هـــــــــــوية في خطـــر

*   شبه الكاتبُ النرويجي الشهير هنريك إبسن هوية أي شعب بثمرةِ البصل التي تتكون من العديد من الرقائق . وبهذا المفهوم الصادر عن أحد أعظم العقول الأدبية الأوربية في العصور الحديثة والمعتمد من مفكري الإنسانية المتحضرة ، فإن الهوية المصرية هي أيضاً ( مثل البصلة ) تكونت من رقائقِ عدة . فهناك العديد من الرقائق التي مصدرها مصر القديمة التي إستمرت حضارتها لنحو ثلاثين قرناً متصلة . وهناك العديد من الرقائق النابعة من الحقبة القبطية ، عندما كانت مصرُ بأكملها مجتمعاً مسيحياً شرقياً . وهناك رقائق لا تحصى مصدرها مصر الإسلامية ومصر المتكلمة باللغة العربية. وهناك رقائق أخرى عديدة مصدرها مصر الحديثة التي أسسها محمد على الذي حكم مصر من 1805 إلى 1848 ، وإستمرت دولته لأكثر قليلاً من قرِناً بعد وفاته . وهناك أخيراً الرقائق العديدة التي أنتجها موقع مصر الجغرافي كمجتمع من مجتمعات البحر المتوسط  بوجه عام ، وكمجتمع من مجتمعات شرق البحر المتوسط بشكل أكثر خصوصية.

·   هذا التكوين المركب هو حقيقة تاريخية وجغرافية لا شك فيها . وهذه الحقيقة لا تحتوي على تناقضات . فالعقل البدائي والبسيط هو فقط الذي يرى التناقض في الظواهر المركبة .

·   هذه الهوية المصرية الثرية والرائعة والبديعة والعامرة بثمارِ عديدةِ من ثمارِ التلاقح الحضاري والثقافي هي اليوم معرضة لتدمير منهجي ومقصود  لذاتها ومكوناتها ، ولتعدد رقائقها العاكس لأهم الفوارق بين المجتمع المصري ومجتمعات أخرى محيطة شديدة الفقر الحضاري والثقافي  بسبب أحادية أبعاد مكوناتها .

·   ان تيار الإسلام السياسي المنتشي اليوم لأنه على وشك الإستحواذ على مقاليد الأمور في مصر بقدر ما أنه حقيقة من حقائق الواقع المصري ، فإنه أيضاً مصدر خطر داهم على الطبيعة المركبة للهوية المصرية  القائمة على تعددية ثرية.

     

*   فبسبب هيمنة المدارس الفكرية المحافظة على معظم  العقول المسلمة المعاصرة ( مع إستفحال شأن المذهب الحنبلي وطروحات ابن تيمية وابن قيم الجوزية والدعوة الوهابية وسائر التيارات السلفية ) فإن احتمال شيوع وذيوع موجة ثقافية معادية للأبعاد غير الأسلامية من أبعاد الهوية المصرية هو إحتمال وارد وشديد الخطورة . ويكفي ما يردده البعض عن آثار الحضارة المصرية القديمة الأروع بين الحضارات الإنسانية. وبمحاذة ذلك ، فإن شيوعَ قيمٍ مضادة ومعادية للآخر ( أيا كان شكل وكنه هذا الآخر ) هو أمر وارد ومحتمل وشديد الخطورة على  طبيعة الهوية المصرية القائمة على التعددية .

*    وأخشى ماأخشاه ان يتولى التيار السياسي إعادة صياغة برامج التعـــــليم في مصَر بشكل يعُلي من شأن البعد الإسلامي / العربي ، في نـــفــــــــس الوقت الذي يدمـــــــــــر فيه الأبعــــــــاد الأخرى . وهذا الإحــــــــتمال ( المدمر ) غير بعيد عن الواقع في ظل وجود مجلس تشريعي ( برلمان ) يسيطر عليه تيار واحد يهيمن على لجنة التعليم بنسق فكري لا شك في كونه مضاد للتعددية الثقافية ، ولا شك في أنه سيكون شديد الإهتمام بالبعد الإسلامي / العربي وفي الوقت نفسه قليل العناية بالأبعاد الأخرى ( وهو موقف متوقع من أي جهة ثيوقراطية ).

·   والمؤسف ان هذا التوجه لخدمة هوية أحادية البعد قد بدأ بالفعل ومنذ سنوات مع زيادة غلبة التفكير الديني (الإسلامي) على عقول القائمين على التعليم في مجتمعنا .   ويكفي مثال واحد للتدليل على هذا القول وهو ما حدث لمقرارات تعليم اللغة العربية وأدابها . فعوضاً عن تقديم ثمار أدبية يانعة لقامات مثل أحمد لطفي السيد و طه حسين والعقاد والمازني وسلامة موسى وتوفيق الحكيم ونجيب محفوظ ويوسف إدريس ونزار قباني والسيابّ وميخائيل نعيمه وعشرات غيرهم ، تحولت موادُ اللغة العربية إلى دروسٍ دينيةٍ بحيث أصبح من الصعب معرفة هل هذه مقررات مواد اللغة العربية وآدابها أم أنها مقررات مادة الدين الأسلامي .

·      يصف المفكر والأديب اللبناني المعروف أمين معلوف أية هوية أحادية البعد بإنها هوية قاتلة . وهذا وصف دقيق وصائب . فأية هوية أحادية البعد في زماننا هذا مرشحة للصدام مع قيم التعددية وقبول الآخر وإعلاء قيمة العقل النقدي ناهيك عن التضاد مع جوهر فكرة الإنسانية بمعنى إشتراك الحضارات والثقافات المختلفة في أفق أعلى هو أفق الأنسانية . وأقول لمن يكرر مقولة : " ولكنها إرادة الشعب " . لهؤلاء أقول : إن إرادة الشعب الألماني هي أيضاً التي جاءت منذ ثمانية عقود بأدولف هتلر لسدة الحكم في ألمانيا ، وهو ما كلّف البشرية حروبً ومجازرً أودت بأرواحِ أكثر من خمسين مليون إنسان. وهو مثال يسوّغ لنا نقد الحقبة الثقافية الراهنة في مصر والتي تهدد المكـــــــونات غير الأسلامية للهوية المصـــــــــــــرية وتـنذر بتحـــــــــــــولنا إلى مجتمع أحادي الهوية ( كمجتمعات الرمال المحيطة بنا ) حتى لو كنا قد وصلنا لما وصلنا إليه بفعل الإرادة الشعبية . فالخطأ ( كما قال فولتير ) يظل خطأً حتى لو كرره الف ألف إنسان.  

  

Teaching superstitions as truths is a most terrible thing...

"Fables should be taught as fables, myths as myths, and miracles as poetic fancies. To teach superstitions as truths is a most terrible thing." - Hypatia of Alexandria (370 - 415 AD) 

هذه مقولة وإن كان عمرها 24 قرنا ، إلا أنها تبقي رائعة وصائبة وحكيمة وعلمية ، ونحن أكثر الشعوب حاجة لتدبر معانيها بعد أن أصبح معظم المصريين عاجزين عن إدراك الفارق بين "الحقيقة العلمية" و "الحقيقة الدينية" .... وهو ما أوصلنا لحالتنا الراهنة ولكون مساهمتنا فى مسيرة التقدم العلمي "صفرا" كبيرا .... طارق حجي

The Spread of Islamic Fundamentalism

I used to believe, wrongly as it turned out, that my reading of the reasons behind the spread of Islamic fundamentalist ideas had settled into a permanent or semi-permanent form. As I saw it, the situation could be summed up as follows:

•  The interpretations of Islam for one thousand and two hundred years after its inception were characterized by the existence of what was, by the standards of the Middle Ages, a moderate, indeed, often an extremely moderate, Sunni trend. Side by side with this moderate trend there existed various schools, trends and interpretations ranging from relative moderation to extreme radicalism, whether within the main Sunni schools [represented by ibn-Taymiyah and ibn-Qaiym Al-Juzeya within the Hanbali trend], or radical sects like the Khawarij , the Qarmations and other secret sects. For the most part, though, it was the moderate interpretations of Islam that steered the course of Muslim societies.

•  Although the moderate trend in interpreting Islam prevailed for twelve centuries, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Christian calendar this trend, with its emphasis on rationality, received a devastating blow when the ruling political class, along with hordes of men of religion and even educated classes turned towards the school of naql , which called for strict adherence to orthodoxy and tradition. So potent was the influence of this school that its leading exponent, Abu Hamid Al-Ghazzali, was dubbedHujat al Islam [the authoritative source of Islam]. At the same time, the works of the great philosopher Ibn Rushd, who championed the primacy of reason, were burnt. While Al-Ghazzali believed that intuition, not reason, was capable of grasping the Truth as ordained by God, Ibn Rushd, a student, interpreter and expositor of Aristotle, believed just the opposite, upholding the primacy of reason as Aristotle had done centuries earlier. The blow suffered by moderate Islam during this period set the stage for what was later to become the dangerous spread of the ideas derived from the teachings of Ahmed Ibn Hanabal, ibn-Taymiyah and ibn-Qaiym Al-Juzeya.

•  In the middle of the eighteenth century of the Christian calendar, a hitherto marginal trend was propelled to the fore with the creation of a state whose system of government and judicature were based on an extremely rigid interpretation of Islam. This was the system that grew out of the alliance forged in 1744 between the ruler of Dir'iyah, Mohamed ibn-Saud, and its judge, Mohamed ibn-Abdul Wahhab, who gave his name to Wahhabism.

•  In the last two centuries moderate Islam, which had hitherto presided over the shaping of the Muslim mindset, was edged out of its central role by the radical school of thought through two gateways: the first was the establishment of a political system that derived its legitimacy from a rigid interpretation of Islam; the second was the unprecedented wealth created by a massive influx of petrodollars into the coffers of religious hardliners who allow no scope for reason or independent thinking when it comes to the interpretation of holy texts. Concomitant with this development, societies traditionally espousing a moderate brand of Islam were in full retreat at all levels – political, economic, cultural and educational.

•  This gives a panoramic view of the changes that have taken place in the way Muslims understood their religion for over fourteen centuries and how the last two centuries have seen the rise of rigid, doctrinaire interpretations as a result of a combination of strategic, political, economic, ethical, cultural, educational and social factors coupled with the overwhelming impact of sudden wealth derived in a manner and of a magnitude unprecedented in human history.

When we place what happened in Egypt after July 23, 1952 , in the context of this general framework, the picture becomes even more dramatic. I believe the essence of the political dream behind the July 23 project was the expansion of the Egyptian middle class. That is a noble aspiration in every sense, but as many will agree, the same cannot be said in respect of the practical measures taken to turn the dream into reality. There is no doubt that the regime that came to power on that date inherited an Egyptian middle class [inclusive of its three components: lower middle, middle middle and upper middle] that was vibrant and richly textured. But it formed a relatively thin crust below which the vast majority lived in circumstances far removed from the march of history. The big dream was to expand the Egyptian middle class both vertically and horizontally, to increase its size, numbers and layers. Was the dream realized? The answer is both yes and no. from the quantitative point of view, there has been a huge expansion in the size of the middle class with its different layers. However, this has been achieved at the expense of quality, with the deterioration, not to say collapse, that has occurred at all levels, perhaps best exemplified by the difference between the standard of Cairo University today and its status as a world-class academic institution sixty years age.

Against the backdrop of these sea changes – the extremists taking over the helm of Islamic affairs from the moderates and the sharp decline in the standards of learning, education and culture of the Egyptian middle class [among the highest in the world between 1900 and 1950] – we find ourselves in a new reality, bereft of a large middle class capable of defending the moderate brand of Islam that held sway in Egypt for close on one thousand and three hundred years.

Among the negative effects of the decline in the standard of the middle class is that it has lost its capacity to serve as an example to be followed, whether in the political, social or cultural domains. The upper middle class in pre-1952 Egypt , as in other societies, performed two functions: on the one hand, it admired the classes above it, including the large foreign contingent living in Egypt at the time, and sought to emulate them; on the other, it was itself a model that the lower classes admired and sought to emulate.

It can be said that art in all its forms, particularly cinema, as well as songs, were all a mirror reflecting these two functions. As someone interested in the philological and sociological analyses of language, I find that the colloquial Arabic used in Egypt today attests to the decline in standards. Sixty years ago, language reflected each class's aspiration to rise to a class higher than itself. Today this process has been turned on its head, with the language used at the base of society moving upwards towards its summit.

I believe that if the post-1952 regime had realized its dream of expanding the Egyptian middle class while maintaining the same high quality of knowledge, education and culture it enjoyed previously, the school of extremism in interpreting Islam would not have made as much headway as it succeeded in doing. Its main achievement is the hold it has gained over Egyptian culture and mindset, an achievement the extremist schools consider as important as their success in spreading their message throughout the world.

Every religion has its share of zealots who preach ideas contrary to the march of human progress. The history of Judaism and Christianity is rife with such examples. Even today there are proselyters in both faiths who hold extremist views. But their followers are few in number and do not constitute a serious problem for humanity. In Islamic societies, on the other hand, those who preach an extremist, doctrinaire version of Islam manage to attract a huge following, while their moderate counterparts succeed in reaching only a limited number of believers.

I always used to attribute the success of the extremists in Islamic societies to political, economic and social factors. However, I have recently come to the conclusion that this explanation is inadequate. Perhaps the point I am trying to make is best illustrated by the situation in Kuwait today, a society whose extreme affluence has not prevented the rise of a particularly rigid and regressive Islamist trend, isolated from the march of civilization and humanity. As I now realize, the phenomenon represented in the huge numbers that find the message of the extremists so appealing is more complex than to be explained solely in terms of poverty, anger and frustration. The real explanation is the absence of a modern, forward-looking middle class with an up-to-date educational formation that can defend the values of progress and modernity. The existence of such a class serves as the main bulwark against the spread of extremist ideas that do not lack the means to expand in all cities and continents, not only in our own societies but in Europe, America and throughout the world.

The Proliferation of Militant Islam: Who Is Responsible?

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In the years between 1967 and 1973, while I was studying towards a degree in law and a Masters in general and comparative law, I acquired a rudimentary knowledge of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Later, while teaching at universities abroad, I set out to develop a wider knowledge of the subject.  In the course of a journey extending over twenty years, I developed a strong aversion for those I call “worshippers of the word” and “prisoners of tradition”, and a profound admiration for the proponents of reason, most notably, of course, Ibn Rushd (Averoess), whose championship of the primacy of reason was adopted by Europe and rejected by the Muslim world. Europe’s gain was our loss: in turning our backs on Ibn Rushd, we lost a historic opportunity for development. A close reading of all Ibn Taymeya’s works, as well as the works of his disciples, from Ibn Qaiym Al-Juzeya to Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab at the end of the eighteenth century, only deepened my aversion towards this trend and my admiration for the Mu’tazalites, who emphasized human responsibility in matters of religion, and for liberal thinkers who chose the path of reason over that of dogma, like Ibn Sinna (Avicenna), Al-Farabi and the leading exponent of this school, Ibn Rushd.


I spent years trying to understand why the Muslims had chosen to follow the line advocated by Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, the proponent of orthodoxy and tradition for whom knowledge meant only knowledge of religion and who cancelled the role of the mind altogether by denying the possibility of acquiring knowledge through intuition, over the line advocated by Ibn Rushd, who upheld the primacy of reason and sowed the seeds of a renaissance we chose not to reap. Why were Al-Ghazali’s ideas so readily accepted while Ibn Rushd’s were rejected? I believe the answer to this paradox can be summed up in one word: despotism. At a time despotism in our part of the world was at its height, it is not surprising that Muslim rulers should have found Al-Ghazali’s ideas more appealing than those of Ibn Rushd. 

The orthodox line was also more appealing to their subjects who, under the yoke of tyranny, found it safer and less demanding to go along with the views of those who required nothing more from them than a suspension of their critical faculties. In Europe, where the forces of enlightenment were locked in a confrontation with the clericalism that stifled intellectual initiative and rational thought, despotism was in retreat. This explains why, in the thirteenth century, a prestigious centre of learning like the University of Paris supported the ideas of the Arab Muslim Ibn Rushd over those of the European Christian Thomas Aquinas, the scholastic philosopher famous for his two-swords doctrine.

Meanwhile, the Muslim world continued to be ruled by despots who brooked no challenge to their authority and an equally despotic religious establishment which decried the use of reason and demanded blind adherence to the authority of tradition. Closely linked as to methods, motivations and goals, these two factors created an atmosphere that was inimical to the unhindered pursuit of knowledge. Still, things were not only either black or white. True, the Muslims lost an historic opportunity to use Ibn Rushd’s ideas as a springboard that could have placed them on a path similar to the one which took Europe from the obscurantist thinking of the thirteenth century to the vigorous intellectual climate which encourages debate, free thinking, general freedoms and creativity in literature, art and science. But it is also true that Muslims have known two “Islams” as it were; one that can be described as the Turkish-Egyptian model and one as the Bedouin model. While the former cannot claim to have attained the level of enlightenment, progressive thinking and freedom that characterizes the ideas of Ibn Rushd, it was nevertheless a gentle and tolerant Islam that could and did coexist with others. Indeed, non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed more protection that any other minority living anywhere else in the world at the time. Under the Ottomans, Christians of the Levant and Jews in Arab countries lived in conditions very similar to the ones in which the Muslim subjects of the empire were living. Even when they were persecuted by certain rulers, like Al-Hakem bi Amr Allah, it was part of a general policy that made no distinction between non-Muslims and Muslims. And although this model of Islam can in no way be described as secular, it adopted an enlightened approach to religion, dealing with it as a system of spiritual beliefs rather than as a system that ruled all aspects of life and governed the affairs of society.


Concurrently, an altogether different model of Islam was taking shape among geographically isolated communities living far from coastlines and hence from exposure to the outside world. Their insularity provided an ideal breeding ground for the ideas of Ibn Taymema, Ibn Qaym Al-Juzeya and, towards the end of the eighteenth century, those of Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab. A collision between the two models of Islam was inevitable, and, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, they confronted one another on the field of battle. Under the command of Mohamed Ali’s son, Tousson, then of his other son, Ibrahim, arguably the greatest of the Egyptian ruler’s sons, the Egyptian army, and with it, the more enlightened Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam, emerged victorious.

But the winds of change were blowing throughout the region, and the years that followed were not kind to Turkey and Egypt. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I brought an end to Turkey’s ascendancy, while Egypt’s influence receded as its economy and educational system declined. Meanwhile, the proponents of the model of Islam which demanded a strict adherence to the letter of scripture and slammed the door shut in the face of rationality, suddenly found themselves in control of vast wealth unprecedented in history. This gave them an enormous edge over their moderate rivals and allowed them to extend their influence into the traditional strongholds of the Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam, where they waged a systematic campaign to co-opt establishment personalities and institutions. The success of this campaign found its most salient expression in the emergence of fanatical movements like the Taliban, who interpreted the doctrines of religion on the basis of tradition alone and imposed a scholastic, doctrinal brand of Islam that left no room for the exercise of reason. This sorry state of affairs could have been avoided if the majority of Muslims had supported Ibn Rushd or if conditions had not forced the retreat of the Turkish-Egyptian model.

In numerous lectures I gave in Europe and America, I tried to familiarize people with what I call Egyptian Islam which, until the nineteen forties, stood as a unique example of tolerance and flexibility. Noted for its acceptance of the Other, it was not pathologically obsessed with the fine print of scripture. While recognizing the divine character of the prophetically revealed laws, it also recognized that some of their provisions were formulated in the context of a different time, place and circumstances. Thus divinity was reserved for religion and did not extend to how mortals understood or chose to interpret its strictures. It was tacitly understood that there is a subjective dimension to the interpretation of any text, and that interpretation is necessarily coloured by the interpreter’s cultural formation, knowledge and intellectual abilities.

The voices now raised in the West in general and in the United States in particular to warn against the menace of “militant Islam” would do well to ask themselves a number of important questions:

- Who shut their eyes for many years to a general climate which allowed the militant model of Islam to spread unchecked and forced the civilized, humanistic Turkish-Egyptian model to retreat in disarray as economic conditions and educational institutions declined, leaving the way open to an invasion by the militant model? Who turned a blind eye to these developments for close to thirty years and are today bemoaning the way things have turned out?


- Who in the nineteen fifties and perhaps even earlier invented the dangerous game of using political Islam to create a strategic balance with socialism? (In the seventies, Egypt played the same game with disastrous consequences.)


- Has the West only now realized that there is no room for freedom, democracy, human rights, women’s rights or civil rights in the militant model of Islam? Did it really believe this model to be a shining example of these noble humanistic values in the nineteen sixties, seventies and eighties?


- Why is the dossier of the honeymoon between the United States and the Afghan mujahedeen not being opened? Or, for that matter, the chapter of the close links which political Islam in pre-revolutionary Iran enjoyed with the West, particularly France? And, before that, the relations between political Islam in Egypt and Britain, the occupying power at the time, particularly during the two terms of the Mohamed Mahmoud government (1928 and 1938)?

The critical mind, which is the pride of civilized humanity, imposes an obligation on all of us to answer those questions. It also requires all parties to assume a share of the responsibility for what happened and is continuing to happen. It requires us, further, to look closely into the two models of Islam referred to in this article and ask ourselves which is more capable of joining the march of civilization and living in harmony with the requirements of the age, without abandoning the positive features of our cultural specificity. 


Is it the model engendered by the school of traditionalists, victims of their geographical isolation behind high sand dunes, or the moderate, tolerant, liberal Turkish-Egyptian model? Better still, could we adopt the enlightened model of Ibn Rushd, which helped Western civilization move out of the Dark Ages into the Enlightenment at a time we chose to adopt the thinking of his opponents, thereby allowing ourselves to fall prey to a culture which favours superstition, myths, ignorance and a rabid militancy over education, work, development and brotherhood? 




One may read the full article (Islam Between Copying & Thinking) here.

Thoughts from a fossilized mind....

خواطر عن العقل الأحفوري ... بقلم : طارق حجي ولعت (منذ دراستي للشريعة الإسلامية بشكل معمق ضمن مواد الماجيستير فى القانون منذ أربعين سنة بالتحديد ) بدراسة الفقه الإسلامي . وهو عمل بشري محض صاغ مؤسسه المعروف بالأمام الأعظم أبي حنيفة النعمان تعريفا رائعا له بأنه علم إستنباط الأحكام العملية من أدلتها الشرعية. ولم أكتف بدراسة شاملة ومعمقة للفقه الحنفي والمالكي والشافعي والحنبلي وفقه مذاهب أخري سنية اندثرت مثل فقه الإمام الليث وأبي جعفر الطبري ، وإنما امتد بحثي لسائر فقه الشيعة ، واهمه فقه جعفر الصادق (وهو ابن محمد الباقر بن علي زين العابدين بن الحسين بن علي بن ابي طالب) ، كما شغفت (من باب الفضول ليس إلا) بفقه مذاهب الخوارج الأربعة ، وأهمها فقه الإباضية وفقه الأزارقة ... كما عرجت على موضوع هام فى التاريخ الإسلامي ، وهو موضوع "الفرق" ... ولم اعجب بفرقة كما اعجبت بالمعتزلة ومن إنبثق عنهم (كالزمخشري فى التفسير والجاحظ فى الأدب ... (وسحرني عقل غيلان الدمشقي الذى كان ينكر فكرة القدر ، ويعتبرها نافية لمسئولية الانسان عن اعماله الخيرة والسيئة ... وسأكتب فى يوم من الأيام عن رحلتي فى هذه العوالم والتى بدأت فى السبعينات بسبب إفتتانى بمؤلفات العلامة المصري محمود اسماعيل الرزاق بوجه عام ، وكتاباته الفذة عن الخوارج والقرامطة . ولكنني أكتفي فى هذا المقال بعدد من الملاحظات والأسئلة الملحة . عاش فقهاء المذاهب السنية الأربعة الكبري (أبو حنيفة ومالك ومحمد بن ادريس الشافعي واحمد بن حنبل) ما بين سنة 70 هجرية وسنة 220 هجرية (690 - 840 ميلادية) . ومن الغرائب والعجائب ان الاول كان اكثر تحررا من الثاني ، وان الثاني كان اكثر تحررا من الثالث ، وان الثالث كان اكثر تحررا من الرابع ... وان الرابع كان اكثرهم محافظة وانعدام حرية عقلية امام النص واكثرهم نقلا واقلهم عقلا ! وسأعطي مثالا واحدا : فبينما سوغ ابو حنيفة رفض الفقيه لتأسيس الأحكام على الأحاديث التى تسمى أخبار أحاد" ، فإن مذهب الرابع (احمد بن حنبل ، واشهر شراحه ابن تيمية وابن قيم الجوزية والداعية الذى سار على نهجهم محمد بن عبدالوهاب الذى تنسب له الوهابية) قام كله (او جله) على اخبار الأحاد ! .... ومن ملاحظاتي أيضا ، أن المحافظين فى التاريخ الإسلامي اتسموا دائما بإنتقائية فيما يقدمونه لطلاب العلم ! فاليوم (وبسببهم) يظن كل المسلمين ان كبار العقول المسلمة آمنت دائما بالقضاء والقدر ، وهو قول غير صحيح ، فهناك عقول مسلمة جبارة كانت ترفض فكرة القضاء والقدر (فرقة "القدرية") ... وهناك مئات الأمثلة على هذه "الإنتقائية" غير العلمية ... والتى أدت بالمسلمين لشكل من النمطية السلبية المنافية لطبيعة المعرفة والثقافة والعلم . ومن أشهر هذه الأمثلة إخفائهم لرأي أبي حنيفة النعمان بخصوص عقوبة المرتد ... فرغم انه لم يرفض العقوبة ، الا انه ابطلها بقوله ان المرتد يستتاب ، وان مدة الإستتابة هى "طول عمر المرتد" !!! ومن ملاحظاتي التى أود أن أعود لها لإيفاءها حقها من البحث ، ان اعظم العقول المسلمة مثل ابن سينا والفارابي وابن رشد (وكثيرين غيرهم) قد إدمغوا جميعا من طرف اتباع المذهب الحنبلي بالكفر !!! ورغم ان رجلا مثل ابن تيمية هو صاحب عقل بالغ المحدودية ولا قبل له بمعالجة القضايا الفلسفية العميقة ، فقد اعطي نفسه الحق ان يكفر رجالا لاشك أن المتابع القادر على فهم أوزان الرجال والعقول سيقر بأنهم أساتذة أساتذة أساتذة ابن تيمية .... والخلاصة ، ان . العقل المسلم بسبب حاكم مظلم العقل (هو الخليفة العباسي الثامن "المعتصم") وبسبب علو سلطان ونفوذ أكثر الفقهاء المسلمين "قلة عقل" (أحمد بن حنبل وشراح مذهبه الأساس : إبن تيمية وإبن قيم الجوزية) قد أصابته حالة فريدة من الجمود والخمود والركود ، بل والتكلس والتحول لحفرية من الحفريات . وهى "حفرية فكرية وذهنية وثقافية" لا تشكل خطرا على الإنسانية فحسب ، بل انها تشكل خطرا على المسلمين انفسهم ، إذ تأخذ المسلمين ومجتمعاتهم لحالة عداء ، بل وحرب مع الإنسانية .... ورغم الحالة حالكة الظلام عميقة التأخر شديدة البدائية لعقول ملايين المسلمين المعاصرين الذين تستقطبهم رؤي فكرية لا تمت للعصر وللعلم وللثقافة المعاصرة بأية صلة ، ورغم أن بعضهم يردد مقولات وأفكار ووجهات نظر لا مثيل لها - على سطح الكرة الأرضية اليوم - من التخلف والبدائية والظلامية .... فإنني على يقين ان المستقبل سيشهد زلازلا تهز العقل المسلم وتهد العديد من بناه الأحفورية بما يماثل ما حدث للمسيحية منذ زلزالي مارتن لوثر وكالفن ... وسيصل المسلمون لقناعة بفصل الدين عن الدولة وبفصل الدين عن التشريع الدستوري والقانوني ، بل وسيصلون لفقه يقوم على "خصوص السبب ، لا عموم النص" ، وهو ما سيسمح بآراء جديدة (مناسبة للعصر وللعلم ولمسيرة التقدم الإنساني) فيما يخص المرأة والآخر ... ولكن بيننا وبين الوصول لذلك الأفق الأرقي سنوات وعقود وكفاح مرير لنصرة العقل والعلم والتقدم ، ولهزيمة سدنة الرحلة الآثمة التى بدأت مع مجيء حاكم سمح للحنابلة بذبح (بالمعني الحرفي للكلمة) المعتزلة فى أزقة دمشق .... وما زال أهل العقل فى مجتمعاتنا من يومها يذبحون إما حرفيا او مجازا بسلاح دعاة التخلف الذى قل نظيره فى تاريخ الإنسانية ..... كتب هذا المقال فى مدريد ليلة 11 يناير 2012

The Perception of Islam Today

As early as the first century of the Muslim calendar, Islam has known radical sects who demanded blind adherence to their rigid reading of the articles of faith, side by side with mainstream Islam, whose adherents eschew violence and extremism and do not profess to hold a monopoly on Truth. The phenomenon began with the emergence of the Khawarij (Seceders) in 660 AD, (the middle of the first Hejira century), a sect which preached a dogmatic interpretation of Scripture and practiced a version of excommunication by branding those who did not adopt its teachings as heretics. This was the first such sect but by no means the last, and throughout the history of Islam the quiet of religious life was broken many times by marginal groups who tried to impose their extremist views on the majority by violent means.

Alongside the groups and sects whose members insisted on a literal interpretation of holy texts and laid down strict rules governing all aspects of life, there was the general trend represented in the main Sunni schools (the most important being the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafite and Hanbalite, and their offshoots, Al-Laith and Al-Tebarry), as well as the Shiites, who are split into a number of sects. The most important Shiite sect is the Imammeya, or Ithna’ashariyya, (i.e. Twelvers), so called because they accept as imams twelve of the descendants of Ali ibn-Abu Talib (according to their belief, the twelfth imam, who disappeared about 874 AD, is still living and will return). Within this general trend there emerged prominent proponents of deductive reasoning, like the great jurist Abu Hanifa, who accepted just over one hundred of the Prophet’s Hadiths as apostolic precept, as well as uncompromising champions of tradition, like Ahmed ibn-Hanbal, whose book, Al-Musnad, is a compilation of over ten thousand Hadiths. The conservative ibn-Hanbal served as the bulwark of orthodoxy and tradition against any intellectual endeavour, and for a time exerted a considerable hold on public imagination. Although his influence eventually waned, in its heyday tradition reigned supreme and very little room was left for reason. 

The two main disciples of ibn-Hanbal were ibn-Taymiyah and ibn-Qaiym Al-Juzeya, who, like their mentor, allowed no scope for reason or independent thinking, but insisted on a dogmatic adherence to the Hadiths as authoritative sources of all matters spiritual and temporal, laying down strict guidelines to govern every aspect of everyday life. In addition, the world of Islam was the scene of a battle of ideas between Abu Hamid Al-Ghazzali (Algazel), a strict traditionalist who did not believe the human mind capable of grasping the Truth as ordained by God, and Ibn Rushd (Averoess), who championed the primacy of reason. The exponents of these two schools waged a bitter battle in which the first salvo was fired by Al-Ghazzali with his book, The Incoherence of the Philosophers. Ibn Rushd answered with his brilliant treatise in defense of rationality, The Incoherence of the Incoherence. But despite his spirited defense, the outcome of the battle was clearly in Al-Ghazzali’s favour, and the great majority of Islamic jurists adopted his ideas, interpreting the precepts of Islamic law by appeal to the authority of tradition and spurning deductive reasoning altogether. Islamic jurisprudence was dominated by the Mutakallimun, or dialectical theologians, who asserted the primacy of tradition (naql), as advocated by Al-Ghazzali, over that of reason (‘aql), as advocated by Ibn Rushd. But though Ibn Rushd’s ideas were rejected by the Muslim world, they took root strongly in Europe, particularly France, which embraced his vision of the primacy of reason wholeheartedly.

Thus Muslims can be said to have known two different understandings to Islam, as it were, one based on a rigid, doctrinaire interpretation of holy texts and the violent repression of free thought; the other on a moderate and tolerant understanding of Scripture which allowed for the acceptance of the Other. The first was espoused by the secret sects (limited in number and influence) which emerged in remote areas of the Arabian Peninsula and can best be described as the Bedouin model. The second took hold in the more intellectually vibrant climate that prevailed among the peoples descended from ancient civilizations in places like Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and the Levant, which I call the Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model of Islam.

Until the mid-eighteenth century, this was the model adopted by most Muslim communities outside the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula. But that was before the rise of Wahhabism, a puritan revival movement launched by Mohamed ibn-Abdul Wahab from Najd, where he was born in 1703. In 1744, he forged an alliance with the ruler of Al-Dir’iyah, a tribal chieftain by the name of Mohamed ibn-Saud, who became his son-in-law. The alliance led to the first incarnation of the Saudi state, which, by 1804, had expanded to control nearly one million square metres of the Arabian Peninsula. It was a short-lived incarnation, lasting only until 1819, when Mohamed Ali’s son, Ibrahim Pasha, led a military expedition which destroyed Wahhabi power and razed the capital of the first Saudi state, Al-Dir’iyah, to the ground.

Mohamed Ali’s decision to send first his son Tousson then his son Ibrahim Pasha, known for his military skills, to destroy the first Saudi state had implications going far beyond the political or military ambitions of one man. It was in fact an expression of a cultural/civilizational confrontation between the two models of Islam, a confrontation the enlightened Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model decided to take to the heartland of the obscurantist, extremist and fanatical Wahhabi model. Mohamed Ali, who was extremely impressed by the European model of development and saw no contradiction between the mechanisms by which it had come about and his Islamic beliefs, believed the Wahhabi understanding of Islam stood as a major obstacle in the way of the dream he had nurtured since coming to power in 1805 (and until he abdicated in favour of his son Ibrahim in 1848), to place Egypt on a similar road to development.

Years after the defeat inflicted on them by Ibrahim Pasha (who captured their leader and sent him to Egypt, then to Istanbul where he remained until his death), the Saudis reemerged as a political force in the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula. Basing themselves in Riyadh, they began to meddle covertly in political affairs. This placed them on a collision course with the al-Rashid family in Ha’il, and the two sides were soon locked in battle. The Saudis, under the leadership of Abdul Rahman, father of the founder of the current Saudi dynasty, King Abdul Aziz, were defeated in 1891. Abdul Rahman fled to Kuwait with leading members of the House of Saud, where they remained in exile until 1902. During this period, they were the guests of Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabbah, who played an important role in the formation of the young Abdul Aziz. Born in 1876, Abdul Aziz, who came to be known as Ibn Saud, was encouraged in his dream to recapture Riyadh by the ruler of Kuwait. In 1902, Ibn Saud (Abdul Aziz) seized Riyadh and waged a 30-year campaign to assert his dominion over the Arabian Peninsula. In 1925 he entered first Mecca then Medina, and, in September 1932, the 56-year old proclaimed himself king over the Kingdom of Najd and Hejaz, later to become the first kingdom named after its ruling dynasty, Saudi Arabia.

Concomitantly with the birth of the new kingdom, which officially adopted the doctrine of Wahhabism, came the discovery of vast reservoirs of oil under its deserts. This provided the Wahhabis with a virtually endless source of funds which they used to propogate their model of Islam.

Three decades after the creation of Saudi Arabia and the discovery of oil, many things had changed in the world:

• One, Saudi Arabia had built up a huge fortune that enabled it to further the cause of Wahhabism not only within its own borders but throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Its efforts proved successful, as many once moderate Muslims were gradually won over to the harsh version of Islam preached by the Wahhabis.
• Two, beginning in the ‘sixties, Egypt suffered a reversal of fortune at all levels, including a decline in its general cultural climate, allowing Wahhabi influence to infiltrate the venerable institution of Al-Azhar. The defeat of June 1967 opened the door wide to groups which espoused the Saudi understanding of Islam and who translated their radical views into political action, often at the point of a gun.
• Three, in the context of the Cold War, the West in general and the United States in particular adopted a number of misguided policies towards the region, including turning a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabi influence in the Arab and Islamic world, and even occasionally supporting radical groups inspired by the Wahhabi doctrine to achieve their own political ends, such as ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The assassination of President Anwar Sadat by an extremist group was a wake-up call which alerted the world to the growth and spread of the Saudi-backed Wahhabi model of Islam and the retreat of the Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model. A succession of similar events attested to the dangerous spread of this model in most societies with a Muslim majority; in Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia. On the morning of September 11, 2001, a group of fanatics belonging to the Wahhabi brand of Islam launched attacks on New York and Washington that illustrated how the members of this sect view the Other in general and Western civilization in particular.

For the average European or American unfamiliar with some of the facts presented in this article, it is easy to believe that Islam, violence and terrorism go hand in hand. But those who have a more thorough grasp of the issue know that this perception of Islam has taken hold only because a puritanical, fundamentalist model of Islam, which was marginal and ineffectual before oil wealth put it on the map, has managed, thanks to petrodollars, to make the world believe that its interpretation of Islam is Islam. 


The doctrinaire version of Islam propounded by the Wahabbis had no followers among the Muslims of the world before the expansion of Saudi influence following the oil boom. Millions of Muslims in Egypt, Turkey, the Levant, Iraq, Indonesia and throughout the world remained immune to the appeal of the fanatical, violent and bloody message of what was a small and obscure sect bred in the intellectually barren landscape of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. All that changed with the massive influx of petrodollars into the coffers of Saudi Arabia, which used its new-found wealth to propagate the message of its home-grown Wahhabi sect with missionary zeal. Hence the emergence of militant Islam as a force to be reckoned with on the world stage, a force that now represents a dangerous threat to world peace, to humanity and to Islam and Muslims. Half a century ago, the Muslims of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey were models of tolerance who believed in a gentle and enlightened Islam that could, and did, coexist peacefully with other religions and cultures. Following the decline in living standards they have suffered since at the hands of despotic and corrupt rulers, they have become easy prey for the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.

The perception of Islam today by many non-Muslims is that it is a fanatical and violent religion. That is a superficial view which ignores the fact that there are two models of Islam, one that is uncompromising and extremist in its views and another that is tolerant, moderate and humanistic. It is also a naïve view that can lead to dangerous decisions like the ones which informed the West’s policies when it turned a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabism and established close links with radical Islamic movements like the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Finally, there is no need to point out to the neutral reader that the existence of Qur’anic texts which can be used to evidence the violence of Islam is unimportant, because there are enlightened interpretations of the same texts which link them to specific circumstances and events. At the end of the day, any text, even if it is divine, requires a human agency to interpret it, and the real test is how the mind elects to interpret it. Moreover, there are also many Qur’anic texts which proscribe the use of violence and aggression against those belonging to other faiths and creeds, and calls on Muslims to treat them fairly and humanely. But texts should not be the focus of debate here, not least because this would allow extremists on the other side to justify their use of violence by invoking Old Testament texts exhorting believers to violence, notably in the Book of Joshua, son of Nun.

What needs to be done at this stage is to champion the cause of enlightenment by supporting moderates and promoting the humanistic understanding of Islam that once prevailed among the vast majority of Muslims. Efforts in this direction must go hand in hand with a counter offensive against the rigid, doctrinaire, even bloodthirsty, version of Islam that first appeared among isolated communities separated from the march of civilization by the impenetrable sand dunes of the Arabian desert. Geographical isolation coupled with a narrow tribal outlook is a lethal mix that cannot possibly shape a humane and tolerant perception of the Other. The time has come for the Saudi government to part ways with Wahhabism and to realize that the alliance between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi dynasty is responsible for the spread of obscurantism, dogmatism and fanaticism, poisoning minds with radical ideas opposed to humanity, progress, civilization, cultural continuity and pluralism, the diversity of opinions and creeds that is one of the most important and enriching features of human life. 

What is needed is the Martin Luther of Islam

أنا على ثقة أن المجتمعات الإسلامية ستشهد مارتن لوثر الإسلام (وربما أكثر من مارتن لوثر) ، وأن صراعا مريرا سيستمر لسنوات (بالأحري لعقود) قبل أن نصل للحالة الصحية والتى تسمح بإنطلاق وإبداع العقل الإنساني ، وهى الحالة التى بدونها لا يمكن حدوث التقدم واللحاق بمسيرة التقدم الإنسانية ... فثقافة الطاعة والتقليد والإتباع التى يروج لها كثير من الإسلاميين بوجه عام والحنابلة وأتباع إبن تيمية وإبن قيم الجوزية والدعوة الوهابية لا يمكن أن تفرز العقل صانع التقدم ... والدليل الأوضح هو حالتنا الراهنة : فحتي أغني المجتمعات الإسلامية تعيش عالة على تجليات العقل الغربي الذى حرر نفسه منذ أكثر من أربعة قرون من ربقة عبودية العقل الإنساني للسلف والتقليد والإتباع والطاعة.

Prisons of the Arab Mind

I have been studying the Arab mindset for the last four decades from several perspectives. For a start, I myself am a product of this Arabic-speaking region and was able to study the phenomenon from the perspective of an 'insider' as it were, as well as from my vantage point as a researcher who has had twenty books published in Arabic and English (including five devoted exclusively to the Arab mindset and Arab culture). I also had the opportunity to interact with the Arab mindset and culture from a different angle during my years as chairman & CEO of a multinational oil company in the Arab region, when I worked in close proximity with the end product of Arab culture, so to speak – the Arabic-speaking worker in the work environment. The fourth and final perspective from which I interacted with Arab culture and the Arab mindset was when I was called upon to lecture to post-graduate students at a number of universities in various Arab countries on subjects related to modern management sciences and techniques. 

The insight into the contemporary Arab mindset that I was able to develop from all these perspectives, in addition to my consuming interest in and close follow-up of the phenomenon over the last four decades, led me to reach the conclusions laid out in my latest book  The Arab Mind Bound. In the book, I describe the Arab mindset as a prisoner held captive within three prisons or shackled with three chains. The first chain is a regressive, dogmatic interpretation of religion that is totally at odds with the realities of the age, with science and civilization. The second is a culture that is not only totally divorced from science and progress as a result of Arab history and the geopolitics of the Arabian peninsula, but, more importantly, has produced educational institutions and programmes that, rather than foster the values of progress and humanity, actively promote a xenophobic rejection of these values. The third chain holding the Arab mindset back from embracing the spirit of the age is a philosophical dilemma which renders it unable to develop a proper understanding of progress and modernity, and drives it to reject such notions as an invasion of its cultural specificity and civilizational legacy. 

The first chain weighing the Arab mindset down and preventing it from joining the march of human progress which, according to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, is moving towards the attainment of transcendental idealism, is the regressive, medieval, Bedouin understanding of religion. A large number of modern-day Muslims have never been presented with an interpretation of religion other than the one propagated by the enemies of reason and free thinking, from Ibn Hanbal in the tenth century to the founder of the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance in the Arabian Peninsula in 1744 (Mohamed ibn-Abdul Wahab, the spiritual father of Wahhabism, whose message was merged after his death with the ideas of Abul 'Alaa Al-Mawdoody), to the ideas of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 

More recently, an Islamic state established three quarters of a century ago (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ) took it upon itself not only to stand as the embodiment of this brand of Islam but to export its understanding and spread its message to every corner of the world. In that version of Islam there is no room for the Other (Christian, Jewish, Buddhist or otherwise); there can be no equality between men and women nor peaceful coexistence with others, no possibility of allowing the human mind to explore new horizons, no scope for creativity or imaginative thinking. So firmly entrenched in the past is this harsh and uncompromising brand of Islam that it does not allow for the proper interpretation of the word jihad as meaning the use of force only in self-defense against outside aggression but continues to use the interpretation adopted by Bedouin tribes in the Middle Ages, which is the imposition of their religious beliefs on the whole of humanity by force of arms. 

Nine centuries ago, the world of Islam was the scene of a battle of ideas between two trends. One trend, which upheld the primacy of reason, began with the Mu'tazalites and was taken to new Aristotelian heights by Ibn Rushd, who lived in Andalusia just over eight centuries ago. The other opposed the use of reason in the interpretation of holy texts, upholding orthodoxy and tradition and spurning deductive reasoning altogether. This latter trend had many prominent adherents, including Ahmed ibn-Hanbal, one of the four Sunni imams, and Abu Hamed Al-Ghazzali, the noted Islamic jurist. Unfortunately for Muslims, the school which favoured unquestioning adherence to tradition over the use of critical faculties prevailed. The defeat of the school of reason was symbolically represented in the burning of Ibn Rushd's works by the authorities, who elevated the stature of Al-Ghazzali to towering heights by bestowing on him the name " Hujat al Islam " (the authority on Islam). Exalting a man who did not believe the human mind capable of grasping the Truth as ordained by God set into motion a process that continues to this day with devastating effects on the Arab mindset, which has become insular, regressive and unreceptive to new ideas. 

The second chain shackling the Arab mindset is a cultural climate which has encouraged the spread of tribal values, including such negative values as individualism (instead of tolerance) and insularity (instead of open-mindedness). As a result, Arab societies were unable to receive and assimilate the values of pluralism, acceptance of the Other, a belief in the universality of knowledge and science, acceptance of the human rights movement and the movement for women's rights – not to mention an institutional rejection of the most important achievement of human civilization, democracy. Educational systems in Arab societies reflect the prevailing cultural climate, which stands as a barrier between the Arab mindset and the march of human progress. One need only look at the educational systems in force in a country like Saudi Arabia to realize that they are creating generations totally ill equipped to deal with the realities of the age. Indeed, it is enough to see the opinion leaders of that society to realize how strong the organic link between the cultural/educational climate and the insular, backward-looking ethos in some Arab societies. 

Finally, the religious, educational, cultural and media institutions in Arabic-speaking societies have created a mindset that considers the call for progress and modernity a call to accept a cultural invasion and the loss of cultural specificity. 

The problem of Arabic-speaking societies as well as of some non-Arab Muslim societies will not be solved by military confrontations, security measures or economic rewards and/or punishments. None of these measures address the core issue, which is essentially one of culture and knowledge. Accordingly, the most effective way of dealing with the problem is by adopting a level-headed approach based on a thorough understanding of the reasons behind the distinctive characteristics displayed by the contemporary Arab mindset.

 

Ten Random Observations

First Observation: My visits to colleges of Middle Eastern Studies in a number of prestigious European universities were and continue to be a source of great personal joy and enormous intellectual vitality. Some of the most stimulating and enjoyable hours I spent were in the departments of Middle Eastern studies in the universities of Leiden in Holland, Durham in Britain, Heidelberg in Germany and Naples in Italy, among others. On a visit to Calabria University at the southern tip of Italy last March, I had the opportunity to meet with Professor Alberto Ventura, who can rightfully be described as one of Europe’s foremost experts on Sufism in Islam. Our discussion turned to Ibn Rushd, a major influence in my intellectual formation, and to Mohiedine Ibn Araby, whose life and works are the specialized subject of Professor Ventura.

From our discussion I learned something new about the relationship between the two men. I already knew that Ibn Araby was a great admirer of the ideas of Ibn Rushd; what I learned that day was that the two men enjoyed a warm personal friendship. According to Professor Ventura, when Ibn Rushd died in exile, Ibn Araby was the one who handled the burial arrangements, he who wrapped the body in a shroud and carried it on his shoulders to the grave site. There he placed it in a wooden coffin while placing all the deceased’s works in another wooden box. These were then loaded onto the back of a pack animal, the coffin on the right and the book-laden box on the left, the two lashed to a stout pole strapped to the animal’s back. The cortege moved forward followed by Ibn Araby and others in a dramatic scene pregnant with symbolism in which Ibn Rushd’s works balanced the body of the man I believe was the greatest thinker in Islamic history.

As is my wont, I did not take Professor Ventura’s story for granted but on my return delved into the many books written on Ibn Rushd to verify for myself the accuracy of his account. My research confirmed that the Italian professor who had devoted his life to the study of Mohiedine Ibn Araby deserved his reputation as the ultimate authority on the history of Sufism and Sufis. The most interesting aspect of the story is the affinity that existed between a great Sufi and a great thinker, an affinity that is totally lacking in the attitude of Sunni theologians towards the great thinker Ibn Rushd. This is an issue that needs to be looked into in greater depth.

Second Observation: Much has been written about the corruption of ousted president Hosni Mubarak and all the members of his family. But no one has written about the crass ignorance and complete absence of any cultural depth of this thieving despot. In the period between 1986 and 1996, I met him several times when he visited petroleum and natural gas sites belonging to companies I was heading at the time. In the course of those visits, I had the chance to see for myself that Egypt was being ruled by an uncultivated boor. I could well believe that what he took pride in declaring on several occasions was true: the man had never read a serious book in his life. A pastime I indulge in for my own amusement is to paint a picture of the cultural formation of any person I deal with on the basis of the level of their discourse. I was stunned by the way Mubarak spoke, by his crude style and coarse language, and can honestly say he is one of the most ignorant people I have ever spoken to.

The same can be said of his wife, who is even more arrogant and high-handed than her husband, like most children born, like herself, of European mothers. She is also equally shallow and ignorant. Once when I was still chairman of the Heliopolis Library [before I tendered my resignation because of her meddling in the way I managed the library] I organized a Mozart evening on the occasion of the anniversary of the composer’s death on December 5^th. The plan was for the Cairo Symphony Orchestra, under conductor Ahmed el-Saidi, a good friend of mine, to play a number of Mozart’s later works, including the Requiem which he died while composing. When I knew Suzanne Mubarak would be attending the musical evening, I suggested to maestro el-Saidi that he begin with a piece she could understand [if only partially] and perhaps appreciate. Maestro el-Saidi accepted my proposal that the recital begin with Mozart’s 40^th Symphony because it is not as alien to the eastern ear as the Requiem or the works of some composers like Wagner, Liszt or Mendelssohn.  As the second of the four movements of the 40^th Symphony began, Suzanne Mubarak whispered in my ear, “tell him to cut it short”!! I turned my head away pretending not to hear, horrified at the cruel trick fate had played in allowing a bunch of ignorant crooks to rule Egypt, whose name is a shining beacon in the history of nations.

After the “tell him to cut it short” incident, Suzanne Mubarak objected to my inviting Dr. Murad Wahba to give a talk at the Library on “Education in Egypt: from the school of rote memorization to the school of creativity”. I had no choice but to present my resignation (in December 1997) bringing to an end the one hundred sorry days I had spent dealing with a woman whose blind ambition precipitated her husband’s tragic downfall and blackened his name in Egypt’s history as its most ignorant and corrupt ruler in centuries.

Third Observation: I  was asked why I hated Saudi Arabia so much. I replied that I neither hated nor loved it, but that I rejected, condemned, and resisted its pervading cultural climate that it exports to my country, Egypt, as it does to most societies in the world. I reject, condemn and resist the role of the Saudi religious establishment, which I consider to be the root of all evil since the alliance forged between Mohamed Ibn Saud and Mohamed Ibn Abdul Wahab in Al-Dir’iyah in 1955. I reject, condemn and resist the constraints imposed by Saudi men of religion, a caste characterized by extreme ignorance, backwardness and obscurantism, on Saudi women. I reject, condemn and resist the zealotry of the Saudi religious establishment in propagating the Wahabi/Saudi model of Islam, a model that has done more to harm the reputation of Islam and Muslims in the last half of the previous century than anything perpetrated by the so-called enemies of Islam. All of this has nothing to do with the Saudi people or with love or hate. I believe that when the men of deshdasha-land rebel against their anachronistic costumes, particularly the headdress known as the shamagh, which covers not only the head but the mind as well, when the women of that region rebel against the dictum that it is the men who decide what they can and cannot wear, then and only then will their region have taken its first steps towards civilization.

Fourth Observation: One of the things that exasperates me most is the way many in Arabic-speaking societies designate men of religion as ulamas (learned). How can a narrow-minded, ignorant sheikh be described as learned? A man who cannot read-let alone understand- one page of a book by Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Auguste Compte, Kierkegaard, Whitehead, Bertrand Russel, Martin Heidegger, Sartre or John Dewey? How can we use the word ulama to describe someone who doesn’t know whether John Stewart Mill, Ricardo, Malthus, Freud and Durkheim are leading thinkers or automobile brands?

Fifth Observation: In 1914, Taha Hussein, one of the leading lights of enlightenment and reason in all the Arabic-speaking societies, boarded a ship in Alexandria bound for Marseille. In his own words, once the ship set sail, “I removed the turban from my head … and from my heart.” This succinct sentence conveys a powerful message that is self-explanatory.

Sixth Observation: I believe that prosecuting all of Hosni, Suzanne and Gamal Mubarak’s men who dominated Egypt’s political, economic, media and cultural landscape under the ancient regime is the ‘purgatory’ [to use Dante’s term] that will guarantee for the Egyptian people that the black cloud of corruption and despotism under which they have been living for three long decades has finally lifted.

Seventh Observation: In the course of my professional life I met with deposed president Hosni Mubarak quite a few times. Each time I felt a deep sense of shame: how could this ignoramus be the president of a country like Egypt, its name a thing of glory throughout the ages? To this day I cannot understand why Anwar Sadat picked such a shallow, ignorant and uncultured man to be his vice-president. What could have prompted such an ill-founded decision?

Eighth Observation: More than 10 years ago, a senior Egyptian official told me that the interior ministry had finally found an antidote against the poison of the Muslim Brotherhood. I listened with growing amazement as he proceeded to explain that it had been decided to encourage and strengthen the Salafis to hit at the Brotherhood. This is yet another example of the consequences of a ruling caste devoid of any sort of cultural vision for there is no doubt that the Salafis represent a far greater threat to any contemporary society than the Brotherhood. This is just one of countless incidents that attest to the dangerously ignorant leadership that ruled Egypt, the most important country in Africa and the Middle East, for long decades.

Ninth Observation: A few days ago I was walking in Turin when I found myself before the palace of King Victor Emmanuel which stands a few steps away from the Egyptian Museum, home to the largest collection of ancient Egyptian antiquities outside Egypt. As I stood there, I was reminded of the truism that truth is often stranger than fiction. Mohamed Ali, the founder of modern Egypt, sent his grandson Ismail [the son of Ibrahim] who was to rule Egypt from 1863 to 1879, to study in Italy. The young man fell in love with Italy and all things Italian. When he decided to build the Cairo Opera, the first opera in the Middle East, he stipulated that it be an exact replica of the opera house in Turin. When he organized festivities to celebrate the opening of the Suez Canal he commissioned a new opera for the occasion (Giuseppe Verdi’s ‘Aida’). When Britain and France forced him to abdicate in 1879, he went to Turin and placed his youngest son, Ahmed Fouad, (born in 1868, he was to become ruler of Egypt from 1917 until his death in 1936) in the care of King Victor Emmanuel II. Ahmed Fouad was effectively raised in Turin; he attended school in the city and, after graduating from the Military Academy, became an officer in Victor Emmanuel’s royal guards. When he became Sultan of Egypt on October 9^th, 1917, he appointed so many Italians to his household that Italian became the first language of the palace! It was in this atmosphere that Farouk was born and raised so that, not surprisingly, Italian was the language closest to his heart. In a referendum held in May 1946, the Italian people voted to abolish the monarchy forcing the last king of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III, to abdicate. He chose to spend his last years in Alexandria, where he died and is now buried. When Farouk abdicated and left Egypt on July 26^th, 1952, he chose to spend his exile in Italy where he died (probably by poison) on April 18^th, 1965. All this flashed through my mind as I strolled towards the Egyptian museum in Turin, hometown of the House of Savoy.

Tenth Observation: I did not really begin mixing in Egyptian society until 1996. Before then most of my relationships and contacts were with non-Egyptians of all nationalities: European, American, African, Asian, Australian. During those years, I found myself before two options, neither of which was particularly appealing. It was a case of being caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, to be precise, between two circles of people: I shared with the members of one circle cultural, artistic and intellectual interests, while with the other I shared social links. A circle of intellectuals and a circle of class! The members of the first circle were intelligent and highly knowledgeable – but filled with bitterness. The members of the other circle were silly and frivolous – as insipid as a meal of watermelons, to quote Nizar Qabbani.

And so life continues to prove over and over that it is a comedy of errors or, as Tewfik El Hakim put it in the title of the last book he wrote, “The world is a farce.”

 

Thoughts on Sayyid Al-Qemany

سيد القمني أحد أنبغ العقول الكبري بين كل من يكتبون اليوم باللغة العربية . والسواد الأعظم من معارضيه لا يرقون لموقع تلاميذ سيد القمني . الكائنات الأحفورية التى تهاجمه (بعدوانية وشراشة غير متحضرة) ومنهم خالد الجندي هم (معرفيا وثقافيا) محض أقزام يرمون القمني بالحجارة لعل ذلك يرفع من أقدارهم الضيئلة ... فى الحقيقة ، لا مجال لأن تتعايش الثقافة الإسلامية مع البشرية المعاصرة إلا من خلال فكر مستنير (وتنويري) مثل فكر سيد القمني.