics belonging to the Wahhabi brand of Islam launched attacks on New York and Washington that illustrated how the members of this sect view the Other in general and Western civilization in particular.

For the average European or American unfamiliar with some of the facts presented in this article, it is easy to believe that Islam, violence and terrorism go hand in hand. But those who have a more thorough grasp of the issue know that this perception of Islam has taken hold only because a puritanical, fundamentalist model of Islam, which was marginal and ineffectual before oil wealth put it on the map, has managed, thanks to petrodollars, to make the world believe that its interpretation of Islam is Islam. 


The doctrinaire version of Islam propounded by the Wahabbis had no followers among the Muslims of the world before the expansion of Saudi influence following the oil boom. Millions of Muslims in Egypt, Turkey, the Levant, Iraq, Indonesia and throughout the world remained immune to the appeal of the fanatical, violent and bloody message of what was a small and obscure sect bred in the intellectually barren landscape of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. All that changed with the massive influx of petrodollars into the coffers of Saudi Arabia, which used its new-found wealth to propagate the message of its home-grown Wahhabi sect with missionary zeal. Hence the emergence of militant Islam as a force to be reckoned with on the world stage, a force that now represents a dangerous threat to world peace, to humanity and to Islam and Muslims. Half a century ago, the Muslims of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey were models of tolerance who believed in a gentle and enlightened Islam that could, and did, coexist peacefully with other religions and cultures. Following the decline in living standards they have suffered since at the hands of despotic and corrupt rulers, they have become easy prey for the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.

The perception of Islam today by many non-Muslims is that it is a fanatical and violent religion. That is a superficial view which ignores the fact that there are two models of Islam, one that is uncompromising and extremist in its views and another that is tolerant, moderate and humanistic. It is also a naïve view that can lead to dangerous decisions like the ones which informed the West’s policies when it turned a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabism and established close links with radical Islamic movements like the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Finally, there is no need to point out to the neutral reader that the existence of Qur’anic texts which can be used to evidence the violence of Islam is unimportant, because there are enlightened interpretations of the same texts which link them to specific circumstances and events. At the end of the day, any text, even if it is divine, requires a human agency to interpret it, and the real test is how the mind elects to interpret it. Moreover, there are also many Qur’anic texts which proscribe the use of violence and aggression against those belonging to other faiths and creeds, and calls on Muslims to treat them fairly and humanely. But texts should not be the focus of debate here, not least because this would allow extremists on the other side to justify their use of violence by invoking Old Testament texts exhorting believers to violence, notably in the Book of Joshua, son of Nun.

What needs to be done at this stage is to champion the cause of enlightenment by supporting moderates and promoting the humanistic understanding of Islam that once prevailed among the vast majority of Muslims. Efforts in this direction must go hand in hand with a counter offensive against the rigid, doctrinaire, even bloodthirsty, version of Islam that first appeared among isolated communities separated from the march of civilization by the impenetrable sand dunes of the Arabian desert. Geographical isolation coupled with a narrow tribal outlook is a lethal mix that cannot possibly shape a humane and tolerant perception of the Other. The time has come for the Saudi government to part ways with Wahhabism and to realize that the alliance between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi dynasty is responsible for the spread of obscurantism, dogmatism and fanaticism, poisoning minds with radical ideas opposed to humanity, progress, civilization, cultural continuity and pluralism, the diversity of opinions and creeds that is one of the most important and enriching features of human life. 

What is needed is the Martin Luther of Islam

أنا على ثقة أن المجتمعات الإسلامية ستشهد مارتن لوثر الإسلام (وربما أكثر من مارتن لوثر) ، وأن صراعا مريرا سيستمر لسنوات (بالأحري لعقود) قبل أن نصل للحالة الصحية والتى تسمح بإنطلاق وإبداع العقل الإنساني ، وهى الحالة التى بدونها لا يمكن حدوث التقدم واللحاق بمسيرة التقدم الإنسانية ... فثقافة الطاعة والتقليد والإتباع التى يروج لها كثير من الإسلاميين بوجه عام والحنابلة وأتباع إبن تيمية وإبن قيم الجوزية والدعوة الوهابية لا يمكن أن تفرز العقل صانع التقدم ... والدليل الأوضح هو حالتنا الراهنة : فحتي أغني المجتمعات الإسلامية تعيش عالة على تجليات العقل الغربي الذى حرر نفسه منذ أكثر من أربعة قرون من ربقة عبودية العقل الإنساني للسلف والتقليد والإتباع والطاعة.

العقل المسلم بين التقليد والإبداع

عندما تطورت المجتمعات التى هى اليوم الأكثر تقدما ، فإنها قامت بتقليم أظافر رجال الدين والمؤسسات الدينية المسيحية (دين أغلبية شعوب هذه المجتمعات) ... وتم رسم الحدود بوضوح تام بين ما يحق لرجال الدين تنظيمه ، وبين ما يترك للعلم الوضعي لإدارته. وقد إقتضي حدوث ذلك صراع مرير بيت رجال ومؤسسات الدين وبين قادة الفكر . ولولا ظهور رجل مثل مارتن لوثر وما أحدثه من هزة لقواعد سلطان رجال الدين لما كانت تلك المجتمعات قد تمكنت من الخروج من الدائرة المغلقة لسلطان المؤسسات الدينية . وكما يحلو لي أن لأصف ما حدث باللهجة المصرية ، فإن رجال الدين والمؤسسات الدينية بعدما أعطوا "العقل العلمي" أكثر من ضربة موجعة "أي علقة بالمصري و قتلة بالسوري) ، فإن التقدم العلمي والفكري مكن (بفتح الميم وتسكين الكاف) من أن يعطوا هم رجال الدين والمؤسسات الدينية "علقة تاريخية" ، فأصبحوا ملتزمين بأن مجال نفوذهم هو الجانب الروحي ، أما إدارة المجتمع فإنها ليست مجالهم . وعندما رأي رجال الدين اليهود الذين كانوا يعيشون فى المجتمعات الغربية "الضربة " أو "العلقة" أو "القتلة" التى نالها رجال الدين المسيحي والمؤسسات الدينية المسيحية ، تعلموا الدرس ، فصاروا يقصرون نفوذهم - اساسا- على يوم "السبت" ... أما بقية أيام الأسبوع فيعيشها اليهود فى ظل نظام المجتمع المدني ... وأنا على ثقة أن المجتمعات الإسلامية ستشهد مارتن لوثر الإسلام (وربما أكثر من مارتن لوثر) ، وأن صراعا مريرا سيستمر لسنوات (بالأحري لعقود) قبل أن نصل للحالة الصحية والتى تسمح بإنطلاق وإبداع العقل الإنساني ، وهى الحالة التى بدونها لا يمكن حدوث التقدم واللحاق بمسيرة التقدم الإنسانية ... فثقافة الطاعة والتقليد والإتباع التى يروج لها كثير من الإسلاميين بوجه عام والحنابلة وأتباع إبن تيمية وإبن قيم الجوزية والدعوة الوهابية لا يمكن أن تفرز العقل صانع التقدم ... والدليل الأوضح هو حالتنا الراهنة : فحتي أغني المجتمعات الإسلامية تعيش عالة على تجليات العقل الغربي الذى حرر نفسه منذ أكثر من أربعة قرون من ربقة عبودية العقل الإنساني للسلف والتقليد والإتباع والطاعة

Three Interlinked Problematics: Identity, Education, Democracy

“An educated citizenry is vital to the survival of democracy”—Thomas Jefferson

1]   Identity:  On August 13, 1947, the Muslim Indian who went to bed resolved to remain in India woke up on August 14, 1947 still an Indian. But Muslim Indians who chose to leave India and join the new entity, Pakistan, slept as Indians and woke up the next morning having dropped the word Indian from their name and replaced it with a new appellation derived from the word ‘Pakistan’.

However, given that a new identity cannot be acquired overnight, the truth is that Muslim Indians who decided not to remain Indian chose to discard the Indian component of their identity and retain only the Muslim – thereby falling victim to an acute identity crisis. For they had decided to define their identity in terms of only one of its constituent elements: the religious.

How did these Indian Muslims who had cast off the Indian component of their identity fare? Pakistan broke up into two separate states when its eastern province seceded and formed the new nation of Bangladesh. It was wracked by half a dozen military coups d’état and was ruled by military juntas for long stretches at a time. As for India, not only did it not witness a single military coup, but is universally acknowledged to be the largest democracy in the world. Moreover, it developed one of the best judicial systems of the age, unlike Pakistan, whose judiciary has all too often been dominated by the military. And, where India enjoys one of the best educational systems in the world, Pakistan’s educational system is in severe decline, not least because of the proliferation of religious madrasas, one of the main breeding grounds of violence and terrorism in the world. While Pakistan, together with Arab and non-Arab partners, has provided violent Islamic organizations with some of their leading cadres, the sizable Muslim community in India, which boasts more members than the entire population of Pakistan, has remained largely aloof from these organizations.

That is because the Muslims of India who chose to retain their Indian citizenship did not fall victim to the identity crisis that has plagued Indian Muslims who renounced their Indian identity on August 14, 1947. This identity crisis is what has determined the course and destiny of Pakistan and its people, who have witnessed the break-up of Pakistan’s territorial integrity with the secession of Bangladesh, the chain of military coups, the rule by military juntas and the abortion of democracy; the declining standards of education and the lack of an independent judiciary, not to mention the burgeoning seeds of violence and the fragility of social peace. Anyone concerned about the deficiencies and breakdowns afflicting many sectors in societies like Egypt cannot afford to ignore Pakistan’s identity crisis. For Egypt and other Arab societies are going through a crisis that is in its essence similar to the one besetting Pakistan in that both base identity on religion not citizenship.

****************

In 1938, Dr. Taha Hussein published his seminal work entitled The Future of Culture in Egypt. Among the many topics he addressed in the book was the issue of identity. He began by questioning who we are culturally: Are we part of the Arab world, the Islamic world or the Mediterranean basin? We could add yet another dimension to the question: or are we, given our geographical location, part of Africa?

I believe the last six decades have brought about a great deal of confusion in the minds of Egyptians as to just what their identity is. If we were to ask a cross-section of Egyptians today to define their identity, some would say Muslim, others Arab and yet others would reply Egyptian.

The ambiguity surrounding the all-important question of identity in the country derives from political choices at the leadership level. During the Nasser era, emphasis was placed on Egypt’s Arab identity; in the post-Nasser years the emphasis gradually shifted to its Islamic identity. Today, Egypt is in dire need of concerted efforts in the cultural, information and educational fields aimed at dissipating the confusion and ambiguity in the contemporary Egyptian mindset over the critical question of identity.  In my personal opinion, Egypt needs to come to terms with itself, so to speak, on the question of identity. But this cannot be achieved by promoting one aspect of the Egyptian identity over the others.

I believe the most suitable formula for the Egyptian case is a cultural defense of the compound nature of the Egyptian identity, which, like an onion, is made up of several layers. Only such a defense can dissipate the confusion and prevent partisanship and divisiveness. Moreover, it is the only defense that reflects the reality of the situation. There is no doubt that Islamic culture has played a major role in forming the Egyptian identity. But it is by no means the only factor. Arab culture too has played a major role in developing the contemporary Egyptian identity but it would also be wrong to claim that it is the only factor. It does, however, constitute a vital part of our identity. In this connection, it is interesting to recall the late nationalist Coptic leader Makram Ebeid and a current Patriarch of the Coptic Church, Pope Shenouda III, great orators both, whose mastery of the Arabic language enabled them to play leading roles in Egyptian public life and for whom Arabic culture is a component element of their identity.

In the final analysis, the compound nature of Egypt’s identity derives from its geographical location. Instilling a sense in the national psyche of the multi-layered composition of Egypt’s identity, with its Arab, Muslim, Coptic and Mediterranean dimensions is the only way to avoid falling into a trap similar to the one in which the Pakistani identity now finds itself.

************

I can see no better way of stabilising the erratic needle on the compass of our Egyptian identity than through the medium of education. However, we are faced here with a massive and extremely complicated challenge. It would be all too easy to stuff educational programmes with material aimed at giving precedence to the Arab layer of our identity at the expense of all the others. It would be just as easy to churn out graduates with a sense of identity based on religion. But these are options that carry within them the seeds of social fragmentation as well as of society’s isolation from the modern age. The ideal option, on the other hand, is not easy. It would require the development and introduction of educational material designed to teach young people that they are Egyptians first and foremost and that their Egyptianness is the end product of a shared past and common heritage made up of millennia of ancient Egyptian history, of a Coptic era, of Islamic centuries, of Arab culture and of countless influences linked to Egypt’s status as one of the main countries abutting the Mediterranean sea. Difficult though it may be to put into effect, this option is the only one capable of achieving two primordial objectives at one and the same time: the first is social peace and harmony between the various components of society; the second is the ability to join the march of human progress.

2]   Education: The question of education has been at the forefront of a vigorous national debate over the recent period. The consensus that seems to have been reached is that setting in place a modern and creative educational system is the only solution to the problems we are facing in the political, economic, cultural and social spheres, as well as the only antidote to the spread of an understanding and interpretation of religion running counter to science and the realities of the age. But though all agree that educational reform is the key to Egypt’s salvation, they differ when it comes to how best to go about it. Some are unable to see that discipline, though essential in all educational establishments, indeed, in any institution, cannot in and of itself create a modern and creative educational system capable of rising to the challenges of our age. Others see the solution as lying in the construction of more educational buildings. Actually, the essence of the challenge is related to three issues: the first is educational philosophy, the second is educational material or curricula and the third is the teacher.

By educational philosophy I mean the formulation – at the official level – of an answer to the following question: What are our aims when it comes to education? To answer this question we need to come up with what is known in modern management science as a vision. Our vision in regard to education could be based on the following: putting in place an educational system aimed at forming citizens [and a sense of citizenship] in step with the realities of our time, who believe in science, humanity and progress, who possess the tools of research, dialogue and criticism, who believe that science and technology are capable of creating better living standards, who believe in the universality of knowledge and science and who have struck a successful balance between pride in the past of their society and a determination to link their future to the march of human progress, to science and to civilization. The educational system should also aim at instilling in the minds and consciences of Egypt’s youth the values of progress. The most important of these values is the acceptance of criticism, the practice of self-criticism, pluralism, tolerance in all its forms, acceptance of the Other, a belief in the supremacy of education and progress, in humanity and peaceful co-existence between different cultures, in the sanctity of human rights and in the rights of women as partners in the creation of a better future.

It is vitally important for educational philosophy to recognize the imperative need to move from the current educational system based on learning by rote and memory tests to a modern system based on encouraging free thinking, initiative, dialogue and debate and on fostering the creativity and imaginative thinking of students, even if they end up forming opinions different from those of the teacher.

Educational curricula should on the one hand serve the agreed upon educational philosophy and, on the other, respond to the latest innovations in applied and social sciences.

As to the teacher, who is the cornerstone of any educational system, he or she must be capable of translating the educational philosophy into a workable formula for the students and of making the transition from the current educational system into one based on free thinking, initiative, dialogue, debate, research and critical thinking.

3]   Democracy: Despite the theory propounded by some that each culture has its own form of democracy, the inescapable reality is that the essence of democracy does not change from one geographical location or culture to another. The essence of democracy is based on three essential factors. The first is that the ruler should come to power in response to free popular will. The second is that the ruler should govern in accordance with constitutional rules and be answerable to the people during and beyond his term in office. The third is that the ruler should leave office in a constitutional manner and that his term or terms should not extend in perpetuity.


Undemocratic forces in many societies pay lip service to the formal aspects of democracy by holding elections. But real democracy is not a question of elections as such but the step-by-step process of selection from beginning to end. It is a modern constitution in mature civil societies with solid institutions, parties enjoying equal rights, duties and opportunities, an independent judiciary, systems that guarantee transparency and mass media that rise above finger-pointing scandal mongering and finally, the voting process.


There is an obvious dialectical relationship between the issues of identity and education on the one hand and the issue of democracy on the other. Confusion in the area of identity can have a severe adverse effect on the process of selection that is at the heart of democracy. The same applies in regard to education. A modern educational system based on developing creativity, free thinking and critical faculties is what can transform the democratic process from a formalistic framework into a genuine tool for translating selection into decision.

Tarek Heggy's newest article (in Arabic) that will be published by "al WAFD" daily on 4th January, 2012

يقولون أنهم يطلبون احترام العالم لهم (وهو حق مؤكد لهم) ، ولكنهم لا يحترمون الآخر بالشكل الذى يطلبونه لأنفسهم ... فبمناسبة وبدون مناسبة يقولون للآخر أن كتابه المقدس محرف ! وأن عقيدته فاسدة ومزيفة !!! .... ويقولون أنهم يؤمنون بحرية الإعتقاد ، ولكنهم يتمسكون بأن المعتقدات المسموح (!!) بها هى الأديان الثلاثة الإبراهيمية (أو التى يسميها البعض بالسماوية) ! ويقولون أنهم ليسوا ضد أي دين آخر ، ولكن ما أن يشرع أبناء أي دين آخر فى بناء دورعبادة لهم ، حتى يثور بركان غضبهم ويقوم بعضهم بتدمير دورالعبادة التى كان "الآخر" يهم ببناءها ! ... ويتحدثون بحماس عن حقهم فى إنشاء دور عبادة لأبناء وبنات دينهم فى أي وكل مكان على سطح الكرة الأرضية ، ولكن الدولة التى تضم أقدس مقدساتهم لا يوجد بها (وغير مسموح) دور عبادة لأي دين أو معتقد أو طائفة أخري !!! وعندما يقرر الشعب السويسري (من خلال إقتراع عام) أنه رغم السماح لهم بإنشاء دور عبادة جديدة ولكن بدون مآذن ، يغلي الدم فى عروقهم ويفور بركان غضبهم وتنطلق كالجحيم صراخاتهم ! وكأنهم نسوا أن كبري بلدانهم لا تسمح بكنيسة واحدة للمسيحيين أو معبد لليهود أو للبوذيين أو للبهائيين !!!! يتمسكون (عن طريق منظمات المجتمع المدني) بتحسين صورتهم وصورة معنقداتهم فى برامج التعليم فى البلدان المتقدمة التى آوتهم وفتحت صدرها وقبلتهم كمهاجرين اليها ... فإن طالب المسيحيون او اليهود او البهائيون بالمقابل ، تعالي عويلهم وشجبهم للتدخلات الأجنبية المشبوهة فى برامجهم التعليمية . يوجد من أبناء دينهم أعضاءا بكل برلمانات أوروبا وأمريكا الشمالية وأستراليا ... أما هم فلا يوجد ببرلماناتهم أي وافد من الخارج ، بل ويقومون بإلغاء عضوية أي إبن أو إبنة من الوطن إن ثبت تمتعه بأية جنسية أخري !!! يهاجرون لبلدان أوروبا وامريكا الشمالية وأستراليا هاربين من إنعدام الحريات (بشتى صورها) وإنعدام فرص الحياة الطيبة ... وما أن يستقروا فى الجنة التى طالما حلموا بها حتى يبدأ بعضهم فى العمل على تدمير البنية الأساسية للمنظومة الدستورية والقانونية والثقافية للجنة التى فروا اليها من جحيم مجتمعاتهم الغارقة تحت مياه بحيرة التخلف الآسنة ... وعندما يكتشف أبناء المجتمعات المتقدمة التى فر لها "هؤلاء" أن كل ما يريده من الديموقراطية "بعض" هؤلاء المهاجرين انما هو إستعمال الديموقراطية لنسف وتدمير الديموقراطيات الغربية ، يعلو صراخهم : إنقذونوا من موجة العداء لنا ولديننا !! .... إنها مأساة منطقتنا التى اختطفها حكام هم آية من أكبر آيات الجهل المضفر بالفساد وإنعدام الرؤية وغياب الحس التاريخي واختفاء الثقافة ... وبعد نصف قرن من حكم هؤلاء اللصوص - الجهلة تكون شعوب مجتمعاتنا غير قادرة على الإطلاق على إختيار الكفاءة المضفرة بالمعرفة والمتوخية للتقدم والمتسمة بالنزاهة .... وعندما تصل بنا عواقب نصف قرن من الجهل والفساد الى ما نحن فيه اليوم ، فلا يبقي لنا من خيار الا خوض المباراة بأدوات الديموقراطية وفى مقدمتها التمسك بإيماننا بالعلم (لا بالخرافة) وبتقنيات علوم الإدارة الحديثة وبالإنسانية وبالتقدم وبالحداثة وبالنسبية وبالتعددية (بمعناها الحقيقي ، لا بمعناها الزائف الذى يكرره اليوم بعض الثيوقراطيين) وبقبول الآخر وبحقوق الانسان وبحقوق المرأة العصرية المساوية تماما للرجل وبالسماحة الثقافية والدينية .... والأهم : بالدولة المدنية القائمة على المواطنة وعلى فصل الدين عن الدولة .... وأن يتمرسوا على العمل السياسي وعلى التواصل من الشعب بشتي طبقاته وعلى خدمة المجتمع .... ورغم أن هذا يبدو كمهمة عسيرة فى مواجهة سحب التراجع (للخلف) السوداء التى تغطي سماء واقعنا اليوم ، فإن الإيمان الحقيقي بقيم التقدم لا يكون حقيقيا وجديرا بالإحترام ما لم يعلنه المؤمنون به فى ظل ظرف تاريخي محبط كالظرف التاريخي الذى خلفه حكام مجرمون مثل بن علي وحسني مبارك والقذافي وعبدالله صالح (وقد سقطوا) وبشار الأسد (وهو سيسقط لا محالة خلال هذا العام الجديد) .... وأن يعملوا من الآن على إسترداد عقل وقلب الوطن من دعاة الماضي وخصوم العلم والتقدم والحريات والمعاصرة

Religious Reform: Cornerstone of Reform in the Arab Societies

I. Overview:

Islam has played an important role in the making of history and culture of the Arabic speaking peoples. While the “Muslim mind” has known periods of prosperity (according to the norms of the Middle-Ages) until the twelfth century A.D., it has also known, since that time, a course of decline, stagnation, and isolation, of which one cannot hide the features. Since the interaction of the peoples of this region with the West (from the first day of the French Campaign in Egypt in 1798), the problematic has materialized in two trends: the first trend asserts that the backwardness of our societies is due to the fact that we do not hold the set of religious doctrines as the way of life and work of individuals and societies. The holders of the second trend believe that it is inevitable to follow the mechanisms of the Western civilization in order to accomplish progress in their societies. It may be said (with some generalization) that the political, cultural, intellectual, and educational atmosphere of the Arabic speaking societies is witnessing a conflict between these two tendencies: the tendency of returning to Islamic sources and origins, and the tendency to use the mechanisms and values of the Western civilization which have gone beyond the frontiers of the West in the geographic sense, as they have been adopted by several societies outside the West. 

I suggest that the preachers of the return to the sources and origins have little to offer besides big promises to the masses, while the intellectuals know that Islamic history is a purely human history which has known an era of relative prosperity (the reality and extent of which are often exaggerated), which has then diminished and fallen after adopting a mentality of copying, opposed to reason and innovation, and when it set a low ceiling to the work of the human mind. 

A big dilemma in this debate (which, in my opinion, is futile) is the mistake of looking upon the engines, mechanisms, dynamics and incentives of the Western civilization as being “Western”. I have proven in many of my books that the progress which Europe has witnessed occurred due to human factors and not European or Western factors. The first of these factors is the strict limitation imposed on the authority and power of clergymen, followed by raising the ceiling on freedom of thought, and the encouragement of the critical mind. These are the two factors which have helped the evolution of the values of progress, which are all “purely human”, not Western, Christian, or European. 

One of the most obvious proofs that the values and characteristics of human progress are human and universal is what has taken place on a big scale in the Asian continent, when non-European societies employed the mechanisms and values of progress to accomplish development, and were able to achieve the required progress. This is what the world has witnessed in Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and then in other societies such as the Malaysian society which one may consider as the biggest proof that the values and mechanisms of progress are universal and human. 

Coming back to Arabic speaking societies, analyzing their present political, economic, social, cultural, educational and media phenomena shows that their environments are devoid of the values of progress which are, as previously stated, clearly human and universal. The biggest challenge this approach will have to face will always come from religious institutions, not for a purely religious motive (or even any religious motive as such), but to defend the unlimited authority and power to rule and direct life in their societies. 

The reform of general education and with equal importance, of religious education is the cornerstone of the project of progress and development, which no one in our (Arabic speaking) societies can achieve before the educational reform, and particularly the reform of religious education, inculcates in the minds and consciences the values of progress as values that are first and foremost human and universal.

II. The Values of Progress:

An overview of the advanced societies, with a parallel knowledge of their history and march, shows that the progress of the societies which have advanced in their course towards development and progress is the result of a set of values which have been made fundamental to the society, by making them fundamental to the religious question.  It is on the basis of these values that our Arabic speaking societies need to rebuild their educational institutions, among which  the institutions of religious teaching. 

The first value of progress is reason, criticism, and a wide space for the “critical mind”. This first value of progress will always be the most attacked by theocracy and those theocrats who know the implications of making this value fundamental to the educational institution of any society.

The second value is the one of “plurality” as being one of the most important characteristics of life in general, and of knowledge, science and culture in particular. 

The third value is “otherness”, the essence of which is accepting the other, regardless of the aspect or the race of that other. Otherness is a natural consequence of the implantation of plurality. 

The fourth of these values is the “universality of science and knowledge”. This value has a strong dialectical link with the three values previously mentioned. 

The fifth value is the value of religious and cultural “tolerance”, as the natural consequence of the belief in the diversity of the different aspects of life. 

The sixth value concerns “women and their place in the society”, starting with the idea that women are totally equal to men, have equal rights and duties, and have an equal human value. The link between progress and the status of women is a double dialectical link: on one hand, women represent half of the society in number; immobilizing half of the society can only have negative effects.  On the other hand, women raise the other half of the society; if they are not free people, they will bring up the other half with a mixture of the defects and disadvantages resulting from being brought up at the hands of an inferior person. 

The seventh value is the one of “human rights” according to the concept which was developed during the past two centuries. 

The eighth value is that of “citizenship”, as being the basis of the relationship between citizens, and their relationship with the state. 

The ninth value is the modern concept of the state and “the rule of law” which differs from the concept of the tribe, the village, and the family. 

The tenth value is that of “democracy”, the noblest human invention of the last two centuries.

The eleventh value is the value of “work”, including the modern notions surrounding work, such as team work, competence, the techniques of modern management, and the culture of enterprise as opposed to the culture of individuals. 

The twelfth value is the “interest in the future” more than the excessive interest in the past, which is a characteristic of the Arab culture. 

The thirteenth value is the value of “objectivity” which, even if it is relative, differs from the subjectivity that reigns in certain ancient cultures, the Arab culture being one of the most important. The sociology of the tribe which has widely governed the Arab culture favors subjectivity, and is far from the notion of objectivity. 

The fourteenth value is the “relativity of science, knowledge and human governance”. The course of the human mind during these last three centuries has led it far from the culture of absolute governance, and driven it closer to the culture of relative governance. 

The fifteenth value is that of “participation” and not following. Participation is a value which strongly opposes the importance of following and the scantiness of participating which the Arab cultures have secreted.

 

III. What is to be done?

During the last two centuries, the partisans of science, reason, and modernity slightly advanced in our societies. Then, they fell back to second place, far behind the school of returning to the roots and origins. In my opinion, there are several reasons for this, the major one being that the debate remains at a global (macro) level, without focusing on the radical change of the mentality through learning. Dialogue on a global level is generally based on slogans which are more attractive to the public. The majority of the supporters of the return to origins hold slogans that attract masses, even if they are half educated or half cultured (which is the case of most of them). When the opportunity presented itself in the form of leadership which was capable of undertaking the crossing from the darkness of reality to the light of progress (like in Turkey from 1923 to 1938, and in Tunisia from 1956 to 1987), the work on the educational institutions remained incomplete, along with the size of religious teaching (totally divorced from the mentality of progress and modernity) reaching, in chief countries like Turkey and Egypt, between 15% and 20% of the number of children of the society enrolled in the educational operation. 

I think that despite the rise of the wave of the return to origins and roots, the world situation and the flow of history favor political authorities, authorities of the civil society, a selection of intellectuals, and authorities of education and media who believe in progress.  These will be able, in the shadow of the general conditions, to sow the seed of reform in the land of education in general, and religious teaching in particular.

 

IV.  Reforming religious institutions, not ignoring them:

Having observed the cultural conditions of Arabic speaking societies for almost forty years, I am almost certain that ignoring religion (let alone wound it with pens and tongues of people motivated by anger rather than knowledge) is a fact which will yield no positive fruit. Religion is an essential element of the air which the peoples of our Arabic speaking region breathe. It is better to work on the reformation of religious institutions, religious culture, religious education and education in general, than to wage a Don Quixotic style duel which will only result in losing of the peoples and distancing them. Here lies the danger of some groups of Arab intellectuals who have set as their primary mission the insolent attack on religion, instead of working on the way people understand religion.

Edited by Sharon Bussell