Identity at Risk

Famous Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen compared the identity of any people with that of an onion composed of multiple layers. Based on this concept, coming from one of the greatest literary European minds in modern times, the Egyptian identity is similarly constructed from many different layers.  Some of these layers originated in Ancient Egypt and its civilization of 30 centuries. Other layers come from its Coptic era, when Egypt was an entirely Eastern Christian society. Countless layers also come from the Islamic and Arabic speaking Egypt.  Several more layers stem from the modern Egypt established by Mohamed Ali, who ruled Egypt between 1805 and 1848, a state which lasted for a bit more than a century after his death. And finally come the multiple layers produced by Egypt's geographical location as a generally Mediterranean society, and more specifically as an Eastern Mediterranean society.

This complex configuration is based upon undeniable historical and geographical fact. It contains no contradictions. Only simplistic thinking would find contradiction in such complex phenomena.  

This rich and wonderful Egyptian identity, loaded with the fruits of cross- fertilization between varied cultures and civilizations, is presently the subject of a systematic destruction of its constituent elements. Its unique richness and plurality poses a threat to other surrounding societies suffering from a severe lack of such variety.

While the Islamist movement, which is now thrilled to harvest the seeds it has sown in Egypt, is among the realities of the Egyptian society, it represents a grave threat to the complexity and plurality of the Egyptian identity.

The prevalence of conservative schools of thought among most present day Muslim minds (as seen in the thinking of Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya, the Wahabi movement, and the rest of the Salafi trends) is ominous. It makes the possibility of spreading a wave of animosity towards the non-Islamic dimensions of the Egyptian identity imminent. It is enough to note what some say of the monuments of Ancient Egypt, which are one of the greatest ever among all human civilizations. (Salafi leaders such as Abdel-Moneim El-Shahat, who was narrowly defeated by a Muslim Brotherhood candidate in Alexandria, repeatedly suggested that Egypt's Pharaonic treasures should be either destroyed or covered with wax because they were "statues banned by Islam.”) Parallel to that, the existence of “anti-other” values, no matter who this “other” might be, is very possible and very dangerous for an Egyptian identity which is based on plurality.

What I fear the most is that the political movement will change school curricula in a way that highlights the Arab Islamic dimension alone, while destroying all others. This destructive scenario is not that farfetched with the existence of a parliamentary majority of this school of thought now taking over the education committee. As expected from all theocratic entities, they will mostly focus on the Arab Islamic component of the Egyptian identity.

It is sad to note that this trend of aiming to serve a single dimension has already started many years ago with the religious (Islamic) thought taking over those in charge of education in our society. For example, the Arabic language and literature curricula, instead of offering brilliant literary texts of great minds such as Ahmed Lotfy Elsayed, Taha Hussein, Al Aqqad, Al Mazni, Salama Moussa, Tawfiq Al Hakim, Naguib Mahfouz, Youssef Edris, Nezar Qabbani, Al Sayab, Michael Naema, and many others excluded them. That transformed the curricula into religious texts to a point where it becomes hard to distinguish whether they are dealing with Arabic language and literature or Islamic texts.

Lebanese intellectual Amin Maalouf describes any single dimensional identity as a fatal one. His is an accurate and precise description; such a single dimensional identity in our time will very like collide with the values of pluralism and the acceptance of the “other” and the critical mind, let alone its contrast with the idea of our common humanity. I would say to those who repeat “this is the will of the people,” that it was also the will of the German people that brought Hitler to power in Germany eight decades ago, which took a devastating toll on humanity, destroying the lives of more than 50 million people. This example allows us to criticize the current state of the Egyptian culture which threatens the non-Islamic components of the Egyptian identity, and could easily transform us into a single dimensional society (just like the societies of sand around us), even if we’ve come to where we are because of the popular will.  Wrong (as Voltaire said) remains wrong, even if repeated a million times.

* This article was translated from Arabic into English by Mohamed Shedou and revised and edited by Sharon Bussell. The Arabic version was published by the Egyptian daily al-WAFD on 18th April, 2012.

هـــــــــــوية في خطـــر

*   شبه الكاتبُ النرويجي الشهير هنريك إبسن هوية أي شعب بثمرةِ البصل التي تتكون من العديد من الرقائق . وبهذا المفهوم الصادر عن أحد أعظم العقول الأدبية الأوربية في العصور الحديثة والمعتمد من مفكري الإنسانية المتحضرة ، فإن الهوية المصرية هي أيضاً ( مثل البصلة ) تكونت من رقائقِ عدة . فهناك العديد من الرقائق التي مصدرها مصر القديمة التي إستمرت حضارتها لنحو ثلاثين قرناً متصلة . وهناك العديد من الرقائق النابعة من الحقبة القبطية ، عندما كانت مصرُ بأكملها مجتمعاً مسيحياً شرقياً . وهناك رقائق لا تحصى مصدرها مصر الإسلامية ومصر المتكلمة باللغة العربية. وهناك رقائق أخرى عديدة مصدرها مصر الحديثة التي أسسها محمد على الذي حكم مصر من 1805 إلى 1848 ، وإستمرت دولته لأكثر قليلاً من قرِناً بعد وفاته . وهناك أخيراً الرقائق العديدة التي أنتجها موقع مصر الجغرافي كمجتمع من مجتمعات البحر المتوسط  بوجه عام ، وكمجتمع من مجتمعات شرق البحر المتوسط بشكل أكثر خصوصية.

·   هذا التكوين المركب هو حقيقة تاريخية وجغرافية لا شك فيها . وهذه الحقيقة لا تحتوي على تناقضات . فالعقل البدائي والبسيط هو فقط الذي يرى التناقض في الظواهر المركبة .

·   هذه الهوية المصرية الثرية والرائعة والبديعة والعامرة بثمارِ عديدةِ من ثمارِ التلاقح الحضاري والثقافي هي اليوم معرضة لتدمير منهجي ومقصود  لذاتها ومكوناتها ، ولتعدد رقائقها العاكس لأهم الفوارق بين المجتمع المصري ومجتمعات أخرى محيطة شديدة الفقر الحضاري والثقافي  بسبب أحادية أبعاد مكوناتها .

·   ان تيار الإسلام السياسي المنتشي اليوم لأنه على وشك الإستحواذ على مقاليد الأمور في مصر بقدر ما أنه حقيقة من حقائق الواقع المصري ، فإنه أيضاً مصدر خطر داهم على الطبيعة المركبة للهوية المصرية  القائمة على تعددية ثرية.

     

*   فبسبب هيمنة المدارس الفكرية المحافظة على معظم  العقول المسلمة المعاصرة ( مع إستفحال شأن المذهب الحنبلي وطروحات ابن تيمية وابن قيم الجوزية والدعوة الوهابية وسائر التيارات السلفية ) فإن احتمال شيوع وذيوع موجة ثقافية معادية للأبعاد غير الأسلامية من أبعاد الهوية المصرية هو إحتمال وارد وشديد الخطورة . ويكفي ما يردده البعض عن آثار الحضارة المصرية القديمة الأروع بين الحضارات الإنسانية. وبمحاذة ذلك ، فإن شيوعَ قيمٍ مضادة ومعادية للآخر ( أيا كان شكل وكنه هذا الآخر ) هو أمر وارد ومحتمل وشديد الخطورة على  طبيعة الهوية المصرية القائمة على التعددية .

*    وأخشى ماأخشاه ان يتولى التيار السياسي إعادة صياغة برامج التعـــــليم في مصَر بشكل يعُلي من شأن البعد الإسلامي / العربي ، في نـــفــــــــس الوقت الذي يدمـــــــــــر فيه الأبعــــــــاد الأخرى . وهذا الإحــــــــتمال ( المدمر ) غير بعيد عن الواقع في ظل وجود مجلس تشريعي ( برلمان ) يسيطر عليه تيار واحد يهيمن على لجنة التعليم بنسق فكري لا شك في كونه مضاد للتعددية الثقافية ، ولا شك في أنه سيكون شديد الإهتمام بالبعد الإسلامي / العربي وفي الوقت نفسه قليل العناية بالأبعاد الأخرى ( وهو موقف متوقع من أي جهة ثيوقراطية ).

·   والمؤسف ان هذا التوجه لخدمة هوية أحادية البعد قد بدأ بالفعل ومنذ سنوات مع زيادة غلبة التفكير الديني (الإسلامي) على عقول القائمين على التعليم في مجتمعنا .   ويكفي مثال واحد للتدليل على هذا القول وهو ما حدث لمقرارات تعليم اللغة العربية وأدابها . فعوضاً عن تقديم ثمار أدبية يانعة لقامات مثل أحمد لطفي السيد و طه حسين والعقاد والمازني وسلامة موسى وتوفيق الحكيم ونجيب محفوظ ويوسف إدريس ونزار قباني والسيابّ وميخائيل نعيمه وعشرات غيرهم ، تحولت موادُ اللغة العربية إلى دروسٍ دينيةٍ بحيث أصبح من الصعب معرفة هل هذه مقررات مواد اللغة العربية وآدابها أم أنها مقررات مادة الدين الأسلامي .

·      يصف المفكر والأديب اللبناني المعروف أمين معلوف أية هوية أحادية البعد بإنها هوية قاتلة . وهذا وصف دقيق وصائب . فأية هوية أحادية البعد في زماننا هذا مرشحة للصدام مع قيم التعددية وقبول الآخر وإعلاء قيمة العقل النقدي ناهيك عن التضاد مع جوهر فكرة الإنسانية بمعنى إشتراك الحضارات والثقافات المختلفة في أفق أعلى هو أفق الأنسانية . وأقول لمن يكرر مقولة : " ولكنها إرادة الشعب " . لهؤلاء أقول : إن إرادة الشعب الألماني هي أيضاً التي جاءت منذ ثمانية عقود بأدولف هتلر لسدة الحكم في ألمانيا ، وهو ما كلّف البشرية حروبً ومجازرً أودت بأرواحِ أكثر من خمسين مليون إنسان. وهو مثال يسوّغ لنا نقد الحقبة الثقافية الراهنة في مصر والتي تهدد المكـــــــونات غير الأسلامية للهوية المصـــــــــــــرية وتـنذر بتحـــــــــــــولنا إلى مجتمع أحادي الهوية ( كمجتمعات الرمال المحيطة بنا ) حتى لو كنا قد وصلنا لما وصلنا إليه بفعل الإرادة الشعبية . فالخطأ ( كما قال فولتير ) يظل خطأً حتى لو كرره الف ألف إنسان.  

  

The Proliferation of Militant Islam: Who Is Responsible?

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In the years between 1967 and 1973, while I was studying towards a degree in law and a Masters in general and comparative law, I acquired a rudimentary knowledge of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence. Later, while teaching at universities abroad, I set out to develop a wider knowledge of the subject.  In the course of a journey extending over twenty years, I developed a strong aversion for those I call “worshippers of the word” and “prisoners of tradition”, and a profound admiration for the proponents of reason, most notably, of course, Ibn Rushd (Averoess), whose championship of the primacy of reason was adopted by Europe and rejected by the Muslim world. Europe’s gain was our loss: in turning our backs on Ibn Rushd, we lost a historic opportunity for development. A close reading of all Ibn Taymeya’s works, as well as the works of his disciples, from Ibn Qaiym Al-Juzeya to Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab at the end of the eighteenth century, only deepened my aversion towards this trend and my admiration for the Mu’tazalites, who emphasized human responsibility in matters of religion, and for liberal thinkers who chose the path of reason over that of dogma, like Ibn Sinna (Avicenna), Al-Farabi and the leading exponent of this school, Ibn Rushd.


I spent years trying to understand why the Muslims had chosen to follow the line advocated by Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, the proponent of orthodoxy and tradition for whom knowledge meant only knowledge of religion and who cancelled the role of the mind altogether by denying the possibility of acquiring knowledge through intuition, over the line advocated by Ibn Rushd, who upheld the primacy of reason and sowed the seeds of a renaissance we chose not to reap. Why were Al-Ghazali’s ideas so readily accepted while Ibn Rushd’s were rejected? I believe the answer to this paradox can be summed up in one word: despotism. At a time despotism in our part of the world was at its height, it is not surprising that Muslim rulers should have found Al-Ghazali’s ideas more appealing than those of Ibn Rushd. 

The orthodox line was also more appealing to their subjects who, under the yoke of tyranny, found it safer and less demanding to go along with the views of those who required nothing more from them than a suspension of their critical faculties. In Europe, where the forces of enlightenment were locked in a confrontation with the clericalism that stifled intellectual initiative and rational thought, despotism was in retreat. This explains why, in the thirteenth century, a prestigious centre of learning like the University of Paris supported the ideas of the Arab Muslim Ibn Rushd over those of the European Christian Thomas Aquinas, the scholastic philosopher famous for his two-swords doctrine.

Meanwhile, the Muslim world continued to be ruled by despots who brooked no challenge to their authority and an equally despotic religious establishment which decried the use of reason and demanded blind adherence to the authority of tradition. Closely linked as to methods, motivations and goals, these two factors created an atmosphere that was inimical to the unhindered pursuit of knowledge. Still, things were not only either black or white. True, the Muslims lost an historic opportunity to use Ibn Rushd’s ideas as a springboard that could have placed them on a path similar to the one which took Europe from the obscurantist thinking of the thirteenth century to the vigorous intellectual climate which encourages debate, free thinking, general freedoms and creativity in literature, art and science. But it is also true that Muslims have known two “Islams” as it were; one that can be described as the Turkish-Egyptian model and one as the Bedouin model. While the former cannot claim to have attained the level of enlightenment, progressive thinking and freedom that characterizes the ideas of Ibn Rushd, it was nevertheless a gentle and tolerant Islam that could and did coexist with others. Indeed, non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed more protection that any other minority living anywhere else in the world at the time. Under the Ottomans, Christians of the Levant and Jews in Arab countries lived in conditions very similar to the ones in which the Muslim subjects of the empire were living. Even when they were persecuted by certain rulers, like Al-Hakem bi Amr Allah, it was part of a general policy that made no distinction between non-Muslims and Muslims. And although this model of Islam can in no way be described as secular, it adopted an enlightened approach to religion, dealing with it as a system of spiritual beliefs rather than as a system that ruled all aspects of life and governed the affairs of society.


Concurrently, an altogether different model of Islam was taking shape among geographically isolated communities living far from coastlines and hence from exposure to the outside world. Their insularity provided an ideal breeding ground for the ideas of Ibn Taymema, Ibn Qaym Al-Juzeya and, towards the end of the eighteenth century, those of Mohamed bin Abdul Wahab. A collision between the two models of Islam was inevitable, and, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, they confronted one another on the field of battle. Under the command of Mohamed Ali’s son, Tousson, then of his other son, Ibrahim, arguably the greatest of the Egyptian ruler’s sons, the Egyptian army, and with it, the more enlightened Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam, emerged victorious.

But the winds of change were blowing throughout the region, and the years that followed were not kind to Turkey and Egypt. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I brought an end to Turkey’s ascendancy, while Egypt’s influence receded as its economy and educational system declined. Meanwhile, the proponents of the model of Islam which demanded a strict adherence to the letter of scripture and slammed the door shut in the face of rationality, suddenly found themselves in control of vast wealth unprecedented in history. This gave them an enormous edge over their moderate rivals and allowed them to extend their influence into the traditional strongholds of the Turkish-Egyptian model of Islam, where they waged a systematic campaign to co-opt establishment personalities and institutions. The success of this campaign found its most salient expression in the emergence of fanatical movements like the Taliban, who interpreted the doctrines of religion on the basis of tradition alone and imposed a scholastic, doctrinal brand of Islam that left no room for the exercise of reason. This sorry state of affairs could have been avoided if the majority of Muslims had supported Ibn Rushd or if conditions had not forced the retreat of the Turkish-Egyptian model.

In numerous lectures I gave in Europe and America, I tried to familiarize people with what I call Egyptian Islam which, until the nineteen forties, stood as a unique example of tolerance and flexibility. Noted for its acceptance of the Other, it was not pathologically obsessed with the fine print of scripture. While recognizing the divine character of the prophetically revealed laws, it also recognized that some of their provisions were formulated in the context of a different time, place and circumstances. Thus divinity was reserved for religion and did not extend to how mortals understood or chose to interpret its strictures. It was tacitly understood that there is a subjective dimension to the interpretation of any text, and that interpretation is necessarily coloured by the interpreter’s cultural formation, knowledge and intellectual abilities.

The voices now raised in the West in general and in the United States in particular to warn against the menace of “militant Islam” would do well to ask themselves a number of important questions:

- Who shut their eyes for many years to a general climate which allowed the militant model of Islam to spread unchecked and forced the civilized, humanistic Turkish-Egyptian model to retreat in disarray as economic conditions and educational institutions declined, leaving the way open to an invasion by the militant model? Who turned a blind eye to these developments for close to thirty years and are today bemoaning the way things have turned out?


- Who in the nineteen fifties and perhaps even earlier invented the dangerous game of using political Islam to create a strategic balance with socialism? (In the seventies, Egypt played the same game with disastrous consequences.)


- Has the West only now realized that there is no room for freedom, democracy, human rights, women’s rights or civil rights in the militant model of Islam? Did it really believe this model to be a shining example of these noble humanistic values in the nineteen sixties, seventies and eighties?


- Why is the dossier of the honeymoon between the United States and the Afghan mujahedeen not being opened? Or, for that matter, the chapter of the close links which political Islam in pre-revolutionary Iran enjoyed with the West, particularly France? And, before that, the relations between political Islam in Egypt and Britain, the occupying power at the time, particularly during the two terms of the Mohamed Mahmoud government (1928 and 1938)?

The critical mind, which is the pride of civilized humanity, imposes an obligation on all of us to answer those questions. It also requires all parties to assume a share of the responsibility for what happened and is continuing to happen. It requires us, further, to look closely into the two models of Islam referred to in this article and ask ourselves which is more capable of joining the march of civilization and living in harmony with the requirements of the age, without abandoning the positive features of our cultural specificity. 


Is it the model engendered by the school of traditionalists, victims of their geographical isolation behind high sand dunes, or the moderate, tolerant, liberal Turkish-Egyptian model? Better still, could we adopt the enlightened model of Ibn Rushd, which helped Western civilization move out of the Dark Ages into the Enlightenment at a time we chose to adopt the thinking of his opponents, thereby allowing ourselves to fall prey to a culture which favours superstition, myths, ignorance and a rabid militancy over education, work, development and brotherhood? 




One may read the full article (Islam Between Copying & Thinking) here.

Thoughts from a fossilized mind....

خواطر عن العقل الأحفوري ... بقلم : طارق حجي ولعت (منذ دراستي للشريعة الإسلامية بشكل معمق ضمن مواد الماجيستير فى القانون منذ أربعين سنة بالتحديد ) بدراسة الفقه الإسلامي . وهو عمل بشري محض صاغ مؤسسه المعروف بالأمام الأعظم أبي حنيفة النعمان تعريفا رائعا له بأنه علم إستنباط الأحكام العملية من أدلتها الشرعية. ولم أكتف بدراسة شاملة ومعمقة للفقه الحنفي والمالكي والشافعي والحنبلي وفقه مذاهب أخري سنية اندثرت مثل فقه الإمام الليث وأبي جعفر الطبري ، وإنما امتد بحثي لسائر فقه الشيعة ، واهمه فقه جعفر الصادق (وهو ابن محمد الباقر بن علي زين العابدين بن الحسين بن علي بن ابي طالب) ، كما شغفت (من باب الفضول ليس إلا) بفقه مذاهب الخوارج الأربعة ، وأهمها فقه الإباضية وفقه الأزارقة ... كما عرجت على موضوع هام فى التاريخ الإسلامي ، وهو موضوع "الفرق" ... ولم اعجب بفرقة كما اعجبت بالمعتزلة ومن إنبثق عنهم (كالزمخشري فى التفسير والجاحظ فى الأدب ... (وسحرني عقل غيلان الدمشقي الذى كان ينكر فكرة القدر ، ويعتبرها نافية لمسئولية الانسان عن اعماله الخيرة والسيئة ... وسأكتب فى يوم من الأيام عن رحلتي فى هذه العوالم والتى بدأت فى السبعينات بسبب إفتتانى بمؤلفات العلامة المصري محمود اسماعيل الرزاق بوجه عام ، وكتاباته الفذة عن الخوارج والقرامطة . ولكنني أكتفي فى هذا المقال بعدد من الملاحظات والأسئلة الملحة . عاش فقهاء المذاهب السنية الأربعة الكبري (أبو حنيفة ومالك ومحمد بن ادريس الشافعي واحمد بن حنبل) ما بين سنة 70 هجرية وسنة 220 هجرية (690 - 840 ميلادية) . ومن الغرائب والعجائب ان الاول كان اكثر تحررا من الثاني ، وان الثاني كان اكثر تحررا من الثالث ، وان الثالث كان اكثر تحررا من الرابع ... وان الرابع كان اكثرهم محافظة وانعدام حرية عقلية امام النص واكثرهم نقلا واقلهم عقلا ! وسأعطي مثالا واحدا : فبينما سوغ ابو حنيفة رفض الفقيه لتأسيس الأحكام على الأحاديث التى تسمى أخبار أحاد" ، فإن مذهب الرابع (احمد بن حنبل ، واشهر شراحه ابن تيمية وابن قيم الجوزية والداعية الذى سار على نهجهم محمد بن عبدالوهاب الذى تنسب له الوهابية) قام كله (او جله) على اخبار الأحاد ! .... ومن ملاحظاتي أيضا ، أن المحافظين فى التاريخ الإسلامي اتسموا دائما بإنتقائية فيما يقدمونه لطلاب العلم ! فاليوم (وبسببهم) يظن كل المسلمين ان كبار العقول المسلمة آمنت دائما بالقضاء والقدر ، وهو قول غير صحيح ، فهناك عقول مسلمة جبارة كانت ترفض فكرة القضاء والقدر (فرقة "القدرية") ... وهناك مئات الأمثلة على هذه "الإنتقائية" غير العلمية ... والتى أدت بالمسلمين لشكل من النمطية السلبية المنافية لطبيعة المعرفة والثقافة والعلم . ومن أشهر هذه الأمثلة إخفائهم لرأي أبي حنيفة النعمان بخصوص عقوبة المرتد ... فرغم انه لم يرفض العقوبة ، الا انه ابطلها بقوله ان المرتد يستتاب ، وان مدة الإستتابة هى "طول عمر المرتد" !!! ومن ملاحظاتي التى أود أن أعود لها لإيفاءها حقها من البحث ، ان اعظم العقول المسلمة مثل ابن سينا والفارابي وابن رشد (وكثيرين غيرهم) قد إدمغوا جميعا من طرف اتباع المذهب الحنبلي بالكفر !!! ورغم ان رجلا مثل ابن تيمية هو صاحب عقل بالغ المحدودية ولا قبل له بمعالجة القضايا الفلسفية العميقة ، فقد اعطي نفسه الحق ان يكفر رجالا لاشك أن المتابع القادر على فهم أوزان الرجال والعقول سيقر بأنهم أساتذة أساتذة أساتذة ابن تيمية .... والخلاصة ، ان . العقل المسلم بسبب حاكم مظلم العقل (هو الخليفة العباسي الثامن "المعتصم") وبسبب علو سلطان ونفوذ أكثر الفقهاء المسلمين "قلة عقل" (أحمد بن حنبل وشراح مذهبه الأساس : إبن تيمية وإبن قيم الجوزية) قد أصابته حالة فريدة من الجمود والخمود والركود ، بل والتكلس والتحول لحفرية من الحفريات . وهى "حفرية فكرية وذهنية وثقافية" لا تشكل خطرا على الإنسانية فحسب ، بل انها تشكل خطرا على المسلمين انفسهم ، إذ تأخذ المسلمين ومجتمعاتهم لحالة عداء ، بل وحرب مع الإنسانية .... ورغم الحالة حالكة الظلام عميقة التأخر شديدة البدائية لعقول ملايين المسلمين المعاصرين الذين تستقطبهم رؤي فكرية لا تمت للعصر وللعلم وللثقافة المعاصرة بأية صلة ، ورغم أن بعضهم يردد مقولات وأفكار ووجهات نظر لا مثيل لها - على سطح الكرة الأرضية اليوم - من التخلف والبدائية والظلامية .... فإنني على يقين ان المستقبل سيشهد زلازلا تهز العقل المسلم وتهد العديد من بناه الأحفورية بما يماثل ما حدث للمسيحية منذ زلزالي مارتن لوثر وكالفن ... وسيصل المسلمون لقناعة بفصل الدين عن الدولة وبفصل الدين عن التشريع الدستوري والقانوني ، بل وسيصلون لفقه يقوم على "خصوص السبب ، لا عموم النص" ، وهو ما سيسمح بآراء جديدة (مناسبة للعصر وللعلم ولمسيرة التقدم الإنساني) فيما يخص المرأة والآخر ... ولكن بيننا وبين الوصول لذلك الأفق الأرقي سنوات وعقود وكفاح مرير لنصرة العقل والعلم والتقدم ، ولهزيمة سدنة الرحلة الآثمة التى بدأت مع مجيء حاكم سمح للحنابلة بذبح (بالمعني الحرفي للكلمة) المعتزلة فى أزقة دمشق .... وما زال أهل العقل فى مجتمعاتنا من يومها يذبحون إما حرفيا او مجازا بسلاح دعاة التخلف الذى قل نظيره فى تاريخ الإنسانية ..... كتب هذا المقال فى مدريد ليلة 11 يناير 2012

The Perception of Islam Today

As early as the first century of the Muslim calendar, Islam has known radical sects who demanded blind adherence to their rigid reading of the articles of faith, side by side with mainstream Islam, whose adherents eschew violence and extremism and do not profess to hold a monopoly on Truth. The phenomenon began with the emergence of the Khawarij (Seceders) in 660 AD, (the middle of the first Hejira century), a sect which preached a dogmatic interpretation of Scripture and practiced a version of excommunication by branding those who did not adopt its teachings as heretics. This was the first such sect but by no means the last, and throughout the history of Islam the quiet of religious life was broken many times by marginal groups who tried to impose their extremist views on the majority by violent means.

Alongside the groups and sects whose members insisted on a literal interpretation of holy texts and laid down strict rules governing all aspects of life, there was the general trend represented in the main Sunni schools (the most important being the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafite and Hanbalite, and their offshoots, Al-Laith and Al-Tebarry), as well as the Shiites, who are split into a number of sects. The most important Shiite sect is the Imammeya, or Ithna’ashariyya, (i.e. Twelvers), so called because they accept as imams twelve of the descendants of Ali ibn-Abu Talib (according to their belief, the twelfth imam, who disappeared about 874 AD, is still living and will return). Within this general trend there emerged prominent proponents of deductive reasoning, like the great jurist Abu Hanifa, who accepted just over one hundred of the Prophet’s Hadiths as apostolic precept, as well as uncompromising champions of tradition, like Ahmed ibn-Hanbal, whose book, Al-Musnad, is a compilation of over ten thousand Hadiths. The conservative ibn-Hanbal served as the bulwark of orthodoxy and tradition against any intellectual endeavour, and for a time exerted a considerable hold on public imagination. Although his influence eventually waned, in its heyday tradition reigned supreme and very little room was left for reason. 

The two main disciples of ibn-Hanbal were ibn-Taymiyah and ibn-Qaiym Al-Juzeya, who, like their mentor, allowed no scope for reason or independent thinking, but insisted on a dogmatic adherence to the Hadiths as authoritative sources of all matters spiritual and temporal, laying down strict guidelines to govern every aspect of everyday life. In addition, the world of Islam was the scene of a battle of ideas between Abu Hamid Al-Ghazzali (Algazel), a strict traditionalist who did not believe the human mind capable of grasping the Truth as ordained by God, and Ibn Rushd (Averoess), who championed the primacy of reason. The exponents of these two schools waged a bitter battle in which the first salvo was fired by Al-Ghazzali with his book, The Incoherence of the Philosophers. Ibn Rushd answered with his brilliant treatise in defense of rationality, The Incoherence of the Incoherence. But despite his spirited defense, the outcome of the battle was clearly in Al-Ghazzali’s favour, and the great majority of Islamic jurists adopted his ideas, interpreting the precepts of Islamic law by appeal to the authority of tradition and spurning deductive reasoning altogether. Islamic jurisprudence was dominated by the Mutakallimun, or dialectical theologians, who asserted the primacy of tradition (naql), as advocated by Al-Ghazzali, over that of reason (‘aql), as advocated by Ibn Rushd. But though Ibn Rushd’s ideas were rejected by the Muslim world, they took root strongly in Europe, particularly France, which embraced his vision of the primacy of reason wholeheartedly.

Thus Muslims can be said to have known two different understandings to Islam, as it were, one based on a rigid, doctrinaire interpretation of holy texts and the violent repression of free thought; the other on a moderate and tolerant understanding of Scripture which allowed for the acceptance of the Other. The first was espoused by the secret sects (limited in number and influence) which emerged in remote areas of the Arabian Peninsula and can best be described as the Bedouin model. The second took hold in the more intellectually vibrant climate that prevailed among the peoples descended from ancient civilizations in places like Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and the Levant, which I call the Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model of Islam.

Until the mid-eighteenth century, this was the model adopted by most Muslim communities outside the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula. But that was before the rise of Wahhabism, a puritan revival movement launched by Mohamed ibn-Abdul Wahab from Najd, where he was born in 1703. In 1744, he forged an alliance with the ruler of Al-Dir’iyah, a tribal chieftain by the name of Mohamed ibn-Saud, who became his son-in-law. The alliance led to the first incarnation of the Saudi state, which, by 1804, had expanded to control nearly one million square metres of the Arabian Peninsula. It was a short-lived incarnation, lasting only until 1819, when Mohamed Ali’s son, Ibrahim Pasha, led a military expedition which destroyed Wahhabi power and razed the capital of the first Saudi state, Al-Dir’iyah, to the ground.

Mohamed Ali’s decision to send first his son Tousson then his son Ibrahim Pasha, known for his military skills, to destroy the first Saudi state had implications going far beyond the political or military ambitions of one man. It was in fact an expression of a cultural/civilizational confrontation between the two models of Islam, a confrontation the enlightened Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model decided to take to the heartland of the obscurantist, extremist and fanatical Wahhabi model. Mohamed Ali, who was extremely impressed by the European model of development and saw no contradiction between the mechanisms by which it had come about and his Islamic beliefs, believed the Wahhabi understanding of Islam stood as a major obstacle in the way of the dream he had nurtured since coming to power in 1805 (and until he abdicated in favour of his son Ibrahim in 1848), to place Egypt on a similar road to development.

Years after the defeat inflicted on them by Ibrahim Pasha (who captured their leader and sent him to Egypt, then to Istanbul where he remained until his death), the Saudis reemerged as a political force in the eastern region of the Arabian Peninsula. Basing themselves in Riyadh, they began to meddle covertly in political affairs. This placed them on a collision course with the al-Rashid family in Ha’il, and the two sides were soon locked in battle. The Saudis, under the leadership of Abdul Rahman, father of the founder of the current Saudi dynasty, King Abdul Aziz, were defeated in 1891. Abdul Rahman fled to Kuwait with leading members of the House of Saud, where they remained in exile until 1902. During this period, they were the guests of Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabbah, who played an important role in the formation of the young Abdul Aziz. Born in 1876, Abdul Aziz, who came to be known as Ibn Saud, was encouraged in his dream to recapture Riyadh by the ruler of Kuwait. In 1902, Ibn Saud (Abdul Aziz) seized Riyadh and waged a 30-year campaign to assert his dominion over the Arabian Peninsula. In 1925 he entered first Mecca then Medina, and, in September 1932, the 56-year old proclaimed himself king over the Kingdom of Najd and Hejaz, later to become the first kingdom named after its ruling dynasty, Saudi Arabia.

Concomitantly with the birth of the new kingdom, which officially adopted the doctrine of Wahhabism, came the discovery of vast reservoirs of oil under its deserts. This provided the Wahhabis with a virtually endless source of funds which they used to propogate their model of Islam.

Three decades after the creation of Saudi Arabia and the discovery of oil, many things had changed in the world:

• One, Saudi Arabia had built up a huge fortune that enabled it to further the cause of Wahhabism not only within its own borders but throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Its efforts proved successful, as many once moderate Muslims were gradually won over to the harsh version of Islam preached by the Wahhabis.
• Two, beginning in the ‘sixties, Egypt suffered a reversal of fortune at all levels, including a decline in its general cultural climate, allowing Wahhabi influence to infiltrate the venerable institution of Al-Azhar. The defeat of June 1967 opened the door wide to groups which espoused the Saudi understanding of Islam and who translated their radical views into political action, often at the point of a gun.
• Three, in the context of the Cold War, the West in general and the United States in particular adopted a number of misguided policies towards the region, including turning a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabi influence in the Arab and Islamic world, and even occasionally supporting radical groups inspired by the Wahhabi doctrine to achieve their own political ends, such as ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The assassination of President Anwar Sadat by an extremist group was a wake-up call which alerted the world to the growth and spread of the Saudi-backed Wahhabi model of Islam and the retreat of the Egyptian/Turkish/Syrian model. A succession of similar events attested to the dangerous spread of this model in most societies with a Muslim majority; in Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia. On the morning of September 11, 2001, a group of fanatics belonging to the Wahhabi brand of Islam launched attacks on New York and Washington that illustrated how the members of this sect view the Other in general and Western civilization in particular.

For the average European or American unfamiliar with some of the facts presented in this article, it is easy to believe that Islam, violence and terrorism go hand in hand. But those who have a more thorough grasp of the issue know that this perception of Islam has taken hold only because a puritanical, fundamentalist model of Islam, which was marginal and ineffectual before oil wealth put it on the map, has managed, thanks to petrodollars, to make the world believe that its interpretation of Islam is Islam. 


The doctrinaire version of Islam propounded by the Wahabbis had no followers among the Muslims of the world before the expansion of Saudi influence following the oil boom. Millions of Muslims in Egypt, Turkey, the Levant, Iraq, Indonesia and throughout the world remained immune to the appeal of the fanatical, violent and bloody message of what was a small and obscure sect bred in the intellectually barren landscape of the eastern Arabian Peninsula. All that changed with the massive influx of petrodollars into the coffers of Saudi Arabia, which used its new-found wealth to propagate the message of its home-grown Wahhabi sect with missionary zeal. Hence the emergence of militant Islam as a force to be reckoned with on the world stage, a force that now represents a dangerous threat to world peace, to humanity and to Islam and Muslims. Half a century ago, the Muslims of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey were models of tolerance who believed in a gentle and enlightened Islam that could, and did, coexist peacefully with other religions and cultures. Following the decline in living standards they have suffered since at the hands of despotic and corrupt rulers, they have become easy prey for the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam.

The perception of Islam today by many non-Muslims is that it is a fanatical and violent religion. That is a superficial view which ignores the fact that there are two models of Islam, one that is uncompromising and extremist in its views and another that is tolerant, moderate and humanistic. It is also a naïve view that can lead to dangerous decisions like the ones which informed the West’s policies when it turned a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabism and established close links with radical Islamic movements like the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Finally, there is no need to point out to the neutral reader that the existence of Qur’anic texts which can be used to evidence the violence of Islam is unimportant, because there are enlightened interpretations of the same texts which link them to specific circumstances and events. At the end of the day, any text, even if it is divine, requires a human agency to interpret it, and the real test is how the mind elects to interpret it. Moreover, there are also many Qur’anic texts which proscribe the use of violence and aggression against those belonging to other faiths and creeds, and calls on Muslims to treat them fairly and humanely. But texts should not be the focus of debate here, not least because this would allow extremists on the other side to justify their use of violence by invoking Old Testament texts exhorting believers to violence, notably in the Book of Joshua, son of Nun.

What needs to be done at this stage is to champion the cause of enlightenment by supporting moderates and promoting the humanistic understanding of Islam that once prevailed among the vast majority of Muslims. Efforts in this direction must go hand in hand with a counter offensive against the rigid, doctrinaire, even bloodthirsty, version of Islam that first appeared among isolated communities separated from the march of civilization by the impenetrable sand dunes of the Arabian desert. Geographical isolation coupled with a narrow tribal outlook is a lethal mix that cannot possibly shape a humane and tolerant perception of the Other. The time has come for the Saudi government to part ways with Wahhabism and to realize that the alliance between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi dynasty is responsible for the spread of obscurantism, dogmatism and fanaticism, poisoning minds with radical ideas opposed to humanity, progress, civilization, cultural continuity and pluralism, the diversity of opinions and creeds that is one of the most important and enriching features of human life. 

Wahabi views on the relationship between men and women

تقوم الذهنية الوهابية فيما يخص العلاقة بين الرجل والمرأة على ركن أساس هو أن المرأة هى مصدر الشر والإغراء ! وهو تفكير عريق فى القدم ، منذ "ألبست" النصوص "المقدسة" وزر ما حاق بأبي البشر آدم من لعنة وأدي لطرده من جنة النعيم وإلقاءه لعذابات الحياة الدنيا ومكابداتها للمرأة ! والغريب ، أن أبسط تحليل لهذه "النظرة" يقود لنتيجة واحدة ، وهى أن مصدر الشر هو الرجل وليس المرأة ... فهو الكائن الهذيل الى لا يسيط...ر على ذاته ورغباته وشهواته ، بل انه أقرب ما يكون للوحش البهيمي الذى ما ان يشم رائحة الدم ، إلا وتحوله غريزته لوحش لا عقل ولا ضمير ولا إرادة له ! فالمؤكد أن الرجل العصري المتعلم والمثقف والمهذب ، لا علاقة له بهذا "الوحش" الذى يبني عليه متدينون كثيرون نظريتهم التى تتوخي حماية هذا الوحش (الذى لا سيطرة له على ذاته ولا عزم أو إرادة أو ضمير له) ... وذلك بتغطية المرأة (كلية) حتى لا يري منها الرجل ما يثيره ، فينبح ! ومن غرائب هذه الذهنية أن المجتمع الذى سيطر على عقله حكام ورجال دين يؤمنون بهذه النظرية (نظرية الرجل الذئب ! ) وقاموا بوضع آلاف المتاريس بين الرجل - الذئب والمرأة - الفريسة - المغرية ، هذا المجتمع هو (تحت سطح البحيرة الزائف والمزور) أكثر المجتمعات إفرازا لأعلي نسبة من العلاقات - الجنسية - الفوضي (بين رجال ونساء ، وبين رجال ورجال وبين نساء ونساء) !!! وهو ما يدل على أن التهذيب الوحيد لهذا الرجل - الذئب (!!) إنما يكون بالتعليم العصري والتربية السيكولوجية السوية