Three Intractable Dilemmas

For the last four decades I have been on a journey of discovery, traveling along the highways and side streets of three cultural/political/historical worlds. First, the world of western culture, its history, philosophies, literature, achievements, and current reality. Second, the world of Arabic-speaking societies, their history, traditions, religious heritage, factions, literature, and current reality. Third, the world of Judaism, which took me on an extensive journey through Jewish scriptures – the Torah, Talmud and other books of the Old Testament; the history of the Jews in general and of German and East European Jews in particular; how the project to establish the modern state of Israel unfolded, from the Dreyfuss affair to the Partition Plan of 29 November 1947, which divided historical Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state; and, finally, the history of Israel from May 1948 to the present day.  One of the conclusions I drew from my journey through these three worlds is that each is living a dilemma that needs to be addressed and resolved. If we are to avoid the negative fallout from the continued existence of these dilemmas, researchers and scholars from around the world should embark on an in-depth study of their underlying causes in order to come up with means of overcoming them.


- The first dilemma concerns the societies of western civilization, specifically the societies of Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia, and is represented by the sharp contradiction between the way they ferociously defend their values on the one hand and their failure to defend these same values outside their geographical borders on the other. For example, while the United States stringently defends its interests and values within its society, it is strangely tolerant of practices outside its borders that are in total opposition to the values it upholds on its domestic front. There are countless examples of this dichotomy but it is sufficient to cite just one of the most glaring. American society, which calls its political leaders to account for any transgression, big or small, has no qualms about dealing with, indeed, befriending, regimes that ride roughshod over values developed over the course of human progress. Thus American society, a vociferous advocate of human rights, women’s rights, transparency and accountability, turns a blind eye to the excesses perpetrated by the rulers of regional allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who violate these values a thousand times a day. I believe that this contradiction is the source of the hatred felt by most Arab societies towards the United States and other western nations. I also believe that it could become a major threat to the very existence of western civilization.



- The second dilemma concerns modern-day Jews. I would like to begin this section by acknowledging certain facts. One, the Jews suffered a great deal over the last two centuries, in ghettos and death camps, from persecution and genocide. Two, their victimization served to energize Jewish men and women scattered throughout the countries of the world and stimulated them to develop remarkable talents. Three, their historical experience led to a dynamic sense of enterprise and allowed them to score great achievements in many fields. But while their collective experience may have equipped them with the tools necessary for survival and preeminence, it has also placed them in a historical impasse. I am talking here of the legacy of fear it has generated. Although I understand the fear, this does not prevent me from realizing that it is one of the main factors preventing the Jews from achieving a genuine peace with the peoples of the region in which they want to live in a state of security. While aspiring to reach a settlement with its geographical surroundings, the legacy of Jewish fear makes Israel insist on achieving all or most of its demands to guarantee the security it craves. This all-or-nothing approach is self-defeating: a negotiator who will settle for nothing less than the fulfillment of all his demands will end up achieving none of them.

Nothing illustrates this attitude better than Golda Meir’s words to Henry Kissinger in 1973, when she told him that it made her very angry if, when she asked Washington for something, she got only 90% of what she wanted!


- As to the third and final dilemma, it concerns the Arabic-speaking peoples of the Middle East. The culture, legacy and traditions of these societies rest on a number of pillars, most notably a strong sense of pride in self, in one’s ancestors, legacy and traditions. For the most part, this pride is grossly exaggerated, not to say unfounded. The poetry written in the vernacular of the Arabian Peninsula is filled with hyperbole, with overblown rhetoric and excessive self-praise, overstating past and present glories (which are mainly imaginary). At the same time, however, this pride is offset by the awareness of the peoples of the region that their contribution to contemporary science and progress is virtually nil. In modern times, the Arabs have made no contributions whatsoever in the fields of medicine, pharmaceuticals, engineering, communication technology, space, arms manufacture or any field of scientific research or technology. Even as they constantly boast of their past and present achievements and heroic exploits, the Arabs know full well that they are forced to buy the fruits of human progress without participating in their creation. This contradiction between an instinctive tendency to brag and the awareness of their modest, not to say non-existent, contribution to the march of human progress creates an unhealthy mental condition in which they exhibit external signs of superiority and grandiosity while in reality suffering from a sense of inadequacy and inferiority. It is a condition that can give rise to fanaticism, violence, terrorism, and paranoia – a feeling that the world is conspiring against them. It also creates feelings of animosity towards humanity at large, of alienation from reality and a sense that there are no solutions to the massive problems they are facing and no hope of catching up with the march of human progress.

First published on 9/16/2011 

The focus of my intellectual project

Plurality is the first and greatest reality of life. It is a realization of the diversity within nature, geography, and organisms, including the multiplicity of human forms, thoughts, and behaviors.

Pluralism obliges us to accept “otherness” for without an acceptance of “the other,” the alternative is rivalry, fighting, and war.

Pluralism and otherness in turn require a belief in and acceptance of a third tenet which is “coexistence.”

These three basic cornerstones: pluralism, otherness, and coexistence necessitate an acceptance of four additional laws, which are:

* Relativity.

* Human Rights.

* Women's rights as human beings who enjoy equal rights (full equality) with men, and any ideas and systems that contradict this are cultural yields of other ages.

* Scientific thinking, as defined in the nineteenth century by the famous French philosopher Auguste Comte, eliminates everything that is not scientifically proven from the circle of scientific thinking to become a “personal matter.”

 

Humanity’s first goal: GOODNESS

It is strange that the meaning or connotations of the expressions “good and evil” differ from the meaning of the expressions “permitted and forbidden.”  Logic dictates they should coincide. But the vast difference between them today confirms it is the “historical”, “manmade”, and “masculine” mind which produced the concepts of “permitted and forbidden” whereas the concepts of “good and evil” have a human dimension to a large extent.

 I invite the reader of this article to review the list of what is counted within the societies of our region as “forbidden” and they will discover specifically what is meant by the “historical”, “manmade” and “masculine” mind which is responsible for codifying the sanctity of dozens and hundreds of things.

 

I have no doubt that the mind which distinguishes between “good” and “evil” is superior cognitively, intellectually, and culturally to the mind which looks at things from the perspective of “permitted” (halal) and “forbidden” (haram).

 

There is also no doubt that the references used by the people of “halal” and “haram” are based not mostly but exclusively on “texts” and the sayings of “those before them” rather than on the basis of reason, thought, and logic.

 

I have never written or spoken the above without my ears ringing with the name of “Abu Hamid al-Ghazali” (died in 1111 AD). He is the one who established in the minds of Muslims in general and in the minds of “jurists” in particular that the human mind is incapable of perceiving these facts on its own!  I devoted fully two years of my life (during the eighties of the last century) on the study of the logic of Al-Ghazali through reading all of his writings.  This was immediately followed by another two years of intensive study into the complete writings which pronounced a contrary (even opposite) logic to that of Al-Ghazali—by whom I mean the logic of Ibn Rushd (died in 1198 AD), which I read with the utmost scrutiny.

 

It is a shame for the people of our region not to honor (deservedly) the works and thinking of Ibn Rushd but rather follow that of two jurists, (neither of whom reaches 1% of the value and stature of Ibn Rushd), namely Ibn Taymiyyah (died in 1328 AD) and Al-Jawziyya (died in 1350 AD).  The reader should also not lose sight of the fact that the hegemony, control, and influence of the clergy class is (absolutely) in full control of defining what is “halal and haram,” thereby guaranteeing their position as the “main reference source” while eliminating the capacity of all others, including senior scholars, thinkers, and encyclopedic intellectuals, from having input on what is permissible and what is not.

 

As is no secret, the logic of “halal and haram” does not allow for the concept of humanity to exist! In contrast, the logic and “good and evil” fully allows for the wide expression of humanity. At its core, the “logic of halal and haram” has and always will be the pillar of the US & THEM mentality with all of its negative consequences.

 

The author of these lines still dreams of an educational, cultural, and intellectual project that promotes the mentality, culture, and logic of “good and evil” using a human formula.  I have even dreamed that the logic of “good and evil” be used as a guide and compass to replace the logic of “halal and haram” as the reference through which one lives a humane life. This cannot be achieved before bringing all jurisprudence in line with the saying of the founder of the science of jurisprudence, Abu Hanifa al Nu’man: “We learned this opinion, so whoever brings us one better, we accept it.”

 

There is no doubt who will fight against this call, including individuals and institutions that will see a reduction in their power and influence, who have used holiness as their first and last reference!

Egypt's Cultural Project--a recent interview with Dr. Suha Ali Ragab

Q: It has been said that the biggest cultural problem Egypt faces is what it takes and what it does not take from Western societies. What is the solution to this problem from your point of view?

A: Western civilization has developed through a combination of what is a cumulative human crop and what is purely European. It is not difficult to differentiate between the two. The values of progress are a cumulative human product of the march of human civilizations. These values are the reason for the progress of Western societies. The most important values of progress are pluralism, altruism (acceptance of the other), coexistence, women's rights, human rights, relativism, secularism, and modern education centered on creativity not indoctrination.  As for the cultures composing Western societies, which are the fruit of the history of these societies, it is neither possible nor logical that this can serve as a guide for Western civilization.

Q: How can cultural industries become a source of national income in Egypt?

A: We are facing a great tragedy when Egypt, with its geographical advantages and historical treasures, is not among the most attractive countries in the world for visitors and tourists. The nature, weather, and beaches of Egypt; ancient Egypt, Coptic Egypt, Mamluk and Ottoman Egypt and modern Egypt are an enormous wealth, which Egyptians can use to achieve economic abundance. 

Q: What are the requirements for the development of cultural industries?

A: What is required, according to the terminology of modern management sciences, is called "vision". Proceeding from this vision, strategies are developed to serve as a reference for a package of policies to take the Egyptian collective mind from its present medieval state to the horizons of modernity.

Q: “We succeeded in ending the organization of the Brotherhood, but the battle is long to eliminate their ideology.” This was your saying. Does this represent an obstacle to Egypt's cultural project 2030?

A:  Yes.  The continuation of this situation finds a society that got rid of the rule of the Brotherhood but did not rise to the horizons of modernity, with the survival of many ideas of fundamentalism common among the sons and daughters of its people. This makes Egypt vulnerable to historical setbacks with a potential for ominous consequences.

Q: In your book "Critique of the Arab Mind," you assert that there are erroneous cultural concepts. What are these concepts?

A:  The most dangerous of these concepts stems from teaching the essence of indoctrination and not scientific thinking and creativity, the rampant religious obsession, the incompleteness of the  civil state and the transgression of some institutions to its borders as part of the Egyptian state.

Q:  What is the role of youth centers and cultural palaces in raising the horizons of modernity?

A:  What youth centers and cultural palaces do is almost "nothing". Ten years ago, I spoke during a televised interview on this very important subject. I said that the total number of these centers and palaces is the same as the number of Egyptian villages, i.e., four thousand. You can imagine what these centers and palaces can do of great cultural work that pulls millions of Egyptians out of the trap of the Brotherhood and the Salafists and their reactionary fundamentalist discourse. But a systematic plan must be put in place to make this happen. And as alienations can be made, so can attraction. They are centers and palaces that must attract audiences with interesting activities such as old and new films and plays, not with lectures that the audience will see as something ridiculous.

Q: How can Egypt’s Cultural Plan 2030 be implemented?

A: I doubt the existence of "vision", "strategies" and "written programs" in the conventional sense of Quality Management. Without that, we will remain in the world of good intentions that cannot achieve the desired end. Therefore, we have to start by setting and formulating these things: vision, strategies, and programs.  This is the only way to create and implement any cultural plan.

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Dr. Suha Ali Ragab conducted with me today the aforementioned talk, which will be published by “Cairo” in its next issue. Cairo is a weekly magazine published by the Egyptian Ministry of Culture.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict Between Reason and Hysteria

 

There are those in the Arab world today who do not recognize Israel’s right to exist in the first place,  and whose ultimate aim is its destruction. Despite our complete rejection of their logic and the premises from which they proceed, and our conviction that they have set themselves a goal that is not only unattainable but one that will bring about unimaginable loss and destruction, we will content ourselves here with  merely expressing our profound disagreement with their viewpoint, without resorting to the mud-slinging tactics they do not hesitate to use against whoever disagrees with them. We want to state for the record that, on the one hand, their logic is seriously flawed and that, on the other, they are, thankfully, in the minority. The vast majority in the Arab world, at the grass roots level and at the level of political movements and organizations, favours a settlement along the lines of the Arab initiative endorsed by the latest Arab summit in Beirut. Initially launched by Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, it was previously known as the Saudi initiative. In other words, the majority of Arabs would like to see a final settlement based, either in absolute or relative terms, on the following five points"

1. The creation of a Palestinian state on all or most of the territory occupied by Israel in June, 1967.
    

2. The establishment of a capital for the Palestinian state in Arab Jerusalem, and an end to Israeli control over important Muslim and Christian holy places.
    

3. A unanimous Arab recognition of Israel, an end to the state of hostility and the establishment of normal political, economic and cultural relations between the Arabs and Israel.
    

4. Removing all Jewish settlements from the Palestinian state, which are a tinder-box waiting for a spark.
    

5. Solving the issue of Palestinian return in a manner acceptable to both parties, not on the basis of the absolute right of return but on the basis of a set of compromise solutions (and indemnity agreements) agreeable to both parties.

It is to this majority that the present article is addressed. If the vision  outlined above is acceptable, it follows that political negotiations conducted around an agenda made up of the five points proposed as the basis for a settlement  are the only way to end this bloody conflict. It also follows that if the Israelis are not ready to conduct peaceful negotiations, the Palestinians are entitled to resort to armed struggle to bring an end to the occupation and achieve their national aspirations. However, I believe the right to armed struggle is subject to limitations, the most important being that it be directed against the occupation forces, a limitation that was strictly observed in the first Palestinian intifada. Overstepping the limits and focusing on suicide operations against civilians inevitably swells the ranks of Israeli refuseniks opposed to a peaceful settlement; it also erodes international sympathy for the Palestinian cause and alienates global players who might otherwise have played a more forceful role.   As I write this article, the BBC has just broadcast a statement by a group of prominent Palestinian intellectuals, including Hanan Ashrawi, condemning the suicide attacks in principle, and accusing them not only of not serving the Palestinian struggle but of provoking a backlash detrimental to the Palestinians. This viewpoint is shared by most of the Palestinian intelligentsia, whether those in the Diaspora or those who did not leave their towns and villages since 1948, who are now known as Israeli Arabs.

In my opinion, and notwithstanding the unforgivable excesses and atrocities committed by the Israeli side, the Arab side  urgently needs to make a sober reappraisal of its positions and policies and to realize that years of allowing itself to be driven by passion, years during which it suspended its critical faculties and turned its back on reason and common sense, has sucked it into a vortex of tragic losses and missed opportunities. For example, if reason had prevailed in 1947, the Arabs would have accepted the Partition Plan; if it had prevailed in 1948, they would not have been led into a war by  leaders who knew, or should have known, that the outcome of a military confrontation would not be in their favour.  Similarly, creating a climate that led to the 1967 war was far from rational. We are still reeling from the devastating effects of that war,  still  scrambling  to recover part of what the Arab side lost in less than one fateful week in June 1967. Lack of reasoned judgement, of the ability to make a sober assessment of political imperatives, manifested itself once again with the stand taken by most of the Arab world against Anwar Sadat in the late nineteen seventies. It was also evident in Yasser Arafat’s  decision to abort the efforts made in Taba in early 2001 to work out an acceptable and balanced framework for a final settlement, when common sense dictated that he accept what was on offer in principle while announcing that a number of issues remained unresolved

This aversion to allowing considerations of rationality and wisdom to prevail is one of the main reasons why Sharon and his like-minded cohorts were able to come to power in Israel in February 2001, running on a platform that defies all modern political norms.  For they represent a political ideology predicated on theological considerations running counter to all that humanity has achieved, invoking what they call ‘religious rights’ and others see as beliefs rooted in mythology and legend to pursue what is clearly a political agenda.

 In focusing on Arab mistakes and miscalculations, I am in no way absolving the Israelis of blame for missed opportunities. A great deal can be said about the number of times Israel has slammed the window of opportunity shut, the way it has seized every chance it could to abort any settlement, starting with Ben Gurion in the early fifties up to Sharon half a century later. But our concern here is with our own mistakes; for it is only by correcting those mistakes that we can hope to move forward.

To that end, we must first review the file of how the Arabs have been dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict from the nineteen forties to the present day in order to avoid repeating the same mistakes. An objective and neutral person looking through the file will discover that the position adopted by the Arab communist parties in 1947 (as well as by a number of prominent Egyptian politicians like Ismail Sidki and Hussein Heikal, even by Mahmoud Fahmy el Nokrashy before he too succumbed to the war fever, and by the renowned thinker and writer Taha Hussein as defined in his literary review, “The Egyptian Writer”) was the most rational and sensible position, even though we  all attacked it in the past. A review of the file will also lead to the inescapable conclusion that the Palestinians are in dire need of a new  leadership that is very different in terms of background and educational and cultural formation from the cadre that came back from Tunisia after Oslo. Not only does the current leadership have a dismal record of missed opportunities, but  it has been instrumental in reinforcing the status of the Israeli right.  To watch the members of the current leadership spouting the resounding slogans of which they are so enamoured is to realize that they are fossils from  another age, exactly like the representatives of the extreme right in Israel, some of whom are even more out of step with the times.     

It is essential for the countries sharing common borders with Israel-Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Egypt- to realize that ending the Arab-Israeli conflict is the gateway through which they need to go before overcoming the many other problems they are facing, the only way they can embark on a process of democratic reform, economic development and social peace and not fall prey to forces opposed to education, civilization and modernity, indeed, to the values of  progress in general. Long before the conflict attained its present unmanageable proportions, that is precisely what the Egyptian Marxists were advocating in 1947 and 1948. We condemned them for their stand, but we now know that theirs was the voice of reason. As we see the predictions they made at the time turning into reality before our eyes, we can only admit that they were among the few whose  vision was rational and far-sighted.   

The time has come to translate this vision into reality. This can only come about if Arab public opinion is made to see that the five points outlined at the beginning of this article, which are the essence of the initiative endorsed by the Arab summit in Beirut, are a matter of life or death for the region. The Arab public must be made to realize the dangers of blindly following the school of ‘big talk’ which has cost the countries and peoples of the region dearly and which is capable of costing them even more if they continue to follow slogans which, though apparently nationalistic or religious, are in essence an invitation to remain in thrall to a conflict  that is destroying the very fabric of our societies.

To that end, we need to focus on forming new generations driven by reason rather than by volcanic passions fuelled by voices which give themselves the right to speak in the name of religion or nationalism. It is a task that is rendered all the more difficult by the victim mentality that has developed in our part of the world, where a deep conviction  has built up over the last few decades in the minds of many  that everything negative in their lives is the result of conspiracies hatched against them by the outside world. True, conflict and competition are facts of life, and the annals of history are rife with conspiracies. But what is certain is that our responsibility for the negative aspects of our life is far greater than that of anyone else. What is also certain is that the world is not made up exclusively of wolves waiting to pounce on us. Here we must have the courage to ask ourselves an important question: Four decades ago, India, China, Japan and Russia (the Soviet Union at the time) supported us on many issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, these countries are not only no longer as close to us as they once were, but have moved closer to Israel than ever before.  Why is that?   The answer to that question holds the key to a solution of many of our problems.  Most societies are concerned today with improving their lot by optimizing their potential in all areas: industry, construction, services, economic life and social welfare. We, for our part, are locked in a time warp. We alone continue to talk in the language of the Cold War, not realizing that no-one today can remain in a cave isolated from the rest of the world. We must wake up from the dream that any country can be important outside its own borders  without  first ensuring that it is internally strong, stable and solid and without contributing to the march of history. Any country that is weak on the domestic front can only be weak on the international front; there can be no exceptions to this rule.

It is all too easy to get caught up in the big talk syndrome, to succumb to the resounding slogans and impossible,  not to say illogical, demands made by those who pass themselves off as warriors battling against impossible odds, when in fact they are nothing but false prophets drawing the gullible into a net of false hopes and dreams. The worst of it is that it is not they who bear the consequences of their irresponsible talk, but the destitute denizens of the refugee camps. What is more difficult is to adopt a position based on reason, common sense and a realistic assessment of the situation, and which does not involve making enemies of influential parties capable of affecting the course of events. Big talk deals with impressions and generalities, common sense with facts and specifics. The record of the former is abysmal; the latter can be the way to a brighter future.

I am well aware that in writing this article I am inviting trouble. The self-appointed knights in shining armour riding on their steeds of big words and empty slogans will rush to fire their arrows of insults against my person and accusations against my integrity.  For personal defamation is the fate of all who dare to cross them, regardless of whether their proposals have any merit. This will not deter me, however, from calling on Arab public opinion and on those responsible for shaping it to turn their backs on meaningless slogans in favour of reason and common sense. It is all too easy to play to the gallery, to tell people what they want to hear. But  the task of any intellectual who is consistent with himself is not to pander to his readers but to write what he believes can contribute to creating a future better than the dark days our region has lived through for over half a century by suspending its critical faculties and allowing meaningless slogans  rather than rationality to shape its destiny.  

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This text is the original English version of an article published in Ha'aretz newspaper in Hebrew on July 5, 2002.

Why Hate America?

I was invited (a few days ago) by one of the most important British political and strategic research centers (in London, where I live) to give a speech in which I try to answer the classic and popular question: Why do billions of people hate the United States of America. This text is my literal account of the words which I delivered, as I attempt to summarize decades of thinking about this question. I hope to have succeeded, in part, in my response to this question, which is one of great importance.

I have visited the United States about forty times since 1985. These visits covered about half of the states as well as most of its regions. I can say that the themes of my visits centered around the following six cities: New York and Washington D.C., Boston, Houston, Dallas, and San Francisco. In these visits, (during my presidency of one of the largest multinational oil companies), I dealt with many large oil leaders in the state of Texas. I visited and spoke in the largest research centers for political and economic studies in Washington D.C. and New York, as well as speaking at more than twenty universities including Princeton, Columbia, California Berkeley (and others). I was also received by the State Department, the National Security Council, and the Congressional Committee on Religious Freedom. Editions of some of my books were also issued in the United States (in Portland, Oregon). Throughout this time, I’ve thought carefully about one of the questions that I heard the most in my life, which is: Why do many people around the world hate the United States? Whenever I heard this, it raised many questions in my mind.  

Why do most young people in societies which hate the United States dream of immigrating to it and becoming Americans? Time spent in dialogue with those haters of America show that most of them are "extremely impressed" with the "American dream,” with “public freedoms in the United States,” with the adherence of all to its constitution and laws, and to the value of the American citizen who is treated “as a human being.” When I hear expressions of hatred and loathing for the United States from many in various parts of the world, including people representing all political, economic, social, educational, cognitive, and cultural spectrums, I am also reminded of two things. The first is that dimension of human nature which makes the inferior exaggerate its criticism for the more advanced and wealthier.  The second is the wellspring of "leftist hatred” of America. It is appropriate for me, in particular, to know the nature, raw material, sources, and goals of this "leftist hatred" as I wrote my first three books on the subject of Marxism!  And the truth is, none of the above succeeded in getting me to share the feelings of these haters of the United States, so that I hate it as they do. 

It is difficult for me not to see aspects of American superiority in dozens of fields, or to ignore the elements that make most of those who hate America dream of immigrating to it and becoming citizens of the United States themselves. 

It is also difficult for a man who knows the subtleties of the techniques of modern management science not to admire the mechanisms of work, creativity, and superiority of American economic entities, or to not admire what American universities are doing in terms of improving science and human lives. However, I cannot deny the presence, urgency, and strength of the important question: Why does the United States receive so much hate from most of humanity? 

During the years of the last decade (2001-2010), the real cause of this hatred began to appear clearly to me.  As I traced it, meditated on it, and examined it, my certainty increased that I discovered the real reason for this hatred, even if no one has yet expressed it clearly, which I hope to now provide in this article.

The source of this hatred is the inability of the leaders of American society to consider the “values of American society” as an integral and organic part of “American interests.” The United States, whose foreign policies serve “American interests,” did not realize, since the United States of America became the largest power on earth on the eve of Japan’s surrender in August 1945, that “the values of American society” must be among and even at the top of the list of “American interests.” The following factors contributed to the exacerbation of this schism between “American values” and “American interests”: 

(1) the pragmatism (purely practical nature and spirit) that characterizes the American mind. 

(2) the relative lack of the American mind in the sense of history and the sense of culture for historical and geographical reasons that do not need clarification. 

(3) The predominance of the financial motive within the American culture. 

As Voltaire said, “the more often a stupidity is repeated, the more it takes on the appearance of wisdom!”  The folly of American politics and politicians since August 1945 was that no one stood up and shouted: Gentlemen-- our values are our most important interests! The dichotomy between the values of American society and its interests is not only the source of this hatred but is also bringing harm to the American states in a way that American politicians still do not understand to this day! 

How do we explain to any human being the relationship of the American administrations for years with the rulers of the banana republics in Latin America? And how do we explain to any sane person the shameful American silence towards violations of human rights, women's rights, and the rights of minorities in the allied societies of the American administrations? How do we explain to any human being the knowledge of the American administrations about the terrifying stories of corruption of its partners around the world, and the silence of these administrations for decades about these amazing cases of corruption? In short: How do we justify to billions of people that what America accepts for non-American peoples, it would never tolerate for 1% of its own citizens!? 

From here stems the hatred, which is definitely justified. The strange thing is that the American political circles do not see this gap between what is accepted abroad and what cannot be accepted at home; that they do not see how this produces huge waves of hatred for the United States, and that they remain blind to the fact that the values of American society should be the cornerstone of American interests and policies.  Excluding the values of American society from the list of American interests will bring enormous harm and huge losses to American society.

London, January 10, 2013

Ezer Weizman : An excerpt from my autobiography

During my many visits to Israel, I met dozens of important Israeli personalities in the political, academic and cultural arenas. A person whom I much admired was Ezer Weizman, who (when I met him for the first time in 1994) was the President of Israel. 

Born in 1924, Ezer Weizman was the nephew of Chaim Weizmann, the first president of the State of Israel, who had a major role in establishing the state in 1948. Ezer Weizman is a great historical figure.

In addition to our meetings at his official office in Jerusalem, I visited his home in Caesarea on several occasions.  I remember that during my first visit there, I saw two side-by-side pictures on a table, one of which was of the former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the other was of his only son Shaul who was struck by a bullet fired from an Egyptian sniper across the Suez Canal. 

On that day, I said to Ezer: two side-by-side photos, one of your son and the second of the supreme commander of the Egyptian army, one of whose soldiers fired a bullet across the Suez Canal from its western bank, hitting your son in the head while he was present as an Israeli soldier near the eastern bank of the Suez Canal! 

Ezer's comment at that moment was: despite the accuracy of your comment, what Anwar Sadat did remains a legendary historical act, one which laid the foundation stone for peace between Israel and Egypt.

The Three Jewish sects: Ashkenazi, Sephardic and Karaite

 

The Ashkenazi Jews or Ashkenazim hail from Germany, Poland, Russia, Ukraine and those communities close to these European countries.

The origin of the Sephardic Jews or the Sephardim is Spain.  However, when Muslims and Jews left Spain together (in 1492 AD) due to their expulsion, the Sephardic Jews spread to several eastern countries, the most important of which were Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt.

As for the Karaite Jews, who are fewer in number than the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim, the majority of them lived in Egypt, Iraq, Turkey and Russia.

The number of Jews in our world today is estimated at 16-17 million, among which approximately 11-12 million are Ashkenazim, 5-6 million are Sephardim, and only one hundred thousand are Karaites.

Between the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim, there are differences regarding a large number of issues within the law (halakhah). However, the differences between them (together) and between the Karaites are much greater.  The Ashkenazim and the Sephardim (together called the Rabbinic Jews) believe in the Torah and the rest of the chapters of the Bible (the Tanakh) as well as the “Talmud” (its two parts: the Mishna and the Gemara) and the Midrash. In contradistinction, the Karaite Jews follow only the 5 chapters comprising the Torah, i.e., Genesis and Exodus, the Book of Leviticus, the Book of Numbers, and the Book of Deuteronomy.

As for the "Mizrahi Jews," they are not a religious sect but rather are Oriental Jews. Their number represents one-fifth of the world's Jewish population as well as half the Jews within the State of Israel. The origin of the word Mizrahim--מִזְרָחִים is derived from the name of Egypt in the Hebrew language: Mizraim: מִצְרַיִם‎. Note that the Mizrahi Jew may be from either the Sephardic tradition or from the Karaite.

 

The Dilemma of “Us” and “Them”

In all cultures, the "us and them" dilemma plays negative roles, but these roles vary.  I tend to believe this dilemma reaches its highest level (i.e., its worst manifestation) in societies with a pastoral history, while it is less acute in agricultural and industrial societies.

During the last half century, a theocratic/religious culture has spread in Arabic-speaking societies.  Because this culture was born in a pastoral environment(s), the mentalities of many in Arabic-speaking societies have become characterized by a culture of hostility towards the "other", even in non-pastoral societies.

If it were up to me, I would make the educational material in our society serve the value of accepting the other and understand the issue of "us and them" in a positive way.  In a society like Egypt, this is not a difficult task.  Egyptian society is not comparable to societies in the same region, with some twenty sects.

The question of the culture of "us and them" and the value of accepting the other is not a secondary issue, but an extremely important and serious one.

A large percentage of the citizens of Arabic-speaking societies today have a non-positive and sometimes even hostile view of the “other” in all its forms including the religious other, the ethnic other, and the other in terms of identity and nationality.

What has happened during the last decade in societies such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and before all of them Lebanon, in terms of fragmentation, rivalry, and divisions that sometimes have reached the point of fighting, was one of the repercussions of the "dilemma of us and them.”

The author of this article has written a lot about the “values of progress.” As such, there is no doubt that all of these values (i.e., the values of progress) are based upon what some call “altruism” and others call “acceptance of the other,” which is the basis of a positive mentality regarding "us and them".  Acceptance of the other is the cornerstone of another very important value: "coexistence".

 

 Written on December 27, 2022.

Jews of Arabic-speaking societies

One of the topics in which I maintain an ongoing interest is that of the "Jews of Arabic-speaking societies." I have read a great deal about them and met many of them as well. There is no doubt that my interest in the Jews of Egypt was the starting point. I then spent years (during the seventies of the last century) in Morocco, during which I became interested in Moroccan Jews. Finally, I developed an interest in the Jews of Iraq. While I could write a book about the Jews of Arabic-speaking societies, I will limit myself here to highlighting one dimension, which is "the Jews of Arabic-speaking societies and the degree of modernity within these societies." The time span for this topic is the period from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the present day. 

A study of the conditions of these societies in general and the condition of Egyptian society in particular confirms the existence of a relationship between the presence of the Jews in these societies and the degree of their modernity. The conditions of Egypt during this era prove the argument which finds the presence and activities of the Jews reflecting the modern trends in Egyptian society. Further, the imposition of an intended (forced) end to the presence of the Jews within Egypt was accompanied by a process of apostasy from modernist tendencies. This argument does not suggest that the Jews within a society, such as within Egypt, were the spearhead of the modernist tendencies, but rather the Jews and their activities were a manifestation of that society’s modernist tendencies. The presence of the Jews was the result of a political, social, and cultural climate characterized by three values: "pluralism", "altruism" (acceptance of the other), and "coexistence".  

Since the fifties of the last century, the prevalence of these values has markedly declined.  This decline has been accompanied by the exodus of most Jews and the beginning of a period of pressure on other Egyptian minorities, foremost among them Christian citizens. There is no doubt that the "citizenship of Egyptian Christians" during the first half of the last century was closer to perfection than the citizenship of Egyptian Christians in the decades following.

The Cornerstones of my Mindset

I know very well the size of the gap between my thinking and the thinking of the majority in Egypt:

~I firmly believe that religion is a personal matter and not a general reference for society.

~I believe in positive laws that change over time.

~I believe in reason, not transmission and intuition.

~I believe in scientific thinking according to its stable definition in the most advanced world since the nineteenth century AD.

~I believe in pluralism, altruism (accepting the other) and coexistence.

~I believe that women are 100% equal to men and that they have all his rights.

~I believe in citizenship as a framework for the relationship of the sons and daughters of society to their country.

~And I believe that non-Muslim Egyptians (primarily the Orthodox Copts) have the same and all the rights of Egyptian Muslims, including the right to occupy any position, including the presidency.

~And I believe that the issues of Egypt are more important to me than the issues of others, including the Palestinian issue.

~I believe in the right of the state to fully supervise all the institutions that the state grants its budgets. This includes state supervision over the education provided by these institutions.

And I know that my belief in these ten things is what makes the gap between my thinking and the thinking of the majority of contemporary Egyptians so great.

But I don't care about that.

My knowledge of history assures me that this is a natural, timeless, and changeable difference. If this difference weakened my resolve, I would have little faith in these ideas. I am sure that “science,” “reason,” “light,” and “progress” stand with me.

 

My essay on the MBs that was published by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Despite the fact that this essay was written six years ago, it could be read as if it was written earlier today.

The-muslim-brotherhoods-past-and-present-an-analysis-of-9-bedford-rows-reports.

DECEMBER 15, 2015DR. TAREK HEGGY - POLITICAL THINKER, AUTHOR OF 30 BOOKS & VISITING PROF AT A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN UNIVERSITIES

The Muslim Brotherhood’s Past and Present: An Analysis of “9 Bedford Row’s” Reports

Over the past four years, a great deal of both scholarly work as well as media analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood has been produced, focusing in particular on its year in power in Egypt. What is striking is how partisan and politicized much of this literature is, particularly since the removal of the Brotherhood from power in 2013. Any mention of the Brotherhood frequently provokes polemical debates between writers and commentators, often falling across an East/West divide. As a result, much of what is published eschews balanced and objective analysis.

It is against this backdrop that I was pleasantly surprised – while undertaking my most recent research project on the history of the Muslim Brotherhood and its year in power in Egypt – to come across two thorough and incisive reports published by the British Nine (9) Bedford Row. The first report on “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood”, comprehensively documents the history and development of the Brotherhood since its establishment in 1928, as well as its organizational structure, ideology and method of expansion. The second report on “The Egyptian Experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Power”, discusses in meticulous detail the reasons for the rise and fall of the Brotherhood between 2012 and 2013.

In this blog post, I will review and discuss some of the most important findings of 9 Bedford Row’s two reports, which highlight many unknown truths about the Brotherhood. It is my firm belief that the Brotherhood never had any intention of establishing a democratic state in Egypt, and that they simply attempted to manipulate democracy to achieve their own ends. The West tends to forget that the Brotherhood abused their year in government to hijack Egypt’s 2011 revolution and to consolidate their rule. Brotherhood figures have continued, to this day, to state that the organization is not committed to Western democratic values, which they believe do not honour the rule of God.

In fact, the Brotherhood’s sinister objectives can only be understood upon closer scrutiny of its history of violence and its ties to Islamic extremist and terrorist groups. The first report by 9 Bedford Row is key to properly understanding this context.

1. The Brotherhood’s History of Violence and ties to terrorism:

Established in Egypt in 1928 to reinstate the Islamic Caliphate dissolved by Kemal Ataturk, ever since its earliest days the Brotherhood has embraced the rhetoric of violence. Hassan El-Banna, the Brotherhood’s founder “demanded controls over all media of communication,” as he regarded theatres, films, radio, popular music, and the press as promoting vice and immorality. He called for strict surveillance of public spaces and heavier punishments for “crimes against morality”. He tolerated and condoned acts of intolerance and violence against religious minorities as well as women who did not wear “correct Islamic attire” (paras 52-55).

Because El-Banna sought to expand the Brotherhood’s reach as far as possible, the movement accommodated and at times encouraged militant and extremist reactionary elements. In fact, he went so far as to express his readiness to declare war against “every leader, every party and every organization” that did not implement the Brotherhood’s programmes (para 59, 63).

Throughout the 1940’s, the Brotherhood’s “Secret Apparatus”, a paramilitary unit established by El-Banna, perpetrated serious acts of political violence. Among those they assassinated were a prominent judge, the Cairo Chief of Police and Egypt’s Prime Minister. In 1954, they attempted to assassinate President Nasser (para 101-113, 140-143).

Even after its was dissolved in December 1948, the Brotherhood turned to more violence, militarization and clandestine action. It remained in the grip of the Secret Apparatus for decades, embracing the jihadist philosophy spearheaded by El-Banna and promoted by his disciple Sayyid Qutb.

Brotherhood splinter groups such as al-Takfir wal Hijra assassinated thinkers who publicly criticized the group’s radical ideology. Tanzim Al-Jihad (established by Al-Qaeda’s second man, Ayman Al-Zawahri – a Brotherhood member), assassinated President Anwar el-Sadat in 1981 after he had signed a Peace Treaty with Israel. These groups as well as others linked to the Brotherhood have also carried out terrorist attacks against tourists and religious minorities.

Equally, the Brotherhood has ties with terrorist organisations established outside Egypt by leading figures within its “international network”. According to 9 Bedford Row’s Report, Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Aballah Yusuf Azzam the three founders of al-Qa’ida were prominent members of the “international network” (para 209, 270-313). All three were strong advocates of Sayyid Qutb’s writings, which formed the basis of their justification for the use of violence both internally and externally (para 211-213, 276, 279).

The Brotherhood’s teachings have been adopted as a reference point for many terrorist organisations that target both Islamic and Western societies and people.

For instance, Article II of the Charter of Hamas states that “The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine. Moslem Brotherhood Movement is a universal organisation which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times. It is characterized by… its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts…the spreading of Islam… and conversion to Islam” (para 15). Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, the mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks was also a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, as was Muhammad Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers. As offshoots of Al-Qaida, ISIS, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab are also indirectly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. All of these groups have cited Sayed Qutb as an inspiration for their actions.

Although the Brotherhood has tried to publicly distance itself from the actions of these groups, it played a central role in providing the ideological framework which forms the core of al-Qa’ida, Daesh, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis, particularly takfirism (the elimination of any deviation from what they consider to be the Islamic Sharia), global jihad (to bring about the rule of God by force), culminating in the establishment of a global Islamic Caliphate.

US counter-terrorism experts have acknowledged that the Brotherhood continues to advocate the use of violence against innocent civilians. Brotherhood members have provided public support for violent acts of terrorism undertaken by militant Islamist groups. These include former Brotherhood Member of Parliament Rajab Hilal Hemeida, who has publicly praised Bin Ladin, Al-Zawahri and Al-Zarqawi, stating that he “supports their activities” and that “terrorism is not a curse when given its true meaning” (para 319). Other leading Brotherhood figures such as Wagdy Ghoneim, Youssef Al-Qaradawi and Mohamed Badie refer to Bin Ladin as a “martyr”, reject the “crusader” alliance to defeat “brothers in ISIL” and advocate the use of both violent jihad against Western governments and peaceful jihad to “eliminate” and “destroy” Western civilization from within (para 263, 320). They also advocate killing so-called “apostates” from Islam, which includes any Muslim person or government that does not subscribe to their radical ideology.

In addition, the Brotherhood was implicated in providing material and financial support to militant organisations, a fact confirmed by European and US investigative authorities and courts, as well as the UN Security Council (paras 337-352). As a result, it was banned in Syria, Iraq, Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Given this legacy and ethos of violence, it is no wonder the Brotherhood and its leadership, up until the time of writing, have been involved in a series of acts of indoctrination, intimidation, subversion of the rule of law, clandestine activity and political violence, including during their year in power and during the mass protests against their rule (para 259). As discussed in more detail below, the Brotherhood’s power grab in Egypt during 2012-2013 and the protests it sparked must be viewed within this much broader context.

          2. The Brotherhood’s Rise to Power and Subsequent Fall

The second report by 9 Bedford Row highlights the distortion and political manipulation that led to Morsi’s rise to power. Within a few months of the revolution, the Brotherhood had established a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), which it claimed was independent (although all party leadership positions were reserved for members of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Council). The party was able, through false promises, to win a majority in parliament (which was subsequently dissolved by the Supreme Constitutional Court – SCC).

Reneging on their promise not to present a candidate in the country’s first presidential election, the Brotherhood nominated Morsi after the disqualification of Khairat El-Shater, its main financier, who had been previously convicted for charges of money laundering and financing of terrorism (para 11-15, 27).

During these presidential elections, a number of challenges undermined the secular/liberal candidates, not least of which was the confusion besetting the electoral map following the revolution, the large number of candidates (which resulted in splitting the secular/liberal vote), the political organisation of the Brotherhood after years of operating clandestinely and subsequently its ability to mobilise its supporters as opposed to other, newly formed, political parties. This is in addition to reports of irregularities, such as electoral bribing, all factors which culminated in Morsi receiving 24.77% of the vote in the first round, thus qualifying for the presidential run-off.

It was during the run-off that voters truly found themselves between a rock and a hard place. They could either vote for Morsi (and hence the Brotherhood) or Ahmed Shafiq, who was widely perceived to be tied to Mubarak’s regime. Large numbers of people boycotted the vote or voted for Morsi to avoid Shafiq. In spite of this, Morsi’s victory was very narrow, securing only 51.73% (para 32-49).

Having secured control of both the executive and legislative branches of government, the Brotherhood proceeded to monopolise the Constitution-drafting process. In a clearly undemocratic process, they appointed 65 Islamists to the one hundred member Constituent Assembly, leaving only 16 seats to secularists, 5 to Copts and 6 to women. By the time the Assembly’s first session was convened, 25 members had already resigned in protest of the Brotherhood’s dominance, with representatives from the Coptic Orthodox Church resigning shortly thereafter (para 58).

Throughout this process, the Brotherhood’s strategy was “to conceal its true objectives … distorting the true intentions of its political platform to appease the concerns of secular and Christian sects” (para 59). This included making false overtures to women’s equality and minority rights, while condoning violence against both women and Egypt’s Copts and other Christians. It also included openly threatening and intimidating political opponents, secretly releasing convicted Islamist extremists, and embarking on a process of “Islamification” (or rather “Ikhwanisation”) of State institutions

In his less than one-year tenure, Morsi repeatedly exceeded his executive powers and defied the rule of law. Less than two weeks after assuming the Presidency, he flouted Egypt’s SCC by re-instating the Islamist-dominated parliament dissolved by court order. He replaced Egypt’s Prosecutor-General, appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council, with his own appointee, known for his Islamist leanings.

Morsi’s power-grab took new heights when he issued a decree declaring that the judiciary was barred from reviewing his decisions, and in particular barring the SCC from dissolving either parliament or the Constituent Assembly (whose constitutionality was being challenged before the Court) (para 97-112). This was coupled with a rush to appoint Islamist sympathisers to replace those who resigned from the Constituent Assembly. This was intended to allow the Assembly to finalise the constitution before the SCC had a chance to rule on the body’s constitutionality. In a mockery of a process, the draft Constitution was approved within nine days. Brotherhood supporters besieged the SCC to prevent the judges from accessing the building.

Morsi’s decree and his attempt to impose a hastily-drafted, unrepresentative and clearly unacceptable constitution intensified the wave of mass protests against his rule. These protests had never ceased throughout his one-year as President. In fact, a report issued by the presidency during Morsi’s last days in office stated that “a total of 24 million people had taken part in 7709 protests and 5821 demonstrations” even before the final mass protests that removed him (para 187).

From 1 May 2013, the Tamarod (Rebellion) campaign started collecting signatures for a petition calling for Morsi’s ouster and for early presidential elections. The petition is reported to have collected more than two million signatures in the first ten days and more than twenty-two million signatures by 29 June 2013. This far outnumbered the 13.2 million votes Morsi won in the presidential elections (para 236). Between 30 June and 3rd July, millions of people took the streets throughout the country, demanding Morsi’s immediate resignation. However, Morsi remained defiant, refusing to bow to the will of the protestors, and even turning a blind eye to increasing incitement to violence from Brotherhood members and supporters.

In fact, during the protests, Morsi contacted Ayman Al-Zawahri and his brother Mohamed, inciting them to rise against the Egyptian army in the Sinai and to compel all jihadi elements to come to the Brotherhood’s aid. Al-Zawahiri promised to “set the Sinai aflame” (First Report, para 328-29). Until this day, terrorist attacks in the Sinai continue to claim innocent lives, destroying many livelihoods and all but crippling Egypt’s tourism industry.

On 1 July, fearing violence and bloodshed between the protestors and the Brotherhood, the army gave Morsi an ultimatum to resign within 48 hours. Two days later, the army announced a political roadmap, naming the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court as interim President (para 263-268).

Conclusion:

Although the Brotherhood purports to present a “moderate” view of Islam, this could not be farther from the truth. The Brotherhood has never embraced democratic principles other than as a vehicle to reach power through their manipulative religious rhetoric. They have openly rejected the civil nature of the state, seeking to impose its rigid and radical views. These were the views decidedly rejected by the majority of Egyptian people in June 2013. God only knows what kind of violence, bloodshed and civil strife could have ensued had the army not taken a stance in favour of the protestors and against the regime. One only needs to look around Egypt to other countries in the region to sense the degree of carnage and chaos that could have ensued.

Egypt is now firmly a state that stands up to, rather then sponsors, finances or condones terrorism. The Muslim Brotherhood that once ruled Egypt has intricate links with other terrorist organisations that have not only wreaked havoc in the Middle East, but have also extended their reach to the United States and Europe, claiming thousands of innocent lives. No country is immune to Islamic extremist terrorism, which has at its core the exclusionary, radical and violent ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that also provides moral, material and financial support to these groups. We should not fall into the trap of dealing with each of these groups in isolation or to discriminate in terms of how we treat them. They all share common origins, a common ideology, and common methods of violence and intimidation. It is only through realizing this fact, and through comprehensively addressing the problem from its roots that we may hope one day to eradicate the scourge of terrorism once and for all.

My watershed moment: 5th June, 1967

A few minutes ago I recorded an interview that shall be broadcast by an Egyptian radio station on 5th June, 2022 about 5th June 1967.

This is what I said in this interview :

The year 1967 was a watershed year in my life. It was there that I began my law studies at the university. And it was the shock that separated me from the thinking/mindset of the herd. 

On a day like this, June 5th, 55 years, ago my search for facts began via scientific thinking tools.

On a day like this 55 years ago my mind started its salvation from many ideas and started getting faraway from dogma, ideologies, and more importantly: from hate !

* this interview was conducted in Arabic, and subsequently translated into English by myself.

This photo is of the section of “Judaism & Israel” in my private library.

700 volumes about :

The Bible.

The Torah.

The Meshnah.

The Gemara.

The Midrash.

The History of the Jewish People.

The History of the Modern Israel Project from 1897 till 29th November, 1947.

The establishment of The State of Israel (14th May, 1948).

The 1948, 1956, 1967 & 1973 Wars.

The Political Life in Israel throughout the past 74 years.

Israeli Literature.

Recent interview conducted by Professor Aryeh Tepper for Sephardi Ideas Monthly

Aryeh Tepper teaches at Ben-Gurion University and is a Visiting Scholar at the Herzl Institute in Jerusalem. He is Chief Editor and Director of Publications for the American Sephardi Federation.

Mr. Heggy recently emailed the following message to his friends and followers:
 
I have 30,000 books in my library in several languages with sections that address all fields within the social sciences, humanities, arts and literature. Not too long ago, a European journalist marveled at one of the largest sections of my library which includes hundreds of books on "religions." In response to a question from him, I said: my country, Egypt, is comprised of more than Muslims, so how can I not try to know all I can about each religion? In 1967, the year I entered the university, an earthquake occurred in my life, the June 5th war. How can I not try to know all that I can about Israel and the Jews?
 
I immersed myself in the study of the Bible with its two covenants. I studied the history of Christianity, the history of the Egyptian Church, and theological issues. As such, my relationship with my fellow Christians became as it is now. And I delved into a study of the Torah and other sacred books of the Jews, the history of the Hebrews and the Jews over the last 40 centuries, the miserable history of the Jews in Europe after the Romans expelled them from the Holy Land in 70 CE until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and the history of Israel since its state was established three years following the end of World War II. As a consequence of these intensive studies, my vision of the Jews and of Israel has become different from those who do not know a fraction of what I mentioned.
 
Sephardi Ideas Monthly: Mr. Heggy, your curious spirit reflects an Egyptian heritage that has been pushed aside by the rise of Political Islam. In your critiques of Political Islam, especially in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, you point to Muhammad Ali's Egypt (1805-1952) as an alternative. Perhaps you could share with our readers what Muhammad Ali's Egypt represents for you: what thrived in Muhammad Ali's Egypt that has been lost?
 
Tarek Heggy: Go back to the Napoleonic conquest at the end of the 18th century. Egyptians were deeply impressed by the new technical wonders that had been developed in France and Europe. Local observers compared Western technological progress with their own condition, and they knew they had much to learn. Muhammad Ali's Egypt accordingly looked northwest. Muhammad Ali himself and his successors did two things simultaneously: they sent hundreds of Egyptians to study things like modern engineering techniques and irrigation systems in Europe, and they employed hundreds of European experts in all Egyptian government departments. Egypt wanted to become open and modern. Amazingly, the first Prime Minister in Modern Egypt was an Armenian, Noubar Pacha (1825-1899).
 
For me, as person who devoted his life and work to advocate for modernity, I can’t be but impressed by this facet of Muhammad Ali's Egypt. However, this openness was aborted by Gamal Abdel Nasser, who aimed to direct the Egyptian mind from the West to pan-Arabism. Then came Anwar Sadat, who opened Egyptian society and culture to Islamist influence. Currently, the influence of Islam on the Egyptian mindset is undeniably the number one influence.

Sephardi Ideas Monthly: Your critical remark about Anwar Sadat opening Egyptian society and culture to Islamist influence is interesting. Outside of Egypt, Sadat is almost exclusively remembered as a brave peacemaker who was tragically assassinated. Your assessment of Sadat is more complex.
 
Tarek Heggy: Six years ago, after her speech to the British parliament, I shared with Mrs. Sadat my multi-layered judgment of Anwar Sadat. Sadat, undeniably, did very well in the October 1973 war with Israel, a war against an army that was much more powerful than his. Without this step, Sadat wouldn’t have been able to do what he did in November 1977 and reach out to Israel. Thanks to that move, Sadat then returned Sinai to Egypt after it was occupied in June 1967. However, while Nasser banned the Muslim Brotherhood, Sadat let the Brotherhood operate in the shadows. Sadat didn't recognize the Brotherhood, but he tried to use them for various political purposes. This de-facto alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood allowed the Brotherhood to grow, and it was a curse that Egypt still suffers from.
 
SIM: And the Muslim Brotherhood actually assumed power during 2012-13. They were ousted, however, by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi following the mass public insurgency of July 2013.  Since assuming power, President El-Sisi has pushed back against Political Islam and, as you like to point out, has called for the renewal of religious discourse in Egypt. El-Sisi's anti-Islamist program is part of the larger regional pushback against Political Islam, but he faces enormous challenges, as the forces of Islamism in Egypt are very strong. How do you assess el-Sisi's situation?
 
TH: President el-Sisi is the first Egyptian political leader to speak about the imperative need to renew the religious discourse. In my opinion, this is precisely what Egypt currently needs before anything else. President el-Sisi is the first head of a state to speak about the necessity of renewing the religious context. It is quite obvious that the Islamic institutions in general and al-Azhar University in particular have rejected this call. As far as Al-Azhar, it advocates what could be described as an alloy of the three Islamist contexts: the Wahhabi, the Salafi and the Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood) contexts. For the sake of perspective, you must remember, nearly a quarter of all Egyptian students receive an Islamic education in schools managed by al-Azhar.  Personally, I believe that President el-Sisi has been very wise in avoiding a societal conflict about this subject. Meanwhile, I do see that there are quantitative changes that might ultimately help him achieve his goal, totally or partially, without an undesired clash with al-Azhar.
 
SIM: Your remark about Al-Azhar is interesting because some have argued that the Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Dr. Ahmad al-Tayeb, played an important role in defeating the Islamists and extremists after el-Sisi took power. That said, some anti-Islamist intellectuals have, like you, argued that Al-Azhar remains very problematic. What is your opinion? Does the Muslim Brotherhood still have a large following at Al-Azhar, despite its outlawed status in Egypt and the public pronouncements of al-Tayeb?
 
TH: I certainly oppose the current role played by Al-Azhar in Egyptian society. Al-Azhar continues to endeavor to set THE TERMS OF REFERENCE with regard to ALL political, cultural, and societal dimensions of our national life. This role that Al-Azhar continues to seek is undeniably supported by Dr. Ahmed al-Tayeb. Despite the fact that Al-Azhar is not formally related to the Wahhabi, the Salafi and Ikhwani streams, they all have common strategic goals. Political Islam movements are different ONLY tactically, yet they are strategically THE SAME ANIMAL.  All of these movements, organizations and groups ultimately aim at an Islamic State that combines all the world’s Muslims and applies constitutional & legal systems based on al Shari’a (Islamic laws). I should also note that it is quite well known that both Al-Azhar and its current Sheikh have never supported Egypt’s President call to modernize religious education.
 
SIM: Your last point about modernizing religious education is a helpful segue to our final question. How can you shape the future of Egyptian culture when the forces of Political Islam are so deeply entrenched in Egyptian society?
 
TH: My forty-year study of Political Islam in general and in Egypt in particular lead me to believe that saving the collective Egyptian mindset from the plague of Political Islam requires hard work that aims for short term results and, at the same time, for a long-term outcome. While the most effective tool for the long-term goal is education, the powerful tool for short-term results is THE MOSQUE & THE PREACHERS. Egypt has some 200,000 Mosques that, altogether per year, witness between 10-11 million Friday sermons. It's an unrivaled platform that can be used for the most destructive or constructive ends.
 

Sephardi Ideas Monthly